95,347 research outputs found
Learning to Reach Agreement in a Continuous Ultimatum Game
It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to
the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a
class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not
have much difficulty with social dilemmas, as they are able to balance personal
benefit and group benefit. As agents in multi-agent systems are regularly
confronted with social dilemmas, for instance in tasks such as resource
allocation, these agents may benefit from the inclusion of mechanisms thought
to facilitate human fairness. Although many of such mechanisms have already
been implemented in a multi-agent systems context, their application is usually
limited to rather abstract social dilemmas with a discrete set of available
strategies (usually two). Given that many real-world examples of social
dilemmas are actually continuous in nature, we extend this previous work to
more general dilemmas, in which agents operate in a continuous strategy space.
The social dilemma under study here is the well-known Ultimatum Game, in which
an optimal solution is achieved if agents agree on a common strategy. We
investigate whether a scale-free interaction network facilitates agents to
reach agreement, especially in the presence of fixed-strategy agents that
represent a desired (e.g. human) outcome. Moreover, we study the influence of
rewiring in the interaction network. The agents are equipped with
continuous-action learning automata and play a large number of random pairwise
games in order to establish a common strategy. From our experiments, we may
conclude that results obtained in discrete-strategy games can be generalized to
continuous-strategy games to a certain extent: a scale-free interaction network
structure allows agents to achieve agreement on a common strategy, and rewiring
in the interaction network greatly enhances the agents ability to reach
agreement. However, it also becomes clear that some alternative mechanisms,
such as reputation and volunteering, have many subtleties involved and do not
have convincing beneficial effects in the continuous case
Emergence of social networks via direct and indirect reciprocity
Many models of social network formation implicitly assume that network properties are static in steady-state. In contrast, actual social networks are highly dynamic: allegiances and collaborations expire and may or may not be renewed at a later date. Moreover, empirical studies show that human social networks are dynamic at the individual level but static at the global level: individuals' degree rankings change considerably over time, whereas network-level metrics such as network diameter and clustering coefficient are relatively stable. There have been some attempts to explain these properties of empirical social networks using agent-based models in which agents play social dilemma games with their immediate neighbours, but can also manipulate their network connections to
strategic advantage. However, such models cannot straightforwardly account for reciprocal behaviour based on reputation scores ("indirect reciprocity"), which is known to play an important role in many economic interactions. In
order to account for indirect reciprocity, we model the network in a bottom-up fashion: the network emerges from the low-level interactions between agents. By so doing we are able to simultaneously account for the effect of both direct reciprocity (e.g. "tit-for-tat") as well as indirect
reciprocity (helping strangers in order to increase one's reputation). This leads to a strategic equilibrium in the frequencies with which strategies are adopted in the population as a whole, but intermittent cycling over different strategies at the level of individual agents, which in turn gives rise to social networks which
are dynamic at the individual level but stable at the network level
Trust Strategies for the Semantic Web
Everyone agrees on the importance of enabling trust on the SemanticWebto ensure more efficient agent interaction. Current research on trust seems to focus on developing computational models, semantic representations, inference techniques, etc. However, little attention has been given to the plausible trust strategies or tactics that an agent can follow when interacting with other agents on the Semantic Web. In this paper we identify five most common strategies of trust and discuss their envisaged costs and benefits. The aim is to provide some guidelines to help system developers appreciate the risks and gains involved with each trust strategy
Partner Selection for the Emergence of Cooperation in Multi-Agent Systems Using Reinforcement Learning
Social dilemmas have been widely studied to explain how humans are able to
cooperate in society. Considerable effort has been invested in designing
artificial agents for social dilemmas that incorporate explicit agent
motivations that are chosen to favor coordinated or cooperative responses. The
prevalence of this general approach points towards the importance of achieving
an understanding of both an agent's internal design and external environment
dynamics that facilitate cooperative behavior. In this paper, we investigate
how partner selection can promote cooperative behavior between agents who are
trained to maximize a purely selfish objective function. Our experiments reveal
that agents trained with this dynamic learn a strategy that retaliates against
defectors while promoting cooperation with other agents resulting in a
prosocial society.Comment:
Asymptotically idempotent aggregation operators for trust management in multi-agent systems
The study of trust management in
multi-agent system, especially distributed,
has grown over the last
years. Trust is a complex subject
that has no general consensus in literature,
but has emerged the importance
of reasoning about it computationally.
Reputation systems takes
into consideration the history of an
entity’s actions/behavior in order to
compute trust, collecting and aggregating
ratings from members in a
community. In this scenario the aggregation
problem becomes fundamental,
in particular depending on
the environment. In this paper we
describe a technique based on a class
of asymptotically idempotent aggregation
operators, suitable particulary
for distributed anonymous environments
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