Pre-flight Functionality Check to Enhance Mission Efficacy of Precision Guided Munitions

Precision-guided munitions (PGMs), because of their precision strike capability, are used extensively in the modern warfare. The efficacy of the mission is critically dependent on the successful deployment of the weapon. To ensure high level of effectiveness of these sophisticated weapons, these must be tested at regular intervals. Periodic functionality checks of these weapons are carried out using comprehensive characterisation systems. In addition to comprehensive testing, pre-flight functionality checks with the weapon strapped on to the launchplatform using portable test systems should be carried out. These functionality checks, also referred to as serviceability checks, perform Go/No Go testing of the weapon by focusing on one or two vital parameters of the guided weapon. Pre-flight functionality check of PGM allows a quick appraisal on the functional status of the vital operational parameters of relevance to efficacy of the mission. This review highlights the parameters that need to be checked, both for comprehensive testing of these weapons on a periodic basis and also those required for pre-flight functionality or readiness checks. International systems available for the purpose have also been reviewed, vis-à-vis, their capabilities and limitations to perform the two types of tests with particular emphasis on the pre-flight functionality checks with guided weapon in strap-on condition. Some alternative design approaches have also been proposed.Defence Science Journal, 2009, 59(5), pp.459-465, DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.14429/dsj.59.154

An Inference about Interference: A Surprising Application of Existing International Law to Inhibit Anti-Satellite Weapons

This article presents a thesis that most readers will find surprising, in an effort to develop a novel, simultaneous solution to three urgent, complex problems related to outer space. The three problems are: a) the technical fact that debris in outer space (the accumulated orbital junk produced by decades of space activities) has grown to present a serious hazard to safe and effective exploration and exploitation of space; b) the strategic fact that many countries (notably the United States, China and Russia, but others, too) continue to demonstrate a misguided interest in pursuing anti-satellite weapons, which can jeopardize the security of space; and c) the political fact that attempts to provide additional legal regulation of outer space (via new bilateral or multilateral international agreements) have failed, with little prospect for prompt conclusion of meaningful new accords. The proposed solution is to adapt existing international law in an unforeseen way. Specifically, numerous current and historical arms control treaties provide for verification of parties’ compliance via “national technical means” (NTM) of verification, which prominently include satellite-based sensory and communications systems. These treaties routinely provide protection for those essential space assets by requiring parties to undertake “not to interfere” with NTM. The argument developed here is that additional tests in space of debris-creating anti-satellite weapons would already be illegal, even without the conclusion of any dedicated new treaty against further weaponization of space, because in the current crowded conditions of space, a new cloud of orbital debris would, sooner or later, impermissibly interfere with NTM satellites. If sustained, this thesis can provide a new rationale for opposition to the development, testing, and use of anti-satellite weapons. It a legal reinforcement for the political instincts to avoid activities that further undercut the optimal usability of outer space, and it demonstrates how creative re-interpretation of existing legal provisions can promote the advancement of the rule of international law, even in circumstances where the articulation of new treaties is blocked

Ballistic missile defence: how soon, how significant, and what should Australia's policy be?

Summary: The issue of ballistic missile defence (BMD) was a controversial one when US President Reagan first advocated a strategic-level system in the early 1980s. It remains so today. What’s Australia’s interest? We live a long way away from most current ballistic missile arsenals. But the ADF frequently deploys within range of ballistic missile systems, especially in Northeast Asia or the Middle East, and those systems might proliferate more widely in the future. The paper considers the two questions we need to decide. The first is the priority for enhancing the ADF’s own BMD capabilities. The second is whether it makes sense for us to participate in a cooperative arrangement with the US or other partners

Country Report: South Korea; Defense Reform and Force Enhancement Plans

The Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) is facing 'omni-directional' threats, including a risk of war with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). South Korea is building up an appropriate level of military force to be able to counter threats from any direction across regions and operational domains. In addition, the ROK Armed Forces are eager to contribute to a mutually complementary and robust ROK-US alliance to strengthen deterrence and territorial defense. At the same time, South Korea aims to bolster its role on the international stage by increasing its contributions to overseas deployments and out-of-area operations. It actively supports global responses against threats to the international norms and order. In South Korea, the idea that the two goals of national- and international-oriented security are complementary enjoys very broad support

Research Brief

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UAV swarm attack: protection system alternatives for Destroyers

Systems Engineering Project ReportThe Navy needs to protect Destroyers (DDGs) from Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) attacks. The team, focusing on improving the DDG’s defenses against small radar cross section UAVs making suicide attacks, established a DRM, identified current capability gaps, established a functional flow, created requirements, modeled the DDG’s current sensing and engagement capabilities in Microsoft Excel, and used Monte Carlo analysis of 500 simulation runs to determine that four out of eight incoming IED UAVs are likely to hit the ship. Sensitivity analysis showed that improving weapon systems is more effec-tive than improving sensor systems, inspiring the generation of alternatives for improving UAV defense. For the eight feasible alternatives the team estimated cost, assessed risk in accordance with the requirements, simulated performance against the eight incoming UAVs, and performed cost benefit analysis. Adding CIWS mounts is the most cost effec-tive alternative, reducing the average number of UAV hits from a baseline of 3.82 to 2.50, costing $816M to equip the 62-DDG fleet for a 12-year life cycle. Combining that with upgraded EW capabilities to jam remote-controlled UAVs reduces the hits to 1.56 for$1844M, and combining those with decoy launchers to defeat the radar-seeking Har-py UAVs reduces the hits to 1.12 for $2862M.http://archive.org/details/uavswarmttackpro1094528669Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited