14,162 research outputs found

    A General Approach for Securely Querying and Updating XML Data

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    Over the past years several works have proposed access control models for XML data where only read-access rights over non-recursive DTDs are considered. A few amount of works have studied the access rights for updates. In this paper, we present a general model for specifying access control on XML data in the presence of update operations of W3C XQuery Update Facility. Our approach for enforcing such updates specifications is based on the notion of query rewriting where each update operation defined over arbitrary DTD (recursive or not) is rewritten to a safe one in order to be evaluated only over XML data which can be updated by the user. We investigate in the second part of this report the secure of XML updating in the presence of read-access rights specified by a security views. For an XML document, a security view represents for each class of users all and only the parts of the document these users are able to see. We show that an update operation defined over a security view can cause disclosure of sensitive data hidden by this view if it is not thoroughly rewritten with respect to both read and update access rights. Finally, we propose a security view based approach for securely updating XML in order to preserve the confidentiality and integrity of XML data.Comment: No. RR-7870 (2012

    Access Control Synthesis for Physical Spaces

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    Access-control requirements for physical spaces, like office buildings and airports, are best formulated from a global viewpoint in terms of system-wide requirements. For example, "there is an authorized path to exit the building from every room." In contrast, individual access-control components, such as doors and turnstiles, can only enforce local policies, specifying when the component may open. In practice, the gap between the system-wide, global requirements and the many local policies is bridged manually, which is tedious, error-prone, and scales poorly. We propose a framework to automatically synthesize local access control policies from a set of global requirements for physical spaces. Our framework consists of an expressive language to specify both global requirements and physical spaces, and an algorithm for synthesizing local, attribute-based policies from the global specification. We empirically demonstrate the framework's effectiveness on three substantial case studies. The studies demonstrate that access control synthesis is practical even for complex physical spaces, such as airports, with many interrelated security requirements

    Secure Querying of Recursive XML Views: A Standard XPath-based Technique

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    Most state-of-the art approaches for securing XML documents allow users to access data only through authorized views defined by annotating an XML grammar (e.g. DTD) with a collection of XPath expressions. To prevent improper disclosure of confidential information, user queries posed on these views need to be rewritten into equivalent queries on the underlying documents. This rewriting enables us to avoid the overhead of view materialization and maintenance. A major concern here is that query rewriting for recursive XML views is still an open problem. To overcome this problem, some works have been proposed to translate XPath queries into non-standard ones, called Regular XPath queries. However, query rewriting under Regular XPath can be of exponential size as it relies on automaton model. Most importantly, Regular XPath remains a theoretical achievement. Indeed, it is not commonly used in practice as translation and evaluation tools are not available. In this paper, we show that query rewriting is always possible for recursive XML views using only the expressive power of the standard XPath. We investigate the extension of the downward class of XPath, composed only by child and descendant axes, with some axes and operators and we propose a general approach to rewrite queries under recursive XML views. Unlike Regular XPath-based works, we provide a rewriting algorithm which processes the query only over the annotated DTD grammar and which can run in linear time in the size of the query. An experimental evaluation demonstrates that our algorithm is efficient and scales well.Comment: (2011

    Automated Certification of Authorisation Policy Resistance

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    Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) extends traditional Access Control by considering an access request as a set of pairs attribute name-value, making it particularly useful in the context of open and distributed systems, where security relevant information can be collected from different sources. However, ABAC enables attribute hiding attacks, allowing an attacker to gain some access by withholding information. In this paper, we first introduce the notion of policy resistance to attribute hiding attacks. We then propose the tool ATRAP (Automatic Term Rewriting for Authorisation Policies), based on the recent formal ABAC language PTaCL, which first automatically searches for resistance counter-examples using Maude, and then automatically searches for an Isabelle proof of resistance. We illustrate our approach with two simple examples of policies and propose an evaluation of ATRAP performances.Comment: 20 pages, 4 figures, version including proofs of the paper that will be presented at ESORICS 201

    SMOQE: A System for Providing Secure Access to XML

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    XML views have been widely used to enforce access control, support data integration, and speed up query answering. In many applications, e.g., XML security enforcement, it is prohibitively expensive to materialize and maintain a large number of views. Therefore, views are necessarily virtual. An immediate question then is how to answer queries on XML virtual views. A common approach is to rewrite a query on the view to an equivalent one on the underlying document, and evaluate the rewritten query. This is the approach used in the Secure MOdular Query Engine (SMOQE). The demo presents SMOQE, the first system to provide efficient support for answering queries over virtual and possibly recursively defined XML views. We demonstrate a set of novel techniques for the specification of views, the rewriting, evaluation and optimization of XML queries. Moreover, we provide insights into the internals of the engine by a set of visual tools. 1

    Policy based roles for distributed systems security

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    Distributed systems are increasingly being used in commercial environments necessitating the development of trustworthy and reliable security mechanisms. There is often no clear informal or formal specification of enterprise authorisation policies and no tools to translate policy specifications to access control implementation mechanisms such as capabilities or Access Control Lists. It is thus difficult to analyse the policy to detect conflicts or flaws and it is difficult to verify that the implementation corresponds to the policy specification. We present in this paper a framework for the specification of management policies. We are concerned with two types of policies: obligations which specify what activities a manager or agent must or must not perform on a set of target objects and authorisations which specify what activities a subject (manager or agent) can or can not perform on the set of target objects. Management policies are then grouped into roles reflecting the organisation..

    Rewrite based Verification of XML Updates

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    We consider problems of access control for update of XML documents. In the context of XML programming, types can be viewed as hedge automata, and static type checking amounts to verify that a program always converts valid source documents into also valid output documents. Given a set of update operations we are particularly interested by checking safety properties such as preservation of document types along any sequence of updates. We are also interested by the related policy consistency problem, that is detecting whether a sequence of authorized operations can simulate a forbidden one. We reduce these questions to type checking problems, solved by computing variants of hedge automata characterizing the set of ancestors and descendants of the initial document type for the closure of parameterized rewrite rules
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