79 research outputs found
Decryption oracle slide attacks on T-310
T-310 is an important Cold War cipher (Schmeh 2006). It was the principal encryption algorithm used to protect various state communication lines in Eastern Germany throughout the 1980s. The cipher seems to be quite robust, and until now no researcher has proposed an attack on T-310. This article studies decryption oracle and slide attacks on T-310
Security analysis of NIST-LWC contest finalists
Dissertação de mestrado integrado em Informatics EngineeringTraditional cryptographic standards are designed with a desktop and server environment in mind, so, with the
relatively recent proliferation of small, resource constrained devices in the Internet of Things, sensor networks,
embedded systems, and more, there has been a call for lightweight cryptographic standards with security,
performance and resource requirements tailored for the highly-constrained environments these devices find
themselves in.
In 2015 the National Institute of Standards and Technology began a Standardization Process in order to select
one or more Lightweight Cryptographic algorithms. Out of the original 57 submissions ten finalists remain, with
ASCON and Romulus being among the most scrutinized out of them.
In this dissertation I will introduce some concepts required for easy understanding of the body of work, do
an up-to-date revision on the current situation on the standardization process from a security and performance
standpoint, a description of ASCON and Romulus, and new best known analysis, and a comparison of the two,
with their advantages, drawbacks, and unique traits.Os padrões criptográficos tradicionais foram elaborados com um ambiente de computador e servidor em mente.
Com a proliferação de dispositivos de pequenas dimensões tanto na Internet of Things, redes de sensores e
sistemas embutidos, apareceu uma necessidade para se definir padrões para algoritmos de criptografia leve, com
prioridades de segurança, performance e gasto de recursos equilibrados para os ambientes altamente limitados
em que estes dispositivos operam.
Em 2015 o National Institute of Standards and Technology lançou um processo de estandardização com o
objectivo de escolher um ou mais algoritmos de criptografia leve. Das cinquenta e sete candidaturas originais
sobram apenas dez finalistas, sendo ASCON e Romulus dois desses finalistas mais examinados.
Nesta dissertação irei introduzir alguns conceitos necessários para uma fácil compreensão do corpo deste
trabalho, assim como uma revisão atualizada da situação atual do processo de estandardização de um ponto
de vista tanto de segurança como de performance, uma descrição do ASCON e do Romulus assim como as
suas melhores análises recentes e uma comparação entre os dois, frisando as suas vantagens, desvantagens e
aspectos únicos
Two philosophies for solving non-linear equations in algebraic cryptanalysis
Algebraic Cryptanalysis [45] is concerned with solving of particular systems of multivariate non-linear equations which occur in cryptanalysis. Many different methods for solving such problems have been proposed in cryptanalytic literature: XL and XSL method, Gröbner bases, SAT solvers, as well as many other. In this paper we survey these methods and point out that the main working principle in all of them is essentially the same. One quantity grows faster than another quantity which leads to a “phase transition” and the problem becomes efficiently solvable. We illustrate this with examples from both symmetric and asymmetric cryptanalysis. In this paper we point out that there exists a second (more) general way of formulating algebraic attacks through dedicated coding techniques which involve redundancy with addition of new variables. This opens numerous new possibilities for the attackers and leads to interesting optimization problems where the existence of interesting equations may be somewhat deliberately engineered by the attacker
Algorithms for Solving Linear and Polynomial Systems of Equations over Finite Fields with Applications to Cryptanalysis
This dissertation contains algorithms for solving linear and polynomial systems
of equations over GF(2). The objective is to provide fast and exact tools for algebraic
cryptanalysis and other applications. Accordingly, it is divided into two parts.
The first part deals with polynomial systems. Chapter 2 contains a successful
cryptanalysis of Keeloq, the block cipher used in nearly all luxury automobiles.
The attack is more than 16,000 times faster than brute force, but queries 0.62 × 2^32
plaintexts. The polynomial systems of equations arising from that cryptanalysis
were solved via SAT-solvers. Therefore, Chapter 3 introduces a new method of
solving polynomial systems of equations by converting them into CNF-SAT problems
and using a SAT-solver. Finally, Chapter 4 contains a discussion on how SAT-solvers
work internally.
