Semantics and the Computational Paradigm in Cognitive Psychology

There is a prevalent notion among cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind that computers are merely formal symbol manipulators, performing the actions they do solely on the basis of the syntactic properties of the symbols they manipulate. This view of computers has allowed some philosophers to divorce semantics from computational explanations. Semantic content, then, becomes something one adds to computational explanations to get psychological explanations. Other philosophers, such as Stephen Stich, have taken a stronger view, advocating doing away with semantics entirely. This paper argues that a correct account of computation requires us to attribute content to computational processes in order to explain which functions are being computed. This entails that computational psychology must countenance mental representations. Since anti-semantic positions are incompatible with computational psychology thus construed, they ought to be rejected. Lastly, I argue that in an important sense, computers are not formal symbol manipulators

Discursive psychology

Discursive psychology (DP) is the application of discourse analytic principles to psychological topics. In psychology’s dominant ‘cognitivist’ paradigm, individuals build mental representations of the world on the basis of innate mental structures and perceptual experience, and talk on that basis. The categories and content of discourse are considered to be a reflection, refracted through various kinds of error and distortion, of how the world is perceived to be. In contrast, DP begins with discourse (talk and text), both theoretically and empirically. Discourse is approached, not as the outcome of mental states and cognitive processes, but as a domain of action in its own right. [Continues...

Self-other processes in social cognition

This thesis aimed to investigate self-other processