3,920 research outputs found
A Graphical Adversarial Risk Analysis Model for Oil and Gas Drilling Cybersecurity
Oil and gas drilling is based, increasingly, on operational technology, whose
cybersecurity is complicated by several challenges. We propose a graphical
model for cybersecurity risk assessment based on Adversarial Risk Analysis to
face those challenges. We also provide an example of the model in the context
of an offshore drilling rig. The proposed model provides a more formal and
comprehensive analysis of risks, still using the standard business language
based on decisions, risks, and value.Comment: In Proceedings GraMSec 2014, arXiv:1404.163
Impact Assessment of Hypothesized Cyberattacks on Interconnected Bulk Power Systems
The first-ever Ukraine cyberattack on power grid has proven its devastation
by hacking into their critical cyber assets. With administrative privileges
accessing substation networks/local control centers, one intelligent way of
coordinated cyberattacks is to execute a series of disruptive switching
executions on multiple substations using compromised supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) systems. These actions can cause significant impacts
to an interconnected power grid. Unlike the previous power blackouts, such
high-impact initiating events can aggravate operating conditions, initiating
instability that may lead to system-wide cascading failure. A systemic
evaluation of "nightmare" scenarios is highly desirable for asset owners to
manage and prioritize the maintenance and investment in protecting their
cyberinfrastructure. This survey paper is a conceptual expansion of real-time
monitoring, anomaly detection, impact analyses, and mitigation (RAIM) framework
that emphasizes on the resulting impacts, both on steady-state and dynamic
aspects of power system stability. Hypothetically, we associate the
combinatorial analyses of steady state on substations/components outages and
dynamics of the sequential switching orders as part of the permutation. The
expanded framework includes (1) critical/noncritical combination verification,
(2) cascade confirmation, and (3) combination re-evaluation. This paper ends
with a discussion of the open issues for metrics and future design pertaining
the impact quantification of cyber-related contingencies
Towards Realistic Threat Modeling: Attack Commodification, Irrelevant Vulnerabilities, and Unrealistic Assumptions
Current threat models typically consider all possible ways an attacker can
penetrate a system and assign probabilities to each path according to some
metric (e.g. time-to-compromise). In this paper we discuss how this view
hinders the realness of both technical (e.g. attack graphs) and strategic (e.g.
game theory) approaches of current threat modeling, and propose to steer away
by looking more carefully at attack characteristics and attacker environment.
We use a toy threat model for ICS attacks to show how a realistic view of
attack instances can emerge from a simple analysis of attack phases and
attacker limitations.Comment: Proceedings of the 2017 Workshop on Automated Decision Making for
Active Cyber Defens
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