13,026 research outputs found

    Overview and classification of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains

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    Among coordination mechanisms, contracts are valuable tools used in both theory and practice to coordinate various supply chains. The focus of this paper is to present an overview of contracts and a classification of coordination contracts and contracting literature in the form of classification schemes. The two criteria used for contract classification, as resulted from contracting literature, are transfer payment contractual incentives and inventory risk sharing. The overview classification of the existing literature has as criteria the level of detail used in designing the coordination models with applicability on the forward and reverse supply chains.Coordination contracts; forward supply chain; reverse supply chain

    Channel Selection and Coordination in Dual-Channel Supply Chains

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    This paper investigates the influence of channel structures and channel coordination on the supplier, the retailer, and the entire supply chain in the context of two single-channel and two dual-channel supply chains. We extensively study two Pareto zone concepts: channel-adding Pareto zone and contract-implementing Pareto zone. In the channel-adding Pareto zone, both the supplier and the retailer benefit from adding a new channel to the traditional single-channel supply chain. In the contract-implementing Pareto zone, it is mutually beneficial for the supplier and the retailer to utilize the proposed contract coordination policy. The analysis suggests the preference lists of the supplier and the retailer over channel structures with and without coordination are different, and depend on parameters like channel base demand, channel operational costs, and channel substitutability

    Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions In Retail Supply Chains With Customer Value

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    In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value‐added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non‐cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers

    Method and Approach Mapping of Fair and Balanced Risk and Value-added Distribution in Supply Chains: A Review and Future Agenda

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    This paper proposes a fair and balanced risk and value-added distribution as a novel approach for collaborative supply chain. The objective of this article is to analyze the existing methods and approaches for risk management, value-adding, risk and revenue sharing to develop a new framework for balancing risk and value-adding in collaborative supply chains. The authors reviewed and synthesized 162 scientific articles which were published between 2001 and 2017 and. The reviewed articles were categorized into supply chain management and performance, risk management, value-added, fair risk and value-added distribution and supply chain negotiation. The potentials identified for future research were the importance of decision-making and sustainability for effectiveness of supply chain risk management. Most previous authors have applied an approach of revenue and risk-- sharing with both decentralized and centralized supply chains to achieve the fair risk and value-added distribution. The dominant methods we found in literature were game theory and complex mathematical formulation. Most literature focused on operation research techniques. We identified a lack of discussion of the intelligent system approach and a potential for future exploration. This paper guide future research and application agenda of fair risk and value-added distribution in supply chain collaboration. We developed a new framework for a fair and balanced risk and value-added distribution model. For a future agenda, we point towards the development of a systematic intelligent system applying soft-computing techniques and knowledge transfer for maintaining sustainable supply chains.Keywords Supply chain collaboration, Fair risk and value-added distribution, Revenue sharing, Risk management, Risk sharin

    FORWARD CONTRACTING SPECIFICATION THROUGH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

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    Game-based bargaining theory is presented to evaluate the potential of and stability of cooperative coalition among producers for enhancing producer returns and managing market price and income risk. Results clarify that collective bargaining can increase and stabilize producer profits when they face a single processor.Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,
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