Congestion, risk aversion and the value of information

Information about traffic conditions is conveyed to drivers by radio and variable message signs, and more recently available via the Internet and Advanced Traveler Information Systems (ATIS). This has spurred research on how travelers respond to information, how much they are likely to benefit from it and how much they are willing to pay for it. We analyze the decisions of drivers whether to acquire information and which route to take on a simple congested road network. Four information regimes are considered: No information, Free information which is publicly available at no cost, Costly information which is publicly available for a fee, and Private information which is available free to a single individual. We find that Private information is individually more valuable than either Free or Costly information, while the benefits from Free and Costly information cannot be ranked in general. We also find that Free or Costly information can decrease the expected utility of drivers who are sufficiently risk-averse.

Risk aversion, the value of information and traffic equilibrium

Information about traffic conditions has traditionally been conveyed to drivers by radio and variable message signs, and more recently via the Internet and Advanced Traveler Information Systems. This has spurred research on how travelers respond to information, how much they are willing to pay for it and how much they are likely to benefit from it collectively. In this paper we analyze the decisions of drivers whether to acquire information and which route to take on a simple congested road network. Drivers vary in their degree of risk aversion with respect to travel time. Four information regimes are considered: No information, Free information which is publicly available at no cost, Costly information which is publicly available for a fee, and Private information which is available free to a single individual. Private information is shown to be individually more valuable than either Free or Costly information, while the benefits from Free and Costly information cannot be ranked in general. Free or Costly information can decrease the expected utility of drivers who are very risk-averse, and with sufficient risk aversion in the population the aggregate compensating variation for information can be negative.Transportation, route choice, information provision, expected utility, congestion

THEORY AND MISBEHAVIOR OF FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS: THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION FEEDBACK IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS

This article reports the results of a market experiment designed to test the predictions of the constant relative risk aversion model and to study the importance of information feedback in repeated first-price sealed-bid auctions. The data reveal that introduction of price information feedback implies a significant change of individual behavior. Without price information feedback, the data support the risk neutral Nash equilibrium prediction; with price information feedback, on the other hand, subjects overbid the risk neutral Nash equilibrium significantly. The constant relative risk aversion model is rejected since it predicts overbidding for both feedback conditions.Experimental Economics, First-price Sealed-bid Auctions, Independent Private Value Model, Bidding Theory, Risk Aversion

Congestion on risky routes with risk adverse drivers

We study the impact of information on risk adverse drivers who maximize their von Neumann and Morgerstern expected utility (rather than minimizing expected travel time). The preferences of the users are described by their utility functions. Beside the (potentially inconsistent) mean variance model used so far in transportation, we consider three other standard utility functions: the mean standard deviation model, and the CARA and CRRA utility functions. We show that maximization of expected utility provides a more general formulation than minimization of expected travel time (the latter case corresponds to the standard Wardrop principle). We illustrate the proposed approach with a simple network which consists in one origin/one destination and two routes in parallel. Total demand is inelastic. Capacity on one route is constant and on the other route it is stochastic, and depends on the states of nature, with two possible values. We assume that all users have the same value of time but that they differ in their risk aversion parameter. Equilibrium travel time then depends on the distribution of risk aversion. We consider two polar information regimes: no information and full information. We study the differential impacts of information according to the level of risk aversion, and compute the social value of information. We introduce a formula to compute the value of information that is the individual willingness to pay for information (or in economic terms, the compensating variation). Moreover, we find that optimal route choice may depend on global factors (and not only on local traffic conditions). This has serious implications on the design of driver information systems. Finally, we study road pricing when users are risk neutral (and minimize the expected travel time) and when users are risk adverse. We compare the level of tolls, as well as the benefits of road pricing with and without taking into account risk aversion.

