28,723 research outputs found

    Scott v. Harris and the Role of the Jury in Constitutional Litigation

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    Suits brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 to recover damages for excessive force by the police bear some resemblance to common law tort litigation, since the key Fourth Amendment issue is whether the force was \u27unreasonable.\u27 In ordinary negligence law the jury typically decides whether an actor has exercised reasonable care, even when there is no dispute as to the facts. In section 1983 litigation the federal courts are badly split on the allocation of decision making between judge and jury, sometimes even within a particular circuit. The Supreme Court recently faced the judge-jury issue in Scott v. Harris, where it ruled that a police officer acts reasonably when he rams a suspect\u27s car in order to end a high speed chase. But the Court did not explain why it preferred judge over jury, nor even identify the judge-jury choice as an important issue in the case. This article argues that, whatever the merit of the substantive holding in Scott, the Court was right to favor judge over jury on the reasonableness-of-force issue. The key difference between constitutional torts and common law torts is that the defendant in a section 1983 suit can win even if he has violated the plaintiff\u27s constitutional rights. This is so because the defendant enjoys official immunity from liability for damages so long as those rights were not \u27clearly established\u27 at the time he acted. Juries cannot lay down rules. As a result, a regime in which juries decide Fourth Amendment reasonableness on a case by case basis will necessarily thwart plaintiffs\u27 efforts to recover damages. The aims of section 1983 - to deter constitutional violations and vindicate constitutional rights - would be better served by a body of law that consists of bright-line rules, which can only be made by judges

    The Scottish Jury

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    The origin of the jury is one of the subjects on which an agreement has not been. reached by writers on the history of law. A number of theories have been put forward at different times. At this day two of these theories receive considerable support. The first is that the jury system is a gradual and natural sequence from the modes of trial in use among the Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-Normans. The second-and perhaps the one more widely accepted at present-is that we owe trial by jury to the legal institutions of the Frankish empire. (Forsyth\u27s History of Trial by Jury, and Pollock and Maitland\u27s History of English Law ). Among other hypotheses is that of Meyer ( Origin and Progress of the Judicial Institutions of Europe ) who attributes jury trial in part to the assize established by Henry II, and in part to the feudal courts instituted in Palestine by the Crusaders. Beyond question the assize of Henry II marks an, important advance toward jury trial, but Meyer\u27s hypothesis is not now supported. The feudal courts in Palestine were created about io99, in the reign of Godfrey, Duke of Bouillon, and were modeled after those existing in the countries from which the Crusaders came. There were two secular courts, the one presided over by the Duke (then King of Palestine), in which twelve knights were the judges; the other, presided over by a feudal lord, in which the judges were twelve townsfolk. There were also lesser courts on the same lines. They were, however, of the nature of permanent tribunals, and had resemblance in principle to the jury court. Another theory is that of Reeve in his History of English Law. According to it the Northmen carried the Scandinavian mode of trial into Normandy and brought it with them to England. Turner, on the other hand, in his History of the Anglo-Saxons, thinks that the jury system was in use during the Saxon period. But he cannot point to anything in the records that affords any substantial support -to his theory. Other writiers have attributed the origin to a national recognition of the principle that no man ought to be condemned except by the voice of his fellow-citizens. This principle, it is maintained, is found strongly asserted among all the Teutonic nations and the jury is, simply a modification of their ancient assemblies. The objection to this theory is that the jury did not develop in traceable form in any other place than England

    Whom to Ask? Jury Selection for Decision Making Tasks on Micro-blog Services

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    It is universal to see people obtain knowledge on micro-blog services by asking others decision making questions. In this paper, we study the Jury Selection Problem(JSP) by utilizing crowdsourcing for decision making tasks on micro-blog services. Specifically, the problem is to enroll a subset of crowd under a limited budget, whose aggregated wisdom via Majority Voting scheme has the lowest probability of drawing a wrong answer(Jury Error Rate-JER). Due to various individual error-rates of the crowd, the calculation of JER is non-trivial. Firstly, we explicitly state that JER is the probability when the number of wrong jurors is larger than half of the size of a jury. To avoid the exponentially increasing calculation of JER, we propose two efficient algorithms and an effective bounding technique. Furthermore, we study the Jury Selection Problem on two crowdsourcing models, one is for altruistic users(AltrM) and the other is for incentive-requiring users(PayM) who require extra payment when enrolled into a task. For the AltrM model, we prove the monotonicity of JER on individual error rate and propose an efficient exact algorithm for JSP. For the PayM model, we prove the NP-hardness of JSP on PayM and propose an efficient greedy-based heuristic algorithm. Finally, we conduct a series of experiments to investigate the traits of JSP, and validate the efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed algorithms on both synthetic and real micro-blog data.Comment: VLDB201

