The logical anti-psychologism of Frege and Husserl

Frege and Husserl are both recognized for their significant contributions to the overthrowing of logical psychologism, at least in its 19th century forms. Between Frege's profound impact on modern logic that extended the influence of his anti-psychologism and Husserl's extensive attempts at the refutation of logical psychologism in the Prolegomena to Logical Investigations, these arguments are generally understood as successful. This paper attempts to account for the development of these two anti-psychologistic conceptions of logical objects and for some of the basic differences between them. It identifies some problems that are common to strongly anti-psychologistic conceptions of logic and compares the extent to which Frege's and Husserl's views are open to these problems. Accordingly, this paper is divided into two parts. Part I develops a conception of the problems of logical psychologism as they are distinctively understood by each philosopher, out of the explicit arguments and criticisms made against the view in the texts. This conception is in each case informed by the overall historical trajectories of each philosopher's philosophical development. Part II examines the two views in light of common problems of anti-psychologism

Felix Alexandrovich Berezin and his work

This is a survey of Berezin's work focused on three topics: representation theory, general concept of quantization, and supermathematics.Comment: LaTeX, 27 page

Interpreting the Quantum Wave Function in Terms of 'Interacting Faculties'

In this article we discuss the problem of finding an interpretation of quantum mechanics which provides an objective account of physical reality. In the first place we discuss the problem of interpretation and analyze the importance of such an objective account in physics. In this context we present the problems which arise when interpreting the quantum wave function within the orthodox formulation of quantum mechanics. In connection to this critic, we expose the concept of 'entity' as an epistemological obstruction. In the second part of this paper we discuss the relation between actuality and potentiality in classical and quantum physics, and continue to present the concept of 'ontological potentiality' which is distinguished from the generic Aristotelian notion of potentiality in terms of 'becoming actual'. In this paper our main aim is to provide an objective interpretation of quantum mechanics which allows us to discuss the meaning of physical reality according to the theory. For this specific propose we present the concept of 'faculty' in place of the concept of 'entity'. Within our theory of faculties, we continue to discuss and interpret two paradigmatic experiments of quantum mechanics such as the double-slit and Schrodinger's cat.Comment: 34 page

Invariances in Physics and Group Theory

This is a short review of the heritage of Klein's Erlangen program in modern physics.Comment: Talk given at the Conference "Lie and Klein; the Erlangen program and its impact on mathematics and physics", Strasbourg, Sept. 201