Water Rights and Markets in the US Semi-arid West: Efficiency and Equity Issues

There are both high resource and political costs in defining and enforcing property rights to water and in managing it with markets. In this paper, I examine these issues in the semi-arid U.S. West where many of the intensifying demand and supply problems regarding fresh water are playing out. I begin by illustrating the current state of water markets in 12 western U.S. states. There are major differences in water prices across uses (agriculture, urban, environmental) and these differences appear to persist, suggesting that water markets have not developed fully enough to narrow the gaps. Moreover, there is considerable difference in the extent and nature of water trading across the western states, suggesting that water values and transaction costs of trade vary considerably across jurisdictions. I then turn to the resource and political costs of defining water rights and expanding the use of markets. In this discussion, efficiency and equity objectives play important, often conflicting, roles. This tension reflects the very social nature of the water resource. To understand the problems of expanding water markets, it is critical to understand the varying political, bureaucratic, and administrative incentives involved

Baseline Review of the Upper Tana, Kenya

http://greenwatercredits.net/sites/default/files/documents/isric_gwc_report8.pd

Payments for Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts

Payments for environmental services (PES) are part of a new and more direct conservation paradigm, explicitly recognizing the need to bridge the interests of landowners and outsiders. Eloquent theoretical assessments have praised the absolute advantages of PES over traditional conservation approaches. Some pilot PES exist in the tropics, but many fi eld practitioners and prospective service buyers and sellers remain skeptical about the concept. This paper aims to help demystify PES for non-economists, starting with a simple and coherent defi nition of the term. It then provides practical 'how-to' hints for PES design. It considers the likely niche for PES in the portfolio of conservation approaches. This assessment is based on a literature review, combined with fi eld observations from research in Latin America and Asia. It concludes that service users will continue to drive PES, but their willingness to pay will only rise if schemes can demonstrate clear additionality vis-à-vis carefully established baselines, if trust-building processes with service providers are sustained, and PES recipients' livelihood dynamics is better understood. PES best suits intermediate and/or projected threat scenarios, often in marginal lands with moderate conservation opportunity costs. People facing credible but medium-sized environmental degradation are more likely to become PES recipients than those living in relative harmony with Nature. The choice between PES cash and in-kind payments is highly context-dependent. Poor PES recipients are likely to gain from participation, though their access might be constrained and non-participating landless poor could lose out. PES is a highly promising conservation approach that can benefi t buyers, sellers and improv

Characteristics of resources and the provision of biodiversity and ecosystem services in Germany: the cases of fruit tree meadows and wolf protection

Work on common pool resources has paid scant attention to the role of properties of natural resources for the way their provision is governed. This paper scrutinizes determinants of institutions that regulate the provision of biodiversity and ecosystem services. Two cases of maintaining ecosystem services are compared (protection of wolves and management of scattered fruit tree meadows). Distinct characteristics of resources (mobility) and differences in the overarching European regulatory framework explain their different institutional embeddedness. Cost-effectiveness considerations seem to be paramount in the design of institutions. In the case of wolf protection, the state uses its power to modify property rights in order to increase acceptance of wolf management. This is essential for political reasons as well as to prevent EU sanctions. On the other hand, scattered fruit tree maintenance is subject to voluntary, long-term agreements, justified by medium-term irreversibility and asset specific investments.Institutions, Governance, Wolf Management, Scattered fruit trees, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Water Rights and Markets in the U.S. Semi Arid West: Efficiency and Equity Issues

There are both high resource and political costs in defining and enforcing property rights to water and in managing it with markets. In this paper, I examine these issues in the semi-arid U.S. West where many of the intensifying demand and supply problems regarding fresh water are playing out. I begin by illustrating the current state of water markets in 12 western U.S. states. There are major differences in water prices across uses (agriculture, urban, environmental) and these differences appear to persist, suggesting that water markets have not developed fully enough to narrow the gaps. Moreover, there is considerable difference in the extent and nature of water trading across the western states, suggesting that water values and transaction costs of trade vary considerably across jurisdictions. I then turn to the resource and political costs of defining water rights and expanding the use of markets. In this discussion, efficiency and equity objectives play important, often conflicting, roles. This tension reflects the very social nature of the water resource.