    Causal Comparisons

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    Focusing on the multiple meanings of the statement A was a more important cause of C than was B, Professor Strassfeld considers the feasibility of comparative causation as a means of apportioning legal responsibility for harms. He concludse that by combining two different interpretations of more important cause --judgments of comparative counterfactual similarity and the Uniform Comparative Fault Act approach of comparative responsibility--we can effectively make causal comparisons and avoid the effort to compare such incommensurables as the defendant\u27s fault under a strict liability standard and the plaintiff\u27s failt for failure to exercise reasonable care

    The Conviction of Andrea Yates: A Narrative of Denial

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    This piece discusses the case of Andrea Yates, the woman who confessed to drowning her five children to death and was subsequently convicted of murder (though the conviction has since been overturned). In this piece, Colb contends that Andrea Yates was convicted because of the jurors’ emotional/psychological response to the possibility that post-partum psychosis could cause an otherwise decent person to commit such brutal acts. As a symptom of denial, Colb argues, the jury rejected the insanity defense and thereby reassured itself that only evil people could do what Yates did. If that were the case, then it would be fine to continue to ignore the issue of mental illness in general and its impact on post-partum women in particular

    The Conviction of Andrea Yates: A Narrative of Denial

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    Den nationella inköpssamordningen i Sverige bedrivs av två inköpscentraler, dels SKI som verkar inom den kommunala sektorn, dels SIC som svarar för den statliga inköpssamordningen. SKI kan enligt 2 kap. 9 § LOU iklä sig två funktioner: ombuds- och ramavtalsfunktionen. SIC ska däremot enligt förordningen om statlig inköpssamordning upphandla ramavtal till myndigheter under regeringen. Enligt 3 § i förordningen om statlig inköpssamordning ska myndigheter under regeringen avropa från de ramavtal som SIC upphandlar, medan en upphandlande myndighet får anskaffa byggentreprenader, varor och tjänster med hjälp av SKI enligt 4 kap. 22 § LOU. I denna uppsats undersöks om de nationella inköpscentralerna behöver motta uppdrag från upphandlande myndigheter innan inköpscentralerna upphandlar ramavtal och hur upphandlande myndigheter blir avropsberättigade till inköpscentralernas ramavtal. Av domstolsavgöranden framgår att vissa åtgärder krävs för att en upphandlande myndighet ska bli avropsberättigad till SKI:s ramavtal. En av dessa åtgärder är att en myndighet måste lämna ett uppdrag till inköpscentralen, dels för att myndigheten ska kunna bli avropsberättigad, dels för att inköpscentralen ska få upphandla ramavtal för myndighetens räkning. Dessutom krävs att myndigheten godkänner SKI:s allmänna villkor, inte avstegsanmäler sig och att SKI anger myndigheten som avropsberättigad i förfrågningsunderlaget. En myndighet under regeringen blir däremot automatiskt avropsberättigad till SIC:s ramavtal, varför något uppdrag inte är nödvändigt. I uppsatsen tydliggörs också att trenden bland upphandlande myndigheter är att deras upphandlingskompetens försämras, något som leder till att allt fler myndigheter väljer att avropa från SKI:s ramavtal. Fler avropare per ramavtal medför att den generella oförutsebarheten att uppskatta avropsvolymer ökar. Stora ramavtal riskerar att påverka konkurrensen negativt och stå i strid med artikel 32.2 femte stycket i det klassiska direktivet, eftersom konkurrensen riskerar att förhindras, begränsas eller snedvridas genom att stora ramavtal utestänger små leverantörer från att delta i ramavtalsupphandlingarna. Små leverantörer riskerar därmed att försvinna från den offentliga marknaden. De nationella inköpscentralernas arbetssätt har fått utstå en hel del kritik för att bland annat vara oförutsebara. Av den anledningen presenteras i uppsatsen arbetsmetoder som tänkbara lösningar på detta problem. Dock tydliggörs att lösningarna varken är tillfredställande för inköpscentralerna eller gynnsamma för konkurrensen på lång sikt

    Is Epistemic Permissivism a Consistent Position to Argue from?

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    Unacknowledged Permissivism

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    Epistemic permissivism is the view that it is possible for two people to rationally hold incompatible attitudes toward some proposition on the basis of one body of evidence. In this paper, I defend a particular version of permissivism ‚Äď unacknowledged permissivism (UP) ‚Äď which says that permissivism is true, but that no one can ever rationally believe that she is in a permissive case. I show that counter to what virtually all authors who have discussed UP claim, UP is an attractive view: it is compatible with the intuitive motivations for permissivism and avoids a significant challenge to permissivism: the arbitrariness objection
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