Resource Sharing and Coevolution in Evolving Cellular Automata

Evolving one-dimensional cellular automata (CAs) with genetic algorithms has provided insight into how improved performance on a task requiring global coordination emerges when only local interactions are possible. Two approaches that can affect the search efficiency of the genetic algorithm are coevolution, in which a population of problems---in our case, initial configurations of the CA lattice---evolves along with the population of CAs; and resource sharing, in which a greater proportion of a limited fitness resource is assigned to those CAs which correctly solve problems that fewer other CAs in the population can solve. Here we present evidence that, in contrast to what has been suggested elsewhere, the improvements observed when both techniques are used together depend largely on resource sharing alone.Comment: 8 pages, 1 figure; http://www.santafe.edu/~evca/rsc.ps.g

Distance modulation competitive co-evolution method to find initial configuration independent cellular automata rules

IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. Tokyo, 12-15 October 1999.One of the main problems in machine learning methods based on examples is the over-adaptation. This problem supposes the exact adaptation to the training examples losing the capability of generalization. A solution of these problems arises in using large sets of examples. In most of the problems, to achieve generalized solutions, almost infinity examples sets are needed. This make the method useless in practice. In this paper, one way to overcome this problem is proposed, based on biological competitive evolution ideas. The evolution is produced as a result of a competition between sets of solutions and sets of examples, trying to beat each other. This mechanism allows the generation of generalized solutions using short example sets

Analyzing Social Network Structures in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal

The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal (IPD/CR) is an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with evolution that allows players to choose and to refuse their game partners. From individual behaviors, behavioral population structures emerge. In this report, we examine one particular IPD/CR environment and document the social network methods used to identify population behaviors found within this complex adaptive system. In contrast to the standard homogeneous population of nice cooperators, we have also found metastable populations of mixed strategies within this environment. In particular, the social networks of interesting populations and their evolution are examined.Comment: 37 pages, uuencoded gzip'd Postscript (1.1Mb when gunzip'd) also available via WWW at http://www.cs.wisc.edu/~smucker/ipd-cr/ipd-cr.htm

A Family of Controllable Cellular Automata for Pseudorandom Number Generation

In this paper, we present a family of novel Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRNGs) based on Controllable Cellular Automata (CCA) ─ CCA0, CCA1, CCA2 (NCA), CCA3 (BCA), CCA4 (asymmetric NCA), CCA5, CCA6 and CCA7 PRNGs. The ENT and DIEHARD test suites are used to evaluate the randomness of these CCA PRNGs. The results show that their randomness is better than that of conventional CA and PCA PRNGs while they do not lose the structure simplicity of 1-d CA. Moreover, their randomness can be comparable to that of 2-d CA PRNGs. Furthermore, we integrate six different types of CCA PRNGs to form CCA PRNG groups to see if the randomness quality of such groups could exceed that of any individual CCA PRNG. Genetic Algorithm (GA) is used to evolve the configuration of the CCA PRNG groups. Randomness test results on the evolved CCA PRNG groups show that the randomness of the evolved groups is further improved compared with any individual CCA PRNG

Cooperation driven by mutations in multi-person Prisoner's Dilemma

The n-person Prisoner's Dilemma is a widely used model for populations where individuals interact in groups. The evolutionary stability of populations has been analysed in the literature for the case where mutations in the population may be considered as isolated events. For this case, and assuming simple trigger strategies and many iterations per game, we analyse the rate of convergence to the evolutionarily stable populations. We find that for some values of the payoff parameters of the Prisoner's Dilemma this rate is so low that the assumption, that mutations in the population are infrequent on that timescale, is unreasonable. Furthermore, the problem is compounded as the group size is increased. In order to address this issue, we derive a deterministic approximation of the evolutionary dynamics with explicit, stochastic mutation processes, valid when the population size is large. We then analyse how the evolutionary dynamics depends on the following factors: mutation rate, group size, the value of the payoff parameters, and the structure of the initial population. In order to carry out the simulations for groups of more than just a few individuals, we derive an efficient way of calculating the fitness values. We find that when the mutation rate per individual and generation is very low, the dynamics is characterised by populations which are evolutionarily stable. As the mutation rate is increased, other fixed points with a higher degree of cooperation become stable. For some values of the payoff parameters, the system is characterised by (apparently) stable limit cycles dominated by cooperative behaviour. The parameter regions corresponding to high degree of cooperation grow in size with the mutation rate, and in number with the group size.Comment: 22 pages, 7 figures. Accepted for publication in Journal of Theoretical Biolog

