AUCTIONING OUTCOME-BASED CONSERVATION CONTRACTS

This paper explores two ideas to enhance the performance of agri-environmental contracting schemes: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and putting the contracts up for tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the benefits of both approaches. Controlled lab experiments were run in two countries, systematically varying the rate at which payments are linked to environmental outcomes. This paper clarifies the conditions under which the benefits from combining tenders with incentive payments outweigh the costs.Conservation tenders, auctions, incentive contracts, agricultural policy, environmental policy, market-based instruments, experimental economics, Auktionen, Ausschreibungsverfahren, Agrar-Umweltverträge, Agrar-Umweltpolitik, Anreizverträge, experimentelle Ökonomie, Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Agricultural Finance, Demand and Price Analysis, Political Economy,

Computing Bayes Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Auction Games via Simultaneous Online Dual Averaging

Auctions are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. Computing equilibria in auction games is computationally hard in general and no exact solution theory is known. We introduce algorithms computing distributional strategies on a discretized version of the game via online convex optimization. One advantage of distributional strategies is that we do not have to make any assumptions on the shape of the bid function. Besides, the expected utility of agents is linear in the strategies. It follows that if our regularized optimization algorithms converge to a pure strategy, then they converge to an approximate equilibrium of the discretized game with high precision. Importantly, we show that the equilibrium of the discretized game approximates an equilibrium in the continuous game. In a wide variety of auction games, we provide empirical evidence that the method approximates the analytical (pure) Bayes Nash equilibrium closely. This speed and precision is remarkable, because in many finite games learning dynamics do not converge or are even chaotic. In standard models where agents are symmetric, we find equilibrium in seconds. The method allows for interdependent valuations and different types of utility functions and provides a foundation for broadly applicable equilibrium solvers that can push the boundaries of equilibrium analysis in auction markets and beyond

Risk preference discrepancy : a prospect relativity account of the discrepancy between risk preferences in laboratory gambles and real world investments

In this article, we presented evidence that people are more risk averse when investing in financial products in the real world than when they make risky choices between gambles in laboratory experiments. In order to provide an account for this discrepancy, we conducted experiments, which showed that the range of offered investment funds that vary in their riskreward characteristics had a significant effect on the distribution of hypothetical funds to those products. We also showed that people are able to use the context provided by the choice set in order the make relative riskiness judgments for investment products. This context dependent relativistic nature of risk preferences is proposed as a plausible explanation of the risk preference discrepancy between laboratory experiments and real-world investments. We also discuss other possible theoretical interpretations of the discrepancy

Metadata Schema x-econ Repository

Since May 2017, the x-hub project partners OVGU Magdeburg, University of Vienna, and GESIS dispose of a new repository, called x-econ (https://x-econ.org). The service is dedicated to all experimental economics research projects to disseminate user-friendly archiving and provision of experimental economics research data. The repository x-econ contains all necessary core functionalities of a modern repository and is in a continuous optimization process aiming at functionality enhancement and improvement. x-econ is also one pillar of the multidisciplinary repository x-science (https://x-science.org). The present documentation, which is primarily based on the GESIS Technical Reports on datorium 2014|03 and da|ra 4.0, lists and explains the metadata elements, used to describe research information

