Infinite options, intransitive value, and supererogation

Supererogatory acts are those that lie “beyond the call of duty.” There are two standard ways to define this idea more precisely. Although the definitions are often seen as equivalent, I argue that they can diverge when options are infinite, or when there are cycles of better options; moreover, each definition is acceptable in only one case. I consider two ways out of this dilemma

Supererogation and doing the best one can

A thorough philosophical inquiry into supererogation would need to deal with the following four questions. What is the nature of supererogation? Are supererogatory acts possible? Do they actually occur? Are those acts that we commonly call supererogatory in fact supererogatory? There is a certain progression to these questions. Establishing the nature of supererogation does not ensure that supererogatory acts are possible. (Compare inquiring into the nature of a squircle and establishing that it is a square circle.) Establishing the possibility of supererogatory acts does not ensure their actuality. Establishing their actuality does not ensure that those acts that we commonly call supererogatory are in fact so

Moral norms, moral ideals and supererogation

The aim of the paper is to investigate the relations between the basic moral categories, namely those of norms, ideals and supererogation. The subject of discussion is, firstly, the ways that these categories are understood; secondly, the possible approaches towards moral acting that appear due to their use; and thirdly, their relationship within the moral system. However, what is of a special importance here is the relationship between the categories of norms and ideals (or in a wider aspect — laudable acts) and a thesis about their complementary character. For it seems that the omission of one of the elements that are analysed within a moral system must result in an essential limitation of both the possibilities of finding an adequate approach to a given moral problem (on a descriptive level), as well as defining the full set of normative guidelines. Therefore, as I shall argue, resigning from a two-level method of moral analysis may lead to the atrophy of the very idea of ethics itself

Research and Analysis of The Phenomenon of International Terrorism - Issues, Challenges and Weaknesses

In this article we intend to highlight some problems that must be considered within the framework of an approach aiming to comprehend the terrorist phenomenon, an investigation conducted both at a scholarly level, and a at general audience one. In the opening part we identify several difficulties that emerge from any attempt to specify the conceptual meaning of „international terrorism”. This is a concept that involves a great deal of subjectivity and is highly contested, and consequently it cannot grasp the corresponding phenomenon in a universal and objective manner, especially since a large number of actors in the international arena make use of violence in order to advance their political aims. This is why it is imperative to acknowledge the particular interests and the strategic objectives involved in any „construction” of the terrorist phenomenon. Thus we open the way for an analysis, conducted in a critical manner, of the theoretical and empirical issues raised by this approach; finally, we turn to a presentation of the contributions made by sociological research, given the need to gain a better understanding of international terrorism.international terrorism, sociological research, critical analysis

The Nature of Supererogation and its Application in Medical Practice

This thesis emphasises the need for doctors' professional duties to be bound firmly together with their moral obligations; there is danger for the patient when there is a divergence. I believe that the consideration and practice of supererogation acts as a means to further this union. I argue for its inclusion in medical practice. Acts of supererogation go beyond the requirements of duty. The concept has roots in Christianity, and was most fully developed by St Thomas Aquinas. It came under attack during the Reformation; for Protestants, salvation was not to be earned by good works, it was only bestowed by the grace of God. The concept has largely disappeared from everyday usage in a secular society, nevertheless there is an expectation that members of the caring professions should embrace it to some extent. Doctors have lost an understanding of the subject, hampered by the professionalization of medicine. This thesis illustrates the concept in its practical application and provides a framework of three different models of supererogation. I look to the work of K.E.Kirk and Stanley Hauerwas in theology, and I look at the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and Iris Murdoch to support my claims. Examples from literary sources, rather than medical case histories which are often too businesslike in tone, illustrate the complexity of what takes place between patient and doctor. Doctors might fail to see what is important; they need the faculty of moral perception and also imagination to think of what more can be done for patients as well as wisdom to judge if this can be done safely. I believe that my third model of supererogation could be put into practice for the benefit of both patients and doctors

Accommodating Options

Many of us think we have agent-centred options to act suboptimally. Some of these involve favouring our own interests. Others involve sacrificing them. In this paper, I explore three different ways to accommodate agent-centred options in a criterion of objective permissibility. I argue against satisficing and rational pluralism, and in favour of a principle built around sensitivity to personal cost

What We Owe to Ourselves: Essays on Rights and Supererogation

Some sacrifices—like giving a kidney or heroically dashing into a burning building—are supererogatory: they are good deeds beyond the call of duty. But if such deeds are really so good, philosophers ask, why shouldn’t morality just require them? The standard answer is that morality recognizes a special role for the pursuit of self-interest, so that everyone may treat themselves as if they were uniquely important. This idea, however, cannot be reconciled with the compelling picture of morality as impartial—the view that we are each anyone’s equal. I propose an alternative Self-Other Symmetric account of our moral freedom: the limits on what morality may demand of us are set by the duties we owe to ourselves. I begin with a defense of the Self-Other Symmetry: the idea that we owe the same duties to ourselves—and have the same rights against ourselves—as any relevantly similar other. Because we are consenting parties to our own actions, I argue, our rights against ourselves do not function like the rights of unwilling others. Instead, they play a permissive function, allowing us to block the demand to give up what is ours. I conclude by uniting, aggravating, and trying to solve some paradoxes of supererogatory permissions, guided by the idea that morality cannot be reduced to a ranking of options from best-to-worst. Rights against oneself are an irreducible second dimension, one that we need if we are to unify rights and supererogation into an impartial moral vision