Rules of engagement : competitive coevolutionary dynamics in computational systems

Given that evolutionary biologists have considered coevolutionary interactions since the dawn of Darwinism, it is perhaps surprising that coevolution was largely overlooked during the formative years of evolutionary computing. It was not until the early 1990s that Hillis' seminal work thrust coevolution into the spotlight. Upon attempting to evolve fixed-length sorting networks, a problem with a long and competitive history, Hillis found that his standard evolutionary algorithm was producing sub-standard networks. In response, he decided to reciprocally evolve a population of testlists against the sorting network population; thus producing a coevolutionary system. The result was impressive; coevolution not only outperformed evolution, but the best network it discovered was only one comparison longer than the best-known solution. For the first time, a coevolutionary algorithm had been successfully applied to problem-solving. Pre-Hillis, the shortcomings of standard evolutionary algorithms had been understood for some time: whilst defining an adequate fitness function can be as challenging as the problem one is hoping to solve, once achieved, the accumulation of fitness-improving mutations can push a population towards local optima that are difficult to escape. Coevolution offers a solution. By allowing the fitness of each evolving individual to vary (through competition) with other reciprocally evolving individuals, coevolution removes the requirement of a fitness yardstick. In conjunction, the reciprocal adaptations of each individual begin to erode local optima as soon as they appear. However, coevolution is no panacea. As a problem-solving tool, coevolutionary algorithms suffer from some debilitating dynamics, each a result of the relative fitness assessment of individuals. In a single-, or multi-, population competitive system, coevolution may stabilize at a suboptimal equilibrium, or mediocre stable state; analogous to the traditional problem of local optima. Populations may become highly specialized in an unanticipated (and undesirable) manner; potentially resulting in brittle solutions that are fragile to perturbation. The system may cycle; producing dynamics similar to the children's game rock-paper-scissors. Disengagement may occur, whereby one population out-performs another to the extent that individuals cannot be discriminated on the basis of fitness alone; thus removing selection pressure and allowing populations to drift. Finally, coevolution's relative fitness assessment renders traditional visualization techniques (such as the graph of fitness over time) obsolete; thus exacerbating each of the above problems. This thesis attempts to better understand and address the problems of coevolution through the design and analysis of simple coevolutionary models. 'Reduced virulence' - a novel technique specifically designed to tackle disengagement - is developed. Empirical results demonstrate the ability of reduced virulence to combat disengagement both in simple and complex domains, whilst outperforming the only known competitors. Combining reduced virulence with diversity maintenance techniques is also shown to counteract mediocre stability and over-specialization. A critique of the CIAO plot - a visualization technique developed to detect coevolutionary cycling - highlights previously undocumented ambiguities; experimental evidence demonstrates the need for complementary visualizations. Extending the scope of visualization, a first exploration into coevolutionary steering is performed; a technique allowing the user to interact with a coevolutionary system during run-time. Using a simple model incorporating reduced virulence, the coevolutionary steering demonstration highlights the future potential of such tools for both research and education. The role of neutrality in coevolution is discussed in detail. Whilst much emphasis is placed upon neutral networks in the evolutionary computation literature, the nature of coevolutionary neutrality is generally overlooked. Preliminary ideas for modelling coevolutionary neutrality are presented. Finally, whilst this thesis is primarily aimed at a computing audience, strong reference to evolutionary biology is made throughout. Exemplifying potential crossover, the CIAO plot, a tool previously unused in biology, is applied to a simulation of E. Coli, with results con rming empirical observations of real bacteria.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo

Mapping trajectories of becoming: four forms of behaviour in co-housing initiatives

In order learn about planning in a world increasingly characterised by resource interdependencies and a plurality of governing agencies, this paper follows the processes of becoming for two co-housing initiatives. Self-organisation – understood as the emergence of actor-networks – is the leading theoretical concept, complemented by translation from actor-network theory and individuation from assemblage theory. This theoretical hybrid distinguishes four forms of behaviour (decoding, coding, expansion and contraction) that are used to analyse the dynamics of becoming in the two cases. As a result, information is revealed on the conditions that give rise to co-housing initiatives, and the dynamic interactions between planning authorities, (groups of) initiators and other stakeholders that gave shape to the initiatives. Differences between these actors become blurred, as both try to create meaning and reasoning in a non-linear, complex and uncertain world. The paper concludes with a view on planning as an act of adaptive navigation, an act equally performed by professionals working for planning authorities and a case initiator

