8,855 research outputs found
Updating the Social Network: How Outdated and Unclear State Legislation Violates Sex Offendersâ First Amendment Rights
Readily available on computers, phones, tablets, or television, social media has become a necessary platform of expression for many. But, for others, social media is an inaccessible tool whose very use has criminal repercussions. To protect innocent children, many states have enacted legislation restricting sex offendersâ access to social media. Unfortunately, this legislation is often outdated, overly restrictive, and unconstitutional under the First Amendment. North Carolina has recently attracted national attention, as its statute highlights the potential constitutional issues states face in drafting such legislation. To avoid the constitutional concerns that North Carolina faces, state legislators must draft statutes narrowly and provide ample alternative channels of communication for sex offenders. This Note first analyzes current state legislation restricting sex offendersâ social media usage, focusing specifically on North Carolinaâs statute. It then discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Packingham v. North Carolina, challenging the constitutionality of North Carolinaâs statute under the First Amendment. This Note explains how Packingham offers the Supreme Court an opportunity to clarify and instruct states on how to properly draft future legislation. Specifically, the Court must address what constitutes a narrowly tailored statute and what type of alternatives must be available for sex offenders whose social media access is restricted. This Note ultimately concludes that North Carolinaâs statute is not narrowly tailored and does not leave ample alternative channels of communication. To help avoid these issues in the future, this Note concludes by suggesting a model statute for constitutionally restricting sex offendersâ social media use
Updating the Social Network: How Outdated and Unclear State Legislation Violates Sex Offendersâ First Amendment Rights
Readily available on computers, phones, tablets, or television, social media has become a necessary platform of expression for many. But, for others, social media is an inaccessible tool whose very use has criminal repercussions. To protect innocent children, many states have enacted legislation restricting sex offendersâ access to social media. Unfortunately, this legislation is often outdated, overly restrictive, and unconstitutional under the First Amendment. North Carolina has recently attracted national attention, as its statute highlights the potential constitutional issues states face in drafting such legislation. To avoid the constitutional concerns that North Carolina faces, state legislators must draft statutes narrowly and provide ample alternative channels of communication for sex offenders. This Note first analyzes current state legislation restricting sex offendersâ social media usage, focusing specifically on North Carolinaâs statute. It then discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Packingham v. North Carolina, challenging the constitutionality of North Carolinaâs statute under the First Amendment. This Note explains how Packingham offers the Supreme Court an opportunity to clarify and instruct states on how to properly draft future legislation. Specifically, the Court must address what constitutes a narrowly tailored statute and what type of alternatives must be available for sex offenders whose social media access is restricted. This Note ultimately concludes that North Carolinaâs statute is not narrowly tailored and does not leave ample alternative channels of communication. To help avoid these issues in the future, this Note concludes by suggesting a model statute for constitutionally restricting sex offendersâ social media use
Myspace, Yourspace, But Not Theirspace: The Constitutionality of Banning Sex Offenders From Social Networking Sites
In recent years there has been intense public pressure to enact increasingly restrictive and intrusive sex offender laws. The regulation of sex offenders has now moved online, where a growing amount of protected expression and activity occurs. The latest trend in sex offender policy has been the passage of state laws prohibiting sex offenders from visiting social networking sites, such as Myspace or Facebook. The use of these websites implicates the First Amendment right of expressive association. Broad social-networking-site bans threaten the First Amendment expressive association rights of sex offenders, who do not lose all of their constitutional rights by virtue of their conviction. Although social-networking-site bans are politically attractive on the surface, such prohibitions are fundamentally flawed because they are predicated on a number of widespread misconceptions about sex offenses and sex offender behavior. These misconceptions include the beliefs that all registered sex offenders are violent sexual predators who have extremely high recidivism rates and that Internet predators are increasing the incidence of sex crimes against minors. In fact, there is very little evidence to indicate that this type of legislation will help reduce sexual violence. This Note argues for empirically based and narrowly tailored sex offender policies that will strike the appropriate balance between protecting minors from sexual abuse and respecting sex offenders\u27 constitutional rights. Such an approach is more likely to help rehabilitate offenders and thus protect children and others from sexual predators
Myspace, Yourspace, But Not Theirspace: The Constitutionality of Banning Sex Offenders From Social Networking Sites
In recent years there has been intense public pressure to enact increasingly restrictive and intrusive sex offender laws. The regulation of sex offenders has now moved online, where a growing amount of protected expression and activity occurs. The latest trend in sex offender policy has been the passage of state laws prohibiting sex offenders from visiting social networking sites, such as Myspace or Facebook. The use of these websites implicates the First Amendment right of expressive association. Broad social-networking-site bans threaten the First Amendment expressive association rights of sex offenders, who do not lose all of their constitutional rights by virtue of their conviction. Although social-networking-site bans are politically attractive on the surface, such prohibitions are fundamentally flawed because they are predicated on a number of widespread misconceptions about sex offenses and sex offender behavior. These misconceptions include the beliefs that all registered sex offenders are violent sexual predators who have extremely high recidivism rates and that Internet predators are increasing the incidence of sex crimes against minors. In fact, there is very little evidence to indicate that this type of legislation will help reduce sexual violence. This Note argues for empirically based and narrowly tailored sex offender policies that will strike the appropriate balance between protecting minors from sexual abuse and respecting sex offenders\u27 constitutional rights. Such an approach is more likely to help rehabilitate offenders and thus protect children and others from sexual predators
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