359,651 research outputs found
The Inevitability of Conscience: A Response to My Critics
This essay by Professor David Luban is written in response to critics of his book, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity.
In part I Professor Luban addresses the primacy that he assigns conscience over the professional role and focuses mainly on the arguments of his critics, Professors Norman Spaulding and W. Bradley Wendel. Part II explores the challenge of pluralism, replying primarily to Professors Katherine Kruse, Spaulding, and Wendel. Part III, in response to Professors Kruse and William Simon, elaborates on the concept of human dignity. Part IV discusses institutions and ethics, focusing on Professors Susan Carle and Simon. The final part discusses Professor Anthony Alfieri’s essay
Response to my Critics
During the Winter of 2011 I visited SADAF and gave a series of talks based on the central chapters of my manuscript on the Yablo paradox. The following year, I visited again, and was pleased and honored to find out that Eduardo Barrio and six of his students had written ‘responses’ that addressed the claims and arguments found in the manuscript, as well as explored new directions in which to take the ideas and themes found there. These comments reflect my thoughts on these responses (also collected in this issue), as well as my thoughts on further issues that arose during the symposium that was based on the papers and during the many hours I spent talking and working with Eduardo and his students.Durante el invierno de 2011, visité SADAF y dà una serie de conferencias sobre los capÃtulos centrales de mi manuscrito sobre la paradoja de Yablo. El año siguiente, visité Buenos aires nuevamente y tuve el placer y el honor de descubrir que Eduardo Barrio y seis de sus estudiantes habÃan escrito respuestas que abordan las afirmaciones y argumentos de mi manuscrito, además de explorar nuevas direcciones en las cuales considerar las ideas y temas encontrados allÃ. El presente trabajo refleja mis pensamientos sobre estas respuestas (también incluidas en este volumen), asà como mis ideas sobre otras cuestiones que surgieron durante el simposio en el que se presentaron los artÃculos y en las muchas horas que nosotros discutimos y trabajamos con Eduardo y sus estudiante
Response to my critics
During the Winter of 2011 I visited SADAF and gave a series of talks based on the central chapters of my manuscript on the Yablo paradox. The following year, I visited again, and was pleased and honored to find out that Eduardo Barrio and six of his students had written ‘responses’ that addressed the claims and arguments found in the manuscript, as well as explored new directions in which to take the ideas and themes found there. These comments reflect my thoughts on these responses (also collected in this issue), as well as my thoughts on further issues that arose during the symposium that was based on the papers and during the many hours I spent talking and working with Eduardo and his students.Durante el invierno de 2011, visité SADAF y dà una serie de conferencias sobre los capÃtulos centrales de mi manuscrito sobre la paradoja de Yablo. El año siguiente, visité Buenos aires nuevamente y tuve el placer y el honor de descubrir que Eduardo Barrio y seis de sus estudiantes habÃan escrito respuestas que abordan las afirmaciones y argumentos de mi manuscrito, además de explorar nuevas direcciones en las cuales considerar las ideas y temas encontrados allÃ. El presente trabajo refleja mis pensamientos sobre estas respuestas (también incluidas en este volumen), asà como mis ideas sobre otras cuestiones que surgieron durante el simposio en el que se presentaron los artÃculos y en las muchas horas que nosotros discutimos y trabajamos con Eduardo y sus estudiante
Response to my critics: In defense of Kant’s aesthetic nonconceptualism
In this article I respond to objections that MatÃas Oroño, Silvia del Luján di Saanza, Pedro
Stepanenko and Luciana MartÃnez have raised against my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s
aesthetics. The objections are both, substantial and instructive. I first sketch my non-conceptualist
reading of Kant’s doctrine of judgments of taste and then turn to what I take to be the most
important criticisms that these authors have put forward. Two difficulties with a non-conceptualist
reading of Kant’s aesthetics seem to be central: the cognitive status of judgments of taste and the
representationalist capacity of aesthetic feeling as non-conceptual mental content. I respond to
these and additional objections and defend my overall non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s
aesthetics against my critics. I argue that Kant’s aesthetics is highly relevant for the debate over
whether or not Kant is a (non-)conceptualist
- …