Assessing Cultural Drivers of Safety Resilience in a Collegiate Aviation Program

Organizational safety resilience is a key factor in sustaining an effective safety management system (SMS) in high-reliability organizations (HROs) such as aviation. Extant research advocates for monitoring, assessing and continuously improving safety in an organization that has a fully-functional SMS. Safety resilience provides a buffer against vulnerabilities. Extant research also suggests a paucity in terms of a measurement framework for organizational safety resilience in collegiate aviation operations. A quantitative approach using Reason’s safety resilience concept (Reason, 2011) is used to assess organizational safety resilience in a collegiate aviation program with an active conformance SMS accepted by the FAA. A sample of 516research participants responded to an online survey instrument derived from Reason (2011). Structural Equation Model (SEM)/Path Analysis (PA) techniques are used to assess models that measure the strength of relationships between three cultural drivers (Commitment, Cognizance, Competence)of safety and safety resilience. There were strong significant relationships between these cultural drivers and safety resilience. Path analysis suggests that Commitment significantly mediates the path between Cognizance and Competence and highlights its important role in sustaining safety competencies. There were significant differences in the perceptions of safety resilience among top-level leadership, flight operations and ground operations. Flight operations and ground operations had higher mean scores on safety resilience than top-level leadership. Study provides a validated model of safety resilience that is essential for SMS improvements in collegiate aviation programs. Future studies will utilize this safety resilience model to assess other collegiate aviation programs in various phases of SMS implementation, airlines, and air traffic control operations

ATM automation: guidance on human technology integration

© Civil Aviation Authority 2016Human interaction with technology and automation is a key area of interest to industry and safety regulators alike. In February 2014, a joint CAA/industry workshop considered perspectives on present and future implementation of advanced automated systems. The conclusion was that whilst no additional regulation was necessary, guidance material for industry and regulators was required. Development of this guidance document was completed in 2015 by a working group consisting of CAA, UK industry, academia and industry associations (see Appendix B). This enabled a collaborative approach to be taken, and for regulatory, industry, and workforce perspectives to be collectively considered and addressed. The processes used in developing this guidance included: review of the themes identified from the February 2014 CAA/industry workshop1; review of academic papers, textbooks on automation, incidents and accidents involving automation; identification of key safety issues associated with automated systems; analysis of current and emerging ATM regulatory requirements and guidance material; presentation of emerging findings for critical review at UK and European aviation safety conferences. In December 2015, a workshop of senior management from project partner organisations reviewed the findings and proposals. EASA were briefed on the project before its commencement, and Eurocontrol contributed through membership of the Working Group.Final Published versio

Air Traffic Management Safety Challenges

The primary goal of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is to control accident risk. ATM safety has improved over the decades for many reasons, from better equipment to additional safety defences. But ATM safety targets, improving on current performance, are now extremely demanding. Safety analysts and aviation decision-makers have to make safety assessments based on statistically incomplete evidence. If future risks cannot be estimated with precision, then how is safety to be assured with traffic growth and operational/technical changes? What are the design implications for the USA’s ‘Next Generation Air Transportation System’ (NextGen) and Europe’s Single European Sky ATM Research Programme (SESAR)? ATM accident precursors arise from (eg) pilot/controller workload, miscommunication, and lack of upto- date information. Can these accident precursors confidently be ‘designed out’ by (eg) better system knowledge across ATM participants, automatic safety checks, and machine rather than voice communication? Future potentially hazardous situations could be as ‘messy’ in system terms as the Überlingen mid-air collision. Are ATM safety regulation policies fit for purpose: is it more and more difficult to innovate, to introduce new technologies and novel operational concepts? Must regulators be more active, eg more inspections and monitoring of real operational and organisational practices

The development and deployment of a maintenance operations safety survey

Objective: Based on the line operations safety audit (LOSA), two studies were conducted to develop and deploy an equivalent tool for aircraft maintenance: the maintenance operations safety survey (MOSS). Background: Safety in aircraft maintenance is currently measured reactively, based on the number of audit findings, reportable events, incidents, or accidents. Proactive safety tools designed for monitoring routine operations, such as flight data monitoring and LOSA, have been developed predominantly for flight operations. Method: In Study 1, development of MOSS, 12 test peer-to-peer observations were collected to investigate the practicalities of this approach. In Study 2, deployment of MOSS, seven expert observers collected 56 peer-to-peer observations of line maintenance checks at four stations. Narrative data were coded and analyzed according to the threat and error management (TEM) framework. Results: In Study 1, a line check was identified as a suitable unit of observation. Communication and third-party data management were the key factors in gaining maintainer trust. Study 2 identified that on average, maintainers experienced 7.8 threats (operational complexities) and committed 2.5 errors per observation. The majority of threats and errors were inconsequential. Links between specific threats and errors leading to 36 undesired states were established. Conclusion: This research demonstrates that observations of routine maintenance operations are feasible. TEM-based results highlight successful management strategies that maintainers employ on a day-to-day basis. Application: MOSS is a novel approach for safety data collection and analysis. It helps practitioners understand the nature of maintenance errors, promote an informed culture, and support safety management systems in the maintenance domain

Resilience markers for safer systems and organisations

If computer systems are to be designed to foster resilient performance it is important to be able to identify contributors to resilience. The emerging practice of Resilience Engineering has identified that people are still a primary source of resilience, and that the design of distributed systems should provide ways of helping people and organisations to cope with complexity. Although resilience has been identified as a desired property, researchers and practitioners do not have a clear understanding of what manifestations of resilience look like. This paper discusses some examples of strategies that people can adopt that improve the resilience of a system. Critically, analysis reveals that the generation of these strategies is only possible if the system facilitates them. As an example, this paper discusses practices, such as reflection, that are known to encourage resilient behavior in people. Reflection allows systems to better prepare for oncoming demands. We show that contributors to the practice of reflection manifest themselves at different levels of abstraction: from individual strategies to practices in, for example, control room environments. The analysis of interaction at these levels enables resilient properties of a system to be ‘seen’, so that systems can be designed to explicitly support them. We then present an analysis of resilience at an organisational level within the nuclear domain. This highlights some of the challenges facing the Resilience Engineering approach and the need for using a collective language to articulate knowledge of resilient practices across domains