Restricted Positive Quantification Is Not Elementary

We show that a restricted variant of constructive predicate logic with positive (covariant) quantification is of super-elementary complexity. The restriction is to limit the number of eigenvariables used in quantifier introductions rules to a reasonably usable level. This construction suggests that the known non-elementary decision algorithms for positive logic may actually be best possible

Refinement Modal Logic

In this paper we present {\em refinement modal logic}. A refinement is like a bisimulation, except that from the three relational requirements only `atoms' and `back' need to be satisfied. Our logic contains a new operator 'all' in addition to the standard modalities 'box' for each agent. The operator 'all' acts as a quantifier over the set of all refinements of a given model. As a variation on a bisimulation quantifier, this refinement operator or refinement quantifier 'all' can be seen as quantifying over a variable not occurring in the formula bound by it. The logic combines the simplicity of multi-agent modal logic with some powers of monadic second-order quantification. We present a sound and complete axiomatization of multi-agent refinement modal logic. We also present an extension of the logic to the modal mu-calculus, and an axiomatization for the single-agent version of this logic. Examples and applications are also discussed: to software verification and design (the set of agents can also be seen as a set of actions), and to dynamic epistemic logic. We further give detailed results on the complexity of satisfiability, and on succinctness

Counting Incompossibles

We often speak as if there are merely possible people—for example, when we make such claims as that most possible people are never going to be born. Yet most metaphysicians deny that anything is both possibly a person and never born. Since our unreflective talk of merely possible people serves to draw non-trivial distinctions, these metaphysicians owe us some paraphrase by which we can draw those distinctions without committing ourselves to there being merely possible people. We show that such paraphrases are unavailable if we limit ourselves to the expressive resources of even highly infinitary first-order modal languages. We then argue that such paraphrases are available in higher-order modal languages only given certain strong assumptions concerning the metaphysics of properties. We then consider alternative paraphrase strategies, and argue that none of them are tenable. If talk of merely possible people cannot be paraphrased, then it must be taken at face value, in which case it is necessary what individuals there are. Therefore, if it is contingent what individuals there are, then the demands of paraphrase place tight constraints on the metaphysics of properties: either (i) it is necessary what properties there are, or (ii) necessarily equivalent properties are identical, and having properties does not entail even possibly being anything at all

From truth to computability I

The recently initiated approach called computability logic is a formal theory of interactive computation. See a comprehensive online source on the subject at http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~giorgi/cl.html . The present paper contains a soundness and completeness proof for the deductive system CL3 which axiomatizes the most basic first-order fragment of computability logic called the finite-depth, elementary-base fragment. Among the potential application areas for this result are the theory of interactive computation, constructive applied theories, knowledgebase systems, systems for resource-bound planning and action. This paper is self-contained as it reintroduces all relevant definitions as well as main motivations.Comment: To appear in Theoretical Computer Scienc