Decision-making and the role of feedback in complex tasks

This thesis investigates the process of decision-making in relation to complex tasks and considers the important role which dynamic information and real-time feedback play in shaping response behaviour and adaptation within such environments. Through empirical studies, the thesis explores the extent to which decision-makers can be said to act rationally when challenged by complex decision-making environments. Evidence relating to demand for information and the impact of feedback on behaviour is provided with two studies: The first uses a simulated auction platform to examine behaviour within overlapping auctions of short duration with close-to-identical items and minimal participation costs. Mouse tracking is used to capture data on relevant interactions of participants with the simulated online platform, including switching behaviour independent of bidding. The resulting data suggests that participants did behave in a manner consistent with utility maximisation, seeking to acquire the item at the lowest possible price and showing no bias in terms of auction preference. The impact of fixed-price offers in the form of a “Buy it Now” option is also examined with some evidence that participants again seek, and respond to, current information when deciding on their bidding strategy. The second study is a test of the impact of real-time feedback and demand for information within the context of financial markets. The study again uses a novel simulated environment which provides access to considerable amounts of relevant data which participants can choose to access. In addition, participants are exposed to regular feedback with regard to their own performance. Overall, demand for information is found to be dependent upon the type of feedback received and its context. Decision-makers then appear to behave objectively, apparently seeking the latest available information to support current decisions, although investor style is found to be important in determining overall trading propensity. The thesis starts by considering a number of the foundations and pathways which run through the judgment and decision-making literature. It is not a complete description, review or analysis of all of the prevailing lines of enquiry. Nevertheless, it seeks to achieve coherence in terms of bringing together some of the key themes dealing with risky choice under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. The field of judgment and decision-making is inevitably vast; its scope owing much to the fact that it transcends individual disciplines. The emergent behavioural sciences thus draw together important strands from various sources, notably Economics and Finance. In many areas, psychological traits can be applied to explain inconsistencies which are found in classical theory of rational behaviour. The recognition of behavioural traits has thus contributed greatly to the evolution of decisionmaking theories under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity which are, in many cases, substantially more adaptable and robust than early normative theories of rational behaviour. The classical approach to rational decision making within Economics, together with some theoretical and empirical challenges to it, are considered in Chapter 1. It is here that we are introduced to the Rational Man. Like the mythical creatures found in Classical Antiquity, the Rational Man does not actually exist in the real world; he is nevertheless central to the concept of utility maximising rational choice which provided much of the foundation of Economics. Developments of expected utility theory (EUT) are considered, including its replacement of expected value, and the formalisation of rational behaviour within the context of axioms. When those logical axioms apply, decision-makers can be said to behave 'as if' they are utility maximises. The chapter ends with some empirical evidence, showing the types of approaches often used to explore rational decision-making. Some violations of EUT are explored, both in relation to notional gambles and consistency with regard to revealed preferences. Chapter 2 extends the narrative by considering rational decision-making in cases where there is no objective information about possible outcomes. Subjective utility theory (SEU) is then introduced, describing objective functions based upon preferences derived from combined utility and probability functions. The implications of the Allais’ and Ellsberg paradoxes are discussed, along with some possible solutions. It is here that we explore the concepts of uncertainty and ambiguity in more details and consider some theoretical formulations for addressing them. Chapter 3 covers the significant contribution to decision-making under conditions of uncertainty provided by Prospect Theory and, later, Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). Their evolution from the pioneering work of Markowitz is discussed within the context of reference points relative to which outcomes can be evaluated. The significance of stochastic dominance and rank dependence are explored. By this stage, we have examined numerous theories which have fundamentally transformed standard EUT into much more flexible and adaptable frameworks of rational choice. The core concepts of utility maximisation remain yet the initial, strictly concave utility function describing diminishing marginal utility is now substantially replaced by more complex weighted preference functions. From this theoretical base, the process of choice reduction and the application of heuristics in decision-making are considered. We again describe axiomatic behaviour compatible with rational choice. Therefore, decision-makers faced with multiple choices about which there may be little or no objective information about likely outcomes can nevertheless develop rational beliefs and expectations which can then be applied to reduce complex tasks to more manageable proportions. As well as considering these aspects from the point of view of actual choices, we also consider the processes by which decisions are taken. Thus, process tracing methods are introduced into the discussion. The chapter also explicitly considers the role of feedback in decision making. This includes a consideration of Bayesian inference as a process for updating probabilistic expectations subject to new information. From considering theoretical formulations form which we can judge rational behaviour, Chapter 5 looks at evidence for sub-optimal decision-making and bias. Bias with regard to probability assessments are considered along with empirical evidence of bias in relation to intertemporal discounting. Sunk cost bias is also considered as a clear example of irrational behaviour, leading in to a specific discussion about a number of persistent behavioural biases identified within financial markets. As an introduction to later chapters, this also covers the basic theoretical principles of market efficiency and evidence that real markets fail to adhere to those principles in important ways. Chapters 6 and 8 describe the empirical studies with Chapter 7 providing a more detailed introduction to the financial markets experiment, considering aspects of market efficiency, models of behaviour and other empirical evidence