Reverse k-Ranks Queries on Large Graphs

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Sketch-based Influence Maximization and Computation: Scaling up with Guarantees

Propagation of contagion through networks is a fundamental process. It is used to model the spread of information, influence, or a viral infection. Diffusion patterns can be specified by a probabilistic model, such as Independent Cascade (IC), or captured by a set of representative traces. Basic computational problems in the study of diffusion are influence queries (determining the potency of a specified seed set of nodes) and Influence Maximization (identifying the most influential seed set of a given size). Answering each influence query involves many edge traversals, and does not scale when there are many queries on very large graphs. The gold standard for Influence Maximization is the greedy algorithm, which iteratively adds to the seed set a node maximizing the marginal gain in influence. Greedy has a guaranteed approximation ratio of at least (1-1/e) and actually produces a sequence of nodes, with each prefix having approximation guarantee with respect to the same-size optimum. Since Greedy does not scale well beyond a few million edges, for larger inputs one must currently use either heuristics or alternative algorithms designed for a pre-specified small seed set size. We develop a novel sketch-based design for influence computation. Our greedy Sketch-based Influence Maximization (SKIM) algorithm scales to graphs with billions of edges, with one to two orders of magnitude speedup over the best greedy methods. It still has a guaranteed approximation ratio, and in practice its quality nearly matches that of exact greedy. We also present influence oracles, which use linear-time preprocessing to generate a small sketch for each node, allowing the influence of any seed set to be quickly answered from the sketches of its nodes.Comment: 10 pages, 5 figures. Appeared at the 23rd Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM 2014) in Shanghai, Chin

Defending against Sybil Devices in Crowdsourced Mapping Services

Real-time crowdsourced maps such as Waze provide timely updates on traffic, congestion, accidents and points of interest. In this paper, we demonstrate how lack of strong location authentication allows creation of software-based {\em Sybil devices} that expose crowdsourced map systems to a variety of security and privacy attacks. Our experiments show that a single Sybil device with limited resources can cause havoc on Waze, reporting false congestion and accidents and automatically rerouting user traffic. More importantly, we describe techniques to generate Sybil devices at scale, creating armies of virtual vehicles capable of remotely tracking precise movements for large user populations while avoiding detection. We propose a new approach to defend against Sybil devices based on {\em co-location edges}, authenticated records that attest to the one-time physical co-location of a pair of devices. Over time, co-location edges combine to form large {\em proximity graphs} that attest to physical interactions between devices, allowing scalable detection of virtual vehicles. We demonstrate the efficacy of this approach using large-scale simulations, and discuss how they can be used to dramatically reduce the impact of attacks against crowdsourced mapping services.Comment: Measure and integratio