The second part deals with linear systems over GF(2), and other small fields
(and rings). These occur in cryptanalysis when using the XL algorithm, which converts polynomial systems into larger linear systems. We introduce a new complexity
model and data structures for GF(2)-matrix operations. This is discussed in Appendix B but applies to all of Part II. Chapter 5 contains an analysis of "the Method
of Four Russians" for multiplication and a variant for matrix inversion, which is
log n faster than Gaussian Elimination, and can be combined with Strassen-like algorithms. Chapter 6 contains an algorithm for accelerating matrix multiplication
over small finite fields. It is feasible but the memory cost is so high that it is mostly
of theoretical interest. Appendix A contains some discussion of GF(2)-linear algebra
and how it differs from linear algebra in R and C. Appendix C discusses algorithms
faster than Strassen's algorithm, and contains proofs that matrix multiplication,
matrix squaring, triangular matrix inversion, LUP-factorization, general matrix in-
version and the taking of determinants, are equicomplex. These proofs are already
known, but are here gathered into one place in the same notation
Enhancing Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis in an Operational Environment
Side-channel attacks exploit the unintentional emissions from cryptographic devices to determine the secret encryption key. This research identifies methods to make attacks demonstrated in an academic environment more operationally relevant. Algebraic cryptanalysis is used to reconcile redundant information extracted from side-channel attacks on the AES key schedule. A novel thresholding technique is used to select key byte guesses for a satisfiability solver resulting in a 97.5% success rate despite failing for 100% of attacks using standard methods. Two techniques are developed to compensate for differences in emissions from training and test devices dramatically improving the effectiveness of cross device template attacks. Mean and variance normalization improves same part number attack success rates from 65.1% to 100%, and increases the number of locations an attack can be performed by 226%. When normalization is combined with a novel technique to identify and filter signals in collected traces not related to the encryption operation, the number of traces required to perform a successful attack is reduced by 85.8% on average. Finally, software-defined radios are shown to be an effective low-cost method for collecting side-channel emissions in real-time, eliminating the need to modify or profile the target encryption device to gain precise timing information
Improved Side Channel Cube Attacks on PRESENT
The paper presents several improved side channel cube attacks on PRESENT based on single bit leakage model. Compared with the previous study of Yang et al in CANS 2009 [30], based on the same model of single bit leakage in the 3rd round, we show that: if the PRESENT cipher structure is unknown, for the leakage bit 0, 32-bit key can be recovered within chosen plaintexts; if the cipher structure is known, for the leakage bit 4,8,12, 48-bit key can be extracted by chosen plaintexts, which is less than in [30]; then, we extend the single bit leakage model to the 4th round, based on the two level “divide and conquer” analysis strategy, we propose a sliding window side channel cube attack on PRESENT, for the leakage bit 0, about chosen plaintexts can obtain 60-bit key; in order to obtain more key bits, we propose an iterated side channel cube attack on PRESENT, about chosen plaintexts can obtain extra 12 equivalent key bits, so overall chosen plaintexts can reduce the PRESENT-80 key searching space to ; finally, we extend the attack to PRESENT-128, about chosen plaintexts can extract 85 bits key, and reduce the PRESENT-128 key searching space to . Compared with the previous study of Abdul-Latip et al in ASIACCS 2011 [31] based on the Hamming weight leakage model, which can extract 64-bit key of PRESENT-80/128 by chosen plaintexts, our attacks can extract more key bits, and have certain advantages over [31]
SoK: Security Evaluation of SBox-Based Block Ciphers
Cryptanalysis of block ciphers is an active and important research area with an extensive volume of literature. For this work, we focus on SBox-based ciphers, as they are widely used and cover a large class of block ciphers. While there have been prior works that have consolidated attacks on block ciphers, they usually focus on describing and listing the attacks. Moreover, the methods for evaluating a cipher\u27s security are often ad hoc, differing from cipher to cipher, as attacks and evaluation techniques are developed along the way. As such, we aim to organise the attack literature, as well as the work on security evaluation.
In this work, we present a systematization of cryptanalysis of SBox-based block ciphers focusing on three main areas: (1) Evaluation of block ciphers against standard cryptanalytic attacks; (2) Organisation and relationships between various attacks; (3) Comparison of the evaluation and attacks on existing ciphers
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