A Lightweight Implementation of NTRUEncrypt for 8-bit AVR Microcontrollers

Introduced in 1996, NTRUEncrypt is not only one of the earliest but also one of the most scrutinized lattice-based cryptosystems and a serious contender in NIST’s ongoing Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization project. An important criterion for the assessment of candidates is their computational cost in various hardware and software environments. This paper contributes to the evaluation of NTRUEncrypt on the ATmega class of AVR microcontrollers, which belongs to the most popular 8-bit platforms in the embedded domain. More concretely, we present AvrNtru, a carefully-optimized implementation of NTRUEncrypt that we developed from scratch with the goal of achieving high performance and resistance to timing attacks. AvrNtru complies with version 3.3 of the EESS#1 specification and supports recent product-form parameter sets like ees443ep1, ees587ep1, and ees743ep1. A full encryption operation (including mask generation and blinding- polynomial generation) using the ees443ep1 parameters takes 834,272 clock cycles on an ATmega1281 microcontroller; the decryption is slightly more costly and has an execution time of 1,061,683 cycles. When choosing the ees743ep1 parameters to achieve a 256-bit security level, 1,539,829 clock cycles are cost for encryption and 2,103,228 clock cycles for decryption. We achieved these results thanks to a novel hybrid technique for multiplication in truncated polynomial rings where one of the operands is a sparse ternary polynomial in product form. Our hybrid technique is inspired by Gura et al’s hybrid method for multiple-precision integer multiplication (CHES 2004) and takes advantage of the large register file of the AVR architecture to minimize the number of load instructions. A constant-time multiplication in the ring specified by the ees443ep1 parameters requires only 210,827 cycles, which sets a new speed record for the arithmetic component of a lattice-based cryptosystem on an 8-bit microcontroller

SoK: Acoustic Side Channels

We provide a state-of-the-art analysis of acoustic side channels, cover all the significant academic research in the area, discuss their security implications and countermeasures, and identify areas for future research. We also make an attempt to bridge side channels and inverse problems, two fields that appear to be completely isolated from each other but have deep connections.Comment: 16 page

A survey of secure middleware for the Internet of Things

The rapid growth of small Internet connected devices, known as the Internet of Things (IoT), is creating a new set of challenges to create secure, private infrastructures. This paper reviews the current literature on the challenges and approaches to security and privacy in the Internet of Things, with a strong focus on how these aspects are handled in IoT middleware. We focus on IoT middleware because many systems are built from existing middleware and these inherit the underlying security properties of the middleware framework. The paper is composed of three main sections. Firstly, we propose a matrix of security and privacy threats for IoT. This matrix is used as the basis of a widespread literature review aimed at identifying requirements on IoT platforms and middleware. Secondly, we present a structured literature review of the available middleware and how security is handled in these middleware approaches. We utilise the requirements from the first phase to evaluate. Finally, we draw a set of conclusions and identify further work in this area

Distributed EaaS simulation using TEEs: A case study in the implementation and practical application of an embedded computer cluster

Internet of Things (IoT) devices with limited resources struggle to generate the high-quality entropy required for high-quality randomness. This results in weak cryptographic keys. As keys are a single point of failure in modern cryptography, IoT devices performing cryptographic operations may be susceptible to a variety of attacks. To address this issue, we develop an Entropy as a Service (EaaS) simulation. The purpose of EaaS is to provide IoT devices with high-quality entropy as a service so that they can use it to generate strong keys. Additionally, we utilise Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) in the simulation. TEE is a secure processor component that provides data protection, integrity, and confidentiality for select applications running on the processor by isolating them from other system processes (including the OS). TEE thereby enhances system security. The EaaS simulation is performed on a computer cluster known as the Magi cluster. Magi cluster is a private computer cluster that has been designed, built, configured, and tested as part of this thesis to meet the requirements of Tampere University's Network and Information Security Group (NISEC). In this thesis, we explain how the Magi cluster is implemented and how it is utilised to conduct a distributed EaaS simulation utilising TEEs.Esineiden internetin (Internet of Things, IoT) laitteilla on tyypillisesti rajallisten resurssien vuoksi haasteita tuottaa tarpeeksi korkealaatuista entropiaa vahvan satunnaisuuden luomiseen. Tämä johtaa heikkoihin salausavaimiin. Koska salausavaimet ovat modernin kryptografian heikoin lenkki, IoT-laitteilla tehtävät kryptografiset operaatiot saattavat olla haavoittuvaisia useita erilaisia hyökkäyksiä vastaan. Ratkaistaksemme tämän ongelman kehitämme simulaation, joka tarjoaa IoT-laitteille vahvaa entropiaa palveluna (Entropy as a Service, EaaS). EaaS-simulaation ideana on jakaa korkealaatuista entropiaa palveluna IoT-laitteille, jotta ne pystyvät luomaan vahvoja salausavaimia. Hyödynnämme simulaatiossa lisäksi luotettuja suoritusympäristöjä (Trusted Execution Environment, TEE). TEE on prosessorilla oleva erillinen komponentti, joka tarjoaa eristetyn ja turvallisen ajoympäristön valituille ohjelmille. TEE:tä hyödyntämällä ajonaikaiselle ohjelmalle voidaan taata datan suojaus, luottamuksellisuus sekä eheys eristämällä se muista järjestelmällä ajetuista ohjelmista (mukaan lukien käyttöjärjestelmä). Näin ollen TEE parantaa järjestelmän tietoturvallisuutta. EaaS-simulaatio toteutetaan Magi-nimisellä tietokoneklusterilla. Magi on Tampereen Yliopiston Network and Information Security Group (NISEC) -tutkimusryhmän oma yksityinen klusteri, joka on suunniteltu, rakennettu, määritelty ja testattu osana tätä diplomityötä. Tässä diplomityössä käymme läpi, kuinka Magi-klusteri on toteutettu ja kuinka sillä toteutetaan hajautettu EaaS-simulaatio hyödyntäen TEE:itä

Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers

The block cipher is one of the most important primitives in modern cryptography, information and network security; one of the primary purposes of such ciphers is to provide confidentiality for data transmitted in insecure communication environments. To ensure that confidentiality is robustly provided, it is essential to investigate the security of a block cipher against a variety of cryptanalytic attacks. In this thesis, we propose a new extension of differential cryptanalysis, which we call the impossible boomerang attack. We describe the early abort technique for (related-key) impossible differential cryptanalysis and rectangle attacks. Finally, we analyse the security of a number of block ciphers that are currently being widely used or have recently been proposed for use in emerging cryptographic applications; our main cryptanalytic results are as follows. An impossible differential attack on 7-round AES when used with 128 or 192 key bits, and an impossible differential attack on 8-round AES when used with 256 key bits. An impossible boomerang attack on 6-round AES when used with 128 key bits, and an impossible boomerang attack on 7-round AES when used with 192 or 256 key bits. A related-key impossible boomerang attack on 8-round AES when used with 192 key bits, and a related-key impossible boomerang attack on 9-round AES when used with 256 key bits, both using two keys. An impossible differential attack on 11-round reduced Camellia when used with 128 key bits, an impossible differential attack on 12-round reduced Camellia when used with 192 key bits, and an impossible differential attack on 13-round reduced Camellia when used with 256 key bits. A related-key rectangle attack on the full Cobra-F64a, and a related-key differential attack on the full Cobra-F64b. A related-key rectangle attack on 44-round SHACAL-2. A related-key rectangle attack on 36-round XTEA. An impossible differential attack on 25-round reduced HIGHT, a related-key rectangle attack on 26-round reduced HIGHT, and a related-key impossible differential attack on 28-round reduced HIGHT. In terms of either the attack complexity or the numbers of attacked rounds, the attacks presented in the thesis are better than any previously published cryptanalytic results for the block ciphers concerned, except in the case of AES; for AES, the presented impossible differential attacks on 7-round AES used with 128 key bits and 8-round AES used with 256 key bits are the best currently published results on AES in a single key attack scenario, and the presented related-key impossible boomerang attacks on 8-round AES used with 192 key bits and 9-round AES used with 256 key bits are the best currently published results on AES in a related-key attack scenario involving two keys

The Prom Problem: Fair and Privacy-Enhanced Matchmaking with Identity Linked Wishes

In the Prom Problem (TPP), Alice wishes to attend a school dance with Bob and needs a risk-free, privacy preserving way to find out whether Bob shares that same wish. If not, no one should know that she inquired about it, not even Bob. TPP represents a special class of matchmaking challenges, augmenting the properties of privacy-enhanced matchmaking, further requiring fairness and support for identity linked wishes (ILW) – wishes involving specific identities that are only valid if all involved parties have those same wishes. The Horne-Nair (HN) protocol was proposed as a solution to TPP along with a sample pseudo-code embodiment leveraging an untrusted matchmaker. Neither identities nor pseudo-identities are included in any messages or stored in the matchmaker’s database. Privacy relevant data stay within user control. A security analysis and proof-of-concept implementation validated the approach, fairness was quantified, and a feasibility analysis demonstrated practicality in real-world networks and systems, thereby bounding risk prior to incurring the full costs of development. The SecretMatch™ Prom app leverages one embodiment of the patented HN protocol to achieve privacy-enhanced and fair matchmaking with ILW. The endeavor led to practical lessons learned and recommendations for privacy engineering in an era of rapidly evolving privacy legislation. Next steps include design of SecretMatch™ apps for contexts like voting negotiations in legislative bodies and executive recruiting. The roadmap toward a quantum resistant SecretMatch™ began with design of a Hybrid Post-Quantum Horne-Nair (HPQHN) protocol. Future directions include enhancements to HPQHN, a fully Post Quantum HN protocol, and more