Risk aversion, the value of information and traffic equilibrium

Information about traffic conditions has traditionally been conveyed to drivers by radio and variable message signs, and more recently via the Internet and Advanced Traveler Information Systems. This has spurred research on how travelers respond to information, how much they are willing to pay for it and how much they are likely to benefit from it collectively. In this paper we analyze the decisions of drivers whether to acquire information and which route to take on a simple congested road network. Drivers vary in their degree of risk aversion with respect to travel time. Four information regimes are considered: No information, Free information which is publicly available at no cost, Costly information which is publicly available for a fee, and Private information which is available free to a single individual. Private information is shown to be individually more valuable than either Free or Costly information, while the benefits from Free and Costly information cannot be ranked in general. Free or Costly information can decrease the expected utility of drivers who are very risk-averse, and with sufficient risk aversion in the population the aggregate compensating variation for information can be negative

On the Microeconomics of Diversification under Uncertainty and Learning

This paper investigates the microeconomics of diversification, based on a two-period model of an owner-managed firm facing uncertainty. The analysis utilizes a general state-contingent representation of uncertainty and learning. Economies of diversification are defined based on a certainty equivalent, which has three components: expected profit, the risk premium (measuring the cost of risk aversion), and the value of information associated with learning. The influence of scale effects, "trans-ray concavity" effects, and income effects on economies of diversification are examined in detail. We argue that, while scope economies and risk aversion can provide general incentives for diversification, information and learning can have the opposite effect. By integrating scope, risk, and the role of information, our analysis provides new insights on existing economic tradeoffs between firm diversification and specialization.

THE VALUE OF INFORMATION IN HERBICIDE DECISION MAKING FOR WEED CONTROL IN AUSTRALIAN WHEAT CROPS

Most weed control decisions are made with the benefit of some information about weather conditions and actual weed densities. This study is an investigation of the value of adjusting weed control decisions in response to these types of information. For a specific example, it is found that the expected value of information can reach 15% of expected gross margin. The value of information about yield prospects is higher than that for weed density. The value of information is markedly affected by the degree of risk aversion and the type of decision rule adopted. Use of information reduces the expected level of herbicide usage.Crop Production/Industries,

Elements of Decision under Uncertainty with Applications

This work presents the basic elements for the analysis of decision under uncertainty: Expected Utility Theory and its citicisms and risk aversion and its measurement. The concepts of certainty equivalent, risk premium, absolute risk aversion and relative risk aversion, and the "more risk averse than" relation are discussed. The work is completed with several applications of decision making under uncertainty to different economic problems: investment in risky assets and portfolio selection, risk sharing, investment to reduce risk, insurance, taxes and income underreporting, deposit insurance and the value of information

INFORMATION VALUE AND RISK PREMIUM IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION UNDER RISK: THE CASE OF SPLIT NITROGEN APPLICATION FOR CORN

This paper considers an agricultural production model of sequential nitrogen application under risk. Because of random shocks between successive production stages, optimal fertilization decisions depend on the magnitude of farmers' risk aversion (risk premium), and the possibility for farmers to process information (value of information). We propose a joint estimation procedure of technology and risk aversion parameters, using a structural, simulation-based econometric technique. Parameter estimates for the representative farmer's utility function allow to compute both the value of information and the risk premium for farmers. Those account together for about 30 percent of fertilizer cost for Midwest corn producers.Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Risk and Uncertainty,

Heterogeneous Homebuyers, Mortgage Choice and the use of Mortgage Brokers

Choosing a mortgage product in the face of labor income risk, interest rate risk and borrowing constraints is one of the most important decisions facing a household. This paper investigates the choice between a variety of fixed rate mortgages and adjustable rate mortgages. We find that households with a high loan-to-value ratio, risky income and high risk aversion are more likely to choose a fixed rate mortgage. Choosing a mortgage product relies market search and information. The paper finds that in general first-time homebuyers and those with a high loan-to-value ratio are more likely to use a mortgage broker.Mortgage choice,First-time homebuyer,Mortgage broker