Towards an Integrated Model of the Mental Lexicon

Several models have been proposed attempting to describe the mental lexicon-the abstract organization of words in the human mind. Numerous studies have shown that by representing the mental lexicon as a network, where nodes represent words and edges connect similar words using a metric based on some word feature, a small-world structure is formed. This property, pervasive in many real-world networks, implies processing efficiency and resiliency to node deletion within the system, explaining the need for such a robust network as the mental lexicon. However, each model considered a single word feature at a time, such as semantic or phonological information. Moreover, these studies modeled the mental lexicon as an unweighted graph. In this thesis, I expand upon these works by proposing a model that incorporates several word features into a weighted network. Analyses on this model applied to the English lexicon show that while this model does not exhibit the same small-world characteristics as a weighted graph, by setting a minimum threshold on the weights (reminiscent of action potential thresholds in neural networks), the resulting unweighted counterpart is a small-world network. These results suggest that a more integrated model of the mental lexicon can be adopted while affording the same computational benefits of a small-world network. An increased understanding of the structure of the mental lexicon can provide a stronger foundation for more accurate computational models of speech and text processing and word-learning

Why not model spoken word recognition instead of phoneme monitoring?

Norris, McQueen & Cutler present a detailed account of the decision stage of the phoneme monitoring task. However, we question whether this contributes to our understanding of the speech recognition process itself, and we fail to see why phonotactic knowledge is playing a role in phoneme recognition.

Rule-based modeling of biochemical systems with BioNetGen

Totowa, NJ. Please cite this article when referencing BioNetGen in future publications. Rule-based modeling involves the representation of molecules as structured objects and molecular interactions as rules for transforming the attributes of these objects. The approach is notable in that it allows one to systematically incorporate site-specific details about proteinprotein interactions into a model for the dynamics of a signal-transduction system, but the method has other applications as well, such as following the fates of individual carbon atoms in metabolic reactions. The consequences of protein-protein interactions are difficult to specify and track with a conventional modeling approach because of the large number of protein phosphoforms and protein complexes that these interactions potentially generate. Here, we focus on how a rule-based model is specified in the BioNetGen language (BNGL) and how a model specification is analyzed using the BioNetGen software tool. We also discuss new developments in rule-based modeling that should enable the construction and analyses of comprehensive models for signal transduction pathways and similarly large-scale models for other biochemical systems. Key Words: Computational systems biology; mathematical modeling; combinatorial complexity; software; formal languages; stochastic simulation; ordinary differential equations; protein-protein interactions; signal transduction; metabolic networks. 1

Remotely close associations: openness to experience and semantic memory structure

Openness to experience—the enjoyment of novel experiences, ideas, and unconventional perspectives—has shown several connections to cognition that suggest open people might have different cognitive processes than those low in openness. People high in openness are more creative, have broader general knowledge, and show greater cognitive flexibility. The associative structure of semantic memory might be one such cognitive process that people in openness differ in. In this study, 497 people completed a measure of openness to experience and verbal fluency. Three groups of high (n = 115), moderate (n = 121), and low (n = 118) openness were created to construct semantic networks—graphical models of semantic associations that provide quantifiable representations of how these associations are organized—from their verbal fluency responses. The groups were compared on graph theory measures of their respective semantic networks. The semantic network analysis revealed that as openness increased, the rigidity of the semantic structure decreased and the interconnectivity increased, suggesting greater flexibility of associations. Semantic structure also became more condensed and had better integration, which facilitates open people’s ability to reach more unique associations. These results were supported by open people coming up with more individual and unique responses, starting with less conventional responses, and having a flatter frequency proportion slope than less open people. In summary, the semantic network structure of people high in openness to experience supports the retrieval of remote concepts via short associative pathways, which promotes unique combinations of disparate concepts that are key for creative cognition

Predictive minds can think: Addressing generality and surface compositionality of thought

Predictive processing framework (PP) has found wide applications in cognitive science and philosophy. It is an attractive candidate for a unified account of the mind in which perception, action, and cognition fit together in a single model. However, PP cannot claim this role if it fails to accommodate an essential part of cognition—conceptual thought. Recently, Daniel Williams (2018) argued that PP struggles to address at least two of thought’s core properties — generality and rich compositionality. In this paper, I show that neither necessarily presents a problem for PP. In particular, I argue that because we do not have access to cognitive processes but only to their conscious manifestations, compositionality may be a manifest property of thought, rather than a feature of the thinking process, and result from the interplay of thinking and language. Pace Williams, both of these capacities, constituting parts of a complex and multifarious cognitive system, may be fully based on the architectural principles of PP. Under the assumption that language presents a subsystem separate from conceptual thought, I sketch out one possible way for PP to accommodate both generality and rich compositionality

Language, Mind, and Cognitive Science: Remarks on Theories of the Language-Cognition Relationships in Human Minds

My dissertation establishes the basis for a systematic outlook on the role language plays in human cognition. It is an investigation based on a cognitive conception of language, as opposed to communicative conceptions, viz. those that suppose that language plays no role in cognition (its only role being to externalize thought). I focus, in Chapter 2, on three paradigmatic theories adopting this perspective, each offering different views on how language contributes to or changes cognition. In Chapter 3, I criticize current views held by dual-process theorists, and I develop a picture of the complex interaction between language and cognition that I deem more plausible by using resources from the literature on the evolution of the faculty of language. Rather than trying to find one general explanation for all cognitive processes, I take seriously the idea that our mind is composed of many subsystems, and that language can interact and modify each in different ways. There is no reason offered in the empirical literature—besides maybe parsimony—that suggest that language has to interact in the same ways with all cognitive processes. Yet, this is seemingly taken for granted, especially within dual-process approaches. On my view, it is a central requirement for a theory of the role of language in cognition to explain how language might have effects, at once, on and within various parts of cognition. In Chapter 4, I explore how this framework can modify how we think about some experiments in psychology, specifically in research on categorization. My idea is that language, once it (or any possible primitive forms) evolved, changed how some cognitive capacities worked and interacted with each other, but did so in more than one or two ways. Cognitive systems are changed in very different ways—sometimes the transformation is very subtle, such as our way of forming categories by using how similar objects are, while other times it is deep and changes the very way the system works