A framework for the design and analysis of incentive systems for food safety control in supply chains

Since 2005 the EU food industry has primary legal responsibility for food safety control. This requires new responsibilities and relationships between government and industry, and between companies. This research presents a framework for incentive systems for food safety control in supply chains. It emphasizes key elements of food safety control from multiple perspectives and provides insights for the design and analysis of incentive systems for food safety control. An incentive system combines inter-company incentive mechanisms with intra-company decision making processes to control a hazard within the legal environment. Incentive mechanisms, which consist of a performance measure and a performance reward, induce companies to use control measures. The framework can be used to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of alternative incentive systems in which companies have to cooperate with partners from other stages of the supply chain.Incentive mechanism, food safety, supply chain control., Agricultural and Food Policy,

Traceability in the U.S. Food Supply: An Application of Transaction Cost Analysis

Suboptimal supply of food and agricultural traceability is framed in a transaction cost analysis. We propose a model that considers the variables of opportunism potential, agency costs, uncertainty, asset specificity, frequency, and transaction costs. The model is then applied to the development of a typology of feasible governance modes – market, hybrid, firm, or public bureau, considering levels of transaction costs and competencies of private firms. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed and future research opportunities are suggested.traceability supply, transaction cost economics, agency theory, Agribusiness,

Network industries in the new economy

In this paper we discuss two propositions: the supply and demand of knowledge, and network externalities. We outline the characteristics that distinguish knowledge- intensive industries from the general run of manufacturing and service businesses. Knowledge intensity and knowledge specialisation has developed as markets and globalisation have grown, leading to progressive incentives to outsource and for industries to deconstruct. The outcome has been more intensive competition. The paper looks at what is potentially the most powerful economic mechanism: positive feedback, alternatively known as demand-side increasing returns, network effects, or network externalities. We present alternative demand curves that incorporate positive feedback and discuss their potential economic and strategic consequences. We argue that knowledge supply and demand, and the dynamics of network externalities create new situations for our traditional industrial economy such that new types of economies of scale are emerging and "winner takes all" strategies are having more influence. This is the first of a pair of papers. A second paper will take the argument further and look at the nature of firms' strategies in the new world, arguing that technology standards, technical platforms, consumer networks, and supply chain strategies are making a significant contribution to relevant strategies within the new economy

Do Inspection and Traceability Provide Incentives for Food Safety?

One of the goals of inspection and traceability is to motivate suppliers to deliver safer food. The ability of these policies to motivate suppliers depends on the accuracy of the inspection, the cost of failing inspection, the cost of causing a foodborne illness, and the proportion of these costs paid by the supplier. We develop a model of the supplier's expected cost as a function of inspection accuracy, the cost of failure, and the proportion of the failure cost that is allocated to suppliers. The model is used to identify the conditions under which the supplier is motivated to deliver uncontaminated lots. Surprisingly, our results show that when safety failure costs can be allocated to suppliers, minimum levels of inspection error are required to motivate a supplier to deliver uncontaminated lots. This result does not hold when costs cannot be allocated to suppliers. As a case study, we use our results to analyze the technical requirements for suppliers of frozen beef to the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service.diagnostic error, food safety, inspection, sampling error, traceability, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

Towards the development of the supply chain of concentrated solar power

This work focuses on the investigation into the planning of renewable energy power plants in Brazil using the Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) technology. The main aim of the paper is to present an analysis of the planning process that can be used as a basis of the development of a method to assess the Brazilian’s local manufacturing and supply chain capabilities in supporting the deployment of the CSP technology. The paper identifies areas in which the concerted efforts should be emphasized. For this, the paper will first discuss the key components of the chosen CSP technology (in this case the parabolic through). The manufacturing processes of these components will subsequently be analyzed and the key enabling technologies will be determined. The demands of electricity will be estimated using the System Advisory Model®, a modelling tool developed by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). An assessment method will finally be proposed to identify the potentials of the local Brazilian supply chain, through the readiness evaluation of the key enabling technologies and manufacturing processes

CHAIN QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN CO-OPERATIVES

This paper investigates the relationship between the chosen quality strategy and the vertical co-ordination mechanism of a focal company by using new institutional economics, as well as strategic management approaches. The theoretical findings are tested using evidence from 19 of the largest Polish dairy cooperatives, surveyed in spring 2006. The results show that all co-ops recognise the changing market requirements and are treating food quality as more than plain food safety and the ability to continuously reproduce an ex ante defined set of attributes. However, compared to investor-owned dairies, co-ops are disadvantaged in quality-based competition due to their lower flexibility and access to financial and qualified human resources. To overcome this intense competition, co-ops modify their production profile, which leads to market segmentation. Moreover, the choice of quality strategy is an economic activity, guided by the co-op's profit expectations within the selected market. The chosen quality strategy determines the design of the vertical co-ordination mechanism. Thus, the higher the requirements for the final product, the further quality management systems go beyond a firm's boundaries, and the higher is the intensity of the relationships between the intermediary stages in the dairy chain.Network theory, Relationship management, Quality management, Cooperatives, Poland, Institutional and Behavioral Economics,

E-COMMERCE IN AGRICULTURE: DEVELOPMENT, STRATEGY, AND MARKET IMPLICATIONS

Marketing,