Grid Representations and the Chromatic Number

A grid drawing of a graph maps vertices to grid points and edges to line segments that avoid grid points representing other vertices. We show that there is a number of grid points that some line segment of an arbitrary grid drawing must intersect. This number is closely connected to the chromatic number. Second, we study how many columns we need to draw a graph in the grid, introducing some new \NP-complete problems. Finally, we show that any planar graph has a planar grid drawing where every line segment contains exactly two grid points. This result proves conjectures asked by David Flores-Pe\~naloza and Francisco Javier Zaragoza Martinez.Comment: 22 pages, 8 figure

Steinitz Theorems for Orthogonal Polyhedra

We define a simple orthogonal polyhedron to be a three-dimensional polyhedron with the topology of a sphere in which three mutually-perpendicular edges meet at each vertex. By analogy to Steinitz's theorem characterizing the graphs of convex polyhedra, we find graph-theoretic characterizations of three classes of simple orthogonal polyhedra: corner polyhedra, which can be drawn by isometric projection in the plane with only one hidden vertex, xyz polyhedra, in which each axis-parallel line through a vertex contains exactly one other vertex, and arbitrary simple orthogonal polyhedra. In particular, the graphs of xyz polyhedra are exactly the bipartite cubic polyhedral graphs, and every bipartite cubic polyhedral graph with a 4-connected dual graph is the graph of a corner polyhedron. Based on our characterizations we find efficient algorithms for constructing orthogonal polyhedra from their graphs.Comment: 48 pages, 31 figure

Quantum Structure in Competing Lizard Communities

Almost two decades of research on applications of the mathematical formalism of quantum theory as a modeling tool in domains different from the micro-world has given rise to many successful applications in situations related to human behavior and thought, more specifically in cognitive processes of decision-making and the ways concepts are combined into sentences. In this article, we extend this approach to animal behavior, showing that an analysis of an interactive situation involving a mating competition between certain lizard morphs allows to identify a quantum theoretic structure. More in particular, we show that when this lizard competition is analyzed structurally in the light of a compound entity consisting of subentities, the contextuality provided by the presence of an underlying rock-paper-scissors cyclic dynamics leads to a violation of Bell's inequality, which means it is of a non-classical type. We work out an explicit quantum-mechanical representation in Hilbert space for the lizard situation and show that it faithfully models a set of experimental data collected on three throat-colored morphs of a specific lizard species. Furthermore, we investigate the Hilbert space modeling, and show that the states describing the lizard competitions contain entanglement for each one of the considered confrontations of lizards with different competing strategies, which renders it no longer possible to interpret these states of the competing lizards as compositions of states of the individual lizards.Comment: 28 page

How Does Colour Experience Represent the World?

Many favor representationalism about color experience. To a first approximation, this view holds that experiencing is like believing. In particular, like believing, experiencing is a matter of representing the world to be a certain way. Once you view color experience along these lines, you face a big question: do our color experiences represent the world as it really is? For instance, suppose you see a tomato. Representationalists claim that having an experience with this sensory character is necessarily connected with representing a distinctive quality as pervading a round area out there in external space. Let us call it “sensible redness” to highlight the fact that the representation of this property is necessarily connected with the sensory character of the experience. Is this property, sensible redness, really co-instantiated with roundness out there in the space before you