21,042 research outputs found
DETECTING OF PROBABILITY OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD USING FRAUD HEXAGON MODEL: Evidence from Indonesian Public Companies
Many of Indonesian public companies had proven guilty that have committed financial statement fraud.The purpose of this research is for detecting financial statement fraud using fraud hexagon model consists of pressure, opportunity, rationalization, ccompetence, arrogance & collusion variabels. The sample in this reaserch specifically chose companies that were proven to have committed financial statement fraud and used logistical regression estimation technique assisted by STATA 14.The results of this reaserch shows that pressure proxied by financial stability, rationalization proxied by total accruals and collusion proxied by state owned enterprises (SOEs) have positive effect significantly on probability of financal statement fraud. Consequently, change of receivables, change of directors, CEO education, CEO narcissism, managerial ownership and CEO duality have negative effect on probability of financial statement fraud. meanwhile, external pressure, financial target, ineffective monitoring and auditor switching have no efffect on probability of financial statement fraud. The fraud hexagon model  can be used for financial statement fraud detection because the results support the collusion variable proxied by state owned enterprises (SOEs) which indicates that regulation, supervision and punishment are still weak for parties proven to have committed financial statement fraud
Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment
This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of RJV-participating firms, which is also necessary and sufficient for a decrease in consumer welfare. Using information from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust evidence that large networks between direct competitors – created through firms being members in several RJVs at the same time – are conducive to collusive outcomes in the product market which reduce consumer welfare. By contrast, RJVs among non-competitors are efficiency enhancing
Endogenous Price Commitment, Sticky and Leadership Pricing: Evidence from the Italian Petrol Market
This article studies dynamic pricing strategies in the Italian gasoline market before and after the market leader unilaterally announced its commitment to adopt a sticky-pricing policy. Using daily Italian firm level prices and weekly average EU prices, we show that the effect of the new policy was twofold. First, it facilitated price alignment and coordination on price changes. After the policy change, the observed pricing pattern shifted from cost-based to sticky-leadership pricing. Second, using a dif-in-dif estimation and a synthetic control group, we show that the causal effect of the new policy was to significantly increase prices through sticky-leadership pricing. Our paper highlights the importance of price-commitment by a large firm in order to sustain (tacit) collusion
Towards joint decoding of binary Tardos fingerprinting codes
The class of joint decoder of probabilistic fingerprinting codes is of utmost
importance in theoretical papers to establish the concept of fingerprint
capacity. However, no implementation supporting a large user base is known to
date. This article presents an iterative decoder which is, as far as we are
aware of, the first practical attempt towards joint decoding. The
discriminative feature of the scores benefits on one hand from the
side-information of previously accused users, and on the other hand, from
recently introduced universal linear decoders for compound channels. Neither
the code construction nor the decoder make precise assumptions about the
collusion (size or strategy). The extension to incorporate soft outputs from
the watermarking layer is straightforward. An extensive experimental work
benchmarks the very good performance and offers a clear comparison with
previous state-of-the-art decoders.Comment: submitted to IEEE Trans. on Information Forensics and Security. -
typos corrected, one new plot, references added about ECC based
fingerprinting code
On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion
Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint ventures (RJV) participation facilitating collusion, empirical tests are rare. Even more so, there are few empirical tests on the general theme of collusion. This note tries to fill this gap by assuming a correspondence between the stability of research joint ventures and collusion. By using data from the US Nation Cooperation Research Act, we show that large RJVs in concentrated industries are more stable and hence more suspect to collusion
Econometric Tools for Detection of Collusion Equilibrium in the Industry
The article presents the notion of detection of overt or tacit collusion equilibrium in the context of choice of the appropriate econometric method, which is determined by the amount of information that the observer possesses. There has been shown one of the collusion markers coherent with an equilibrium of the proper model of strategic interaction – the presence of structural disturbances in the price process variance for phases of collusion and competition. The Markov Switching Model with switching of variance regimes has been proposed as a proper theoretical method detecting that type of changes without prior knowledge of switching moments. In order to verify the effectiveness of the method it has been applied to a series of lysine market prices throughout and after termination of its manufacturers’ collusion.explicit and tacit collusion, collusive equilibrium, cartel detection, lysine, price variance, Markov switching model.
Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment
This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of RJV-participating firms, which is also necessary and sufficient for a decrease in consumer welfare. Using information from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust evidence that large networks between direct competitors – created through firms being members in several RJVs at the same time – are conducive to collusive outcomes in the product market which reduce consumer welfare. By contrast, RJVs among non-competitors are efficiency enhancing.Research Joint Ventures; Innovation; Collusion; NCRA
Millers, Commission Agents and Collusion in Grain Auction Markets: Evidence from Basmati Auctions in North India
This paper undertakes structural estimation of asymmetric auction models in a market for basmati, and detects the presence of a cartel consisting of a large (in market share) local miller and commission agents purchasing for large distant millers. The contracts between the distant millers and their commission agents help to explain the specific form that collusion takes. Simulations indicate that (i) the cartel gains considerably by colluding, over the competitive outcome; (ii) however, sellers (farmers) do not lose significantly under collusion when the commission agents bid; (iii) a knowledgeable auctioneer would choose much higher starting prices for auctions when commission agents bid, compared with the observed starting prices. The paper also shows that efficient collusion, the form of collusion commonly assumed in the literature, does not explain the data well.Auctions, Cartels, Agricultural Markets.
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