Progress in the producer-scrounger game : information use and spatial models

Les animaux grégaires en quête de ressources peuvent soit consacrer leurs efforts à la recherche (stratégie producteur) ou soit attendre que les producteurs réussissent à trouver ces ressources pour les y rejoindre (stratégie chapardeur). La profitabilité de chaque option peut être analysée par le jeu producteur-chapardeur. Ce jeu a été largement exploré aux plans théorique et empirique, mais plusieurs aspects demeurent toujours inexplorés. J'ai développé cinq modèles afin d'explorer l'approvisionnement social en lien avec l'utilisation d'information et les contraintes spatiales. Le premier modèle concerne l'évolution de règles d'apprentissage, des expressions mathématiques décrivant la valeur qu'un animal accorde aux options producteur et chapardeur en fonction des gains obtenus. J'ai démontré que la règle du relative pay-off sum est évolutivement stable et donc la meilleure disponible. Les paramètres de la règle attendue demeurent intrigants et demandent maintenant à être éplorés au niveau empirique. Le second modèle explorés plutôt l'effet de l'usage d'information sociale (chapardeur) chez un prédateur en examinant son effet sur l'évolution du niveau d'agrégation de ses proies. Le modèle démontre que les proies évoluent à différents niveaux d'agrégation en réponse à l'usage d'information sociale par leurs prédateurs et que cette relation affecte à la fois l'efficacité de recherche du prédateur et la survie des proies. Le troisième modèle teste l'hypothèse, générée à partir de recherche empirique sur les oies cendrées, selon laquelle la variation du niveau de hardiesse serait associée à un dimorphisme de producteurs hardis et de chapardeurs poltrons (bold et shy, respectivement) dans le jeu producteur-chapardeur. Le modèle réfute l'existence d'un tel dimorphisme, mais démontre néanmoins un effet environnemental fort des paramètres de l'approvisionnement social sur le niveau de hardiesse d'une population. Ce résultat a d'importantes implications pour le rôle de l'utilisation d'information et les effets spatiaux dans la régulation des relations entre les producteurs et les chapardeurs. J'ai développé à partir d'une approche d'automate cellulaire un modèle producteur-chapardeur pour déterminer si une règle simple (rule of thumb) fondée sur l'apprentissage social élémentaire dans un contexte spatialement explicite pouvait prédire l'atteinte d'un équilibre producteur-chapardeur. Les résultats démontrent que l'ajout de cette règle simple génère à la fois une flexibilité comportementale significative et des dynamiques complexes qui ne sont pas habituelles à ce genre de systèmes simples. Le modèle lie l'usage d'information sociale à la structure spatiale dans un modèle déterministe. Enfin, avec le cinquième modèle j'ai exploré les effets de la géométrie du paysage (la façon dont l'espace est représenté, habituellement un quadrillage régulier) sur le jeu producteur-chapardeur. Il appert que les représentations spatiales sont un déterminant-clé dans la manière dont un jeu d'approvisionnement social d'alimentation peut réellement rendre compte de l'approvisionnement des animaux. \ud ______________________________________________________________________________ \ud MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : l'approvisionnement social, effets spatiaux, l'utilisation des informations, l'apprentissage, personnalités des animau

A Solution to the Challenge of Optimization on ''Golf-Course''-Like Fitness Landscapes

Genetic algorithms (GAs) have been used to find efficient solutions to numerous fundamental and applied problems. While GAs are a robust and flexible approach to solve complex problems, there are some situations under which they perform poorly. Here, we introduce a genetic algorithm approach that is able to solve complex tasks plagued by so-called ''golf-course''-like fitness landscapes. Our approach, which we denote variable environment genetic algorithms (VEGAs), is able to find highly efficient solutions by inducing environmental changes that require more complex solutions and thus creating an evolutionary drive. Using the density classification task, a paradigmatic computer science problem, as a case study, we show that more complex rules that preserve information about the solution to simpler tasks can adapt to more challenging environments. Interestingly, we find that conservative strategies, which have a bias toward the current state, evolve naturally as a highly efficient solution to the density classification task under noisy conditions