A networked voting rule for democratic representation

We introduce a general framework for exploring the problem of selecting a committee of representatives with the aim of studying a networked voting rule based on a decentralized large-scale platform, which can assure a strong accountability of the elected. The results of our simulations suggest that this algorithm-based approach is able to obtain a high representativeness for relatively small committees, performing even better than a classical voting rule based on a closed list of candidates. We show that a general relation between committee size and representatives exists in the form of an inverse square root law and that the normalized committee size approximately scales with the inverse of the community size, allowing the scalability to very large populations. These findings are not strongly influenced by the different networks used to describe the individuals interactions, except for the presence of few individuals with very high connectivity which can have a marginally negative effect in the committee selection process.Comment: Submitted for publicatio

Analysis of a networked social algorithm for collective selection of a committee of representatives

A recent work by Hern\'andez et al. introduced a networked voting rule supported by a trust-based social network, where indications of possible representatives were based on individuals opinions. Individual contributions went beyond a simple vote-counting and were based on proxy voting. These mechanisms generated a high level of representativeness of the selected committee, weakening the possibility of relations of patronage. By incorporating the integrity of individuals and its perception, here we address the question of the trustability of the resulting committee. Our results show that this voting rule provides high representativeness for small committees with a high level of integrity. Furthermore, the voting system displays robustness to a strategic and untruthful application of the voting algorithm.Comment: 7 pages and 8 figures. Submitted for publication. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1801.0539

Contingent representativity: Rival views of representatve bureaucracy and the challenges for nationbuilders

In this paper, we argue that representative bureaucracy is a changing concept, and that in the academic and policy debate on representative bureaucracy in fact three different debates are intermingled. While the debate on representative bureaucracy in Public Administration is generally situated within wider debates about tensions between bureaucracy and democracy, this is only part of the story. We argue that discussions and scholarship on representative bureaucracy in fact employ three different concepts of representative bureaucracy. The reasons for making the bureaucracy representative in these three rival concepts are quite divergent, and even the conception of what representativity means is totally different. These rival concepts reflect a particular view on the role of the state and the relation between states and citizens

The Employers in the Swedish Model The Importance of Labour Market Competition and Organisation

The way the labour market functions is a crucial factor in any analysis of the Swedish model. Full employment contributed to the growth of what were probably the two most important institutions in this model: centralised negotiations between the social partners and, secondly, the Rehn-Meidner model, involving pay policies based on solidarity with the low-paid. Here, we have examined the role of the employers in the rise, application and fall of the centralised bargaining model. In this respect, the Swedish Metal Trades Employers' Association (VF), the largest and most important employer organisation in the peak association SAF, was the actor whose interests eventually led to the model's demise. The principal cause was discontent over the way this bargaining model worked in practice. The engineering industries felt their interests were being neglected in the giant employer collective. This empirical investigation into an employer organisations's internal actions, combining economic history with organisation theory, shows the importance of the market mechanism for employer policy during full employment. They sought a solution to the problem of wage drift. Significantly, it began by helping to push through centralised bargaining in the 1950s. When wage drift subsequently showed a tendency to decline towards the end of the 1970s, this was seen as a result of more extensive local and regional organisation. Competition and wage drift, it was felt, could be handled better through local collaboration than through large-scale collective action. One of the institutions of the Swedish model had thereby met its end.Employers Swedish Model; Labour Market Competition and Organisation

Tests of representative firm models: results for German manufacturing industries

Many studies of producer behavior consider cost and input demand functions de-rived from microeconomic theory and estimate them on the basis of aggregate data. If firms' characteristics differs, the neglect heterogeneity can lead to estimation bias. An alternative is to restrict individual behavioral functions to be linear in the firm specific parameters. The aim of this paper is to describe aggregate producer behavior without placing too strong restrictions on the functional form and to explicitly take account of firm heterogeneity. Estimation for German manufacturing sectors confirms that ne-glected heterogeneity is an important source of bias in representative agent models. --exact aggregation,representative firm,heterogeneity,demand system