Revitalizing Multilateral Governance at the World Trade Organization Report of the High-Level Board of Experts on the Future of Global Trade Governance. Bertelsmann Policy Brief 2018

If international trade is not governed by rules, mere might dictates what is right. The World Trade Organization (WTO) serves as a place where trade policy issues are addressed, disputes arbitrated, legal frameworks derived and enforced. Through these functions, the WTO ensures that the rules of trade policy are inspired by fairness and reciprocity rather than national interest. It is more important than ever to vitalize the global public good that it rep-resents against various threats that have been undermining it. Therefore, the Global Economic Dynamics project of the Bertelsmann Stiftung has called into life a High-Level Board of Experts on the Future of Global Trade Governance. Composed of eminent experts and seasoned trade diplomats, it elaborated a series of feasible policy recommendations that will increase the effectiveness and sali-ence of the WTO. We hope that this Report provides helpful suggestions in a time marked by increasing trade disputes and protectionism and instead contributes to stronger multilateral institutions and fora.1 The Bertelsmann Stiftung owes a debt of gratitude to Prof Bernard Hoekman, the Chairman of the Expert Board and author of this report. His invaluable expertise and experience, guidance and ability to bridge controversial opinions have been crucial in defining the work of the Board. We would also like to express our sincere thanks to all our Board Members, who generously contributed their expertise, time and networks. Without their dedication, this Report would not have been possible. Finally, we would like to thank Robert Koopman and Aik Hoe Lim of the WTO for their support throughout the whole process and Christian Bluth of Bertelsmann Stiftung for managing this common endeavour

Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?

It is widely argued that Europe's unified monetary policy calls for the international coordination at the fiscal level. We survey the issues involved with such coordination of fiscal policy as a demand management tool and we use a simple model to investigate the circumstances under which coordination may be desirable. It turns out that coordination is beneficial when the correlation of the shocks hitting the various economies is low. However, given the potentially adverse reaction by the ECB (as a result of free-riding and/or a conflict on the orientation of the policy mix), fiscal coordination is likely to be counterproductive when demand or supply shocks are highly symmetric across countries and the governments are unable to acquire a strategic leadership position vis-à-vis the ECB.EMU, fiscal coordination, shocks, demand management

Trade rules and global governance: A long term agenda. The Future of Banking

Contents: 1 - Jürgen von Hagen, Jean Pisani-Ferry - Forum Economique Franco-Allemand /Deutsch-Französisches Wirtschaftspolitisches Forum -- 4 - Pierre Jacquet, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Dominique Strauss-Kahn - Trade Rules and Global Governance: A long term Agenda -- 21 - Reinhard H. Schmidt - The Future of Banking --

EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean - Cooperation against All Odds?

Focusing on the Euro-Mediterranean relations since the early 1990s, this paper investigates in how far the EU has been able to shape its relations with third countries according to its democracy promotion policy. The paper traces the evolution of the EU’s provisions for democracy promotion and compares the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with seven (semi-)authoritarian regimes (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia) since the early 1990s. A clear regional trend to more intensive cooperation lends credibility to the claim that the EU possesses a certain agenda setting power in international relations. A systematic comparison across countries and over time explores the explanatory power of interdependence, political liberalisation, and statehood for the remaining country variation. The paper finds that the degree of political liberalisation in target countries is the most important scope condition for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion and points to the need of further investigating (domestic) factors to account for the EU’s differential ‘normative power’ in international relations.closer cooperation; closer cooperation; democracy; Mediterranean; Europeanization; Europeanization

A Deliberative Democratic Theory of Precedent

Stare decisis is widely regarded as a vital mechanism for promoting the rule of law. Yet high courts can always overrule prior decisions with a special justification, and different justices will inevitably have different perspectives on when such a justification exists. Moreover, when courts rely on stare decisis to follow a mistaken or unjustified decision, they arguably undermine the rule of law. Stare decisis therefore does not, and probably cannot, reliably promote a formal conception of the rule of law. While this reality might lead us to conclude that we should give up on horizontal stare decisis, presumptive deference to precedent may serve other worthwhile functions. This Article argues that rather than providing a binding legal constraint, presumptive deference to precedent is best understood as a mechanism for promoting the democratic legitimacy of a constitutional regime by facilitating reasoned deliberation within the judiciary regarding the most justifiable understanding of the Constitution and generating sustained constitutional dialogue of a deliberative and agonistic nature outside the federal courts. This Article thus contends that deliberation is the governing value that should be used to evaluate and implement stare decisis in practice. This Article explores what a deliberative democratic vision of precedent would entail and concludes that by shifting our focus from law to democracy we can develop a coherent and normatively attractive grand unifying theory of precedent that comports with the best understanding of American legal practice. This theory also provides a normative framework to critique the approach of the current Court and a descriptive lens that may offer potential hope for the future

‘Normative or Realist’ versus ‘Normative and Realist’

The idea of the EU constituting a form of ‘normative power’ in its external relations is one which holds significant appeal – not only to European policymakers but also to a number of academic commentators. This article first outlines what is meant by ‘normative power’, and then offers a critique based on a political economy understanding of the ways in which ‘norms’ and interests are intermeshed. The example of relations between the EU and Morocco is examined in detail. It is concluded that the EU claim to represent a ‘normative power’ – understood in a necessarily positive and idealist sense – is misleading, but that the EU does seek to promote and support certain norms that may or may not be in the best interests of those at the receiving end of these promotive and supportive efforts

Wellbeing and reproductive freedoms: assessing progress, setting agendas

Wellbeing, Rights and Reproduction Research Paper II

The International Negotiation Practices of the European External Action Service

Putnam’s seminal work on two-level game theory has been used widely in international negotiation research. The European Union is often argued to be a tough negotiating partner and its complex system of preferences poses a challenge to many of the fundamental assumptions of the two-level game model. The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2011 introduced another core stakeholder in EU negotiations which remains an under-researched area. This thesis proposes an alternative approach to the research of EU international negotiations based on the two-level game model: the integration of practice theory. The recent ‘practice turn’ in social sciences provides a unique theoretical and methodological approach to the investigation of international phenomena. It is based on the premise that world affairs are enacted through the performance of daily practices by human actors. This thesis thus combines two-level game theory and practice theory in order to describe the practices of the EEAS during the negotiation of the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement. In terms of methodology, the objective is to gain empirical insight in the performance of practices which necessitated data acquisition from semi-structured qualitative interviews and text based primary sources. The data is subsequently interpreted through the combined perspective of the two-level game model and the core concepts of practice theory. The findings demonstrate that the practices of the EEAS were crucial in the negotiation of the PDCA. The practice-based analysis also suggests that practices render preferences dynamic which may relax the assumption of the EU being a tough negotiating partner. Finally, it is concluded that despite the methodological limitations, practice theory promises valuable perspectives for the implementation of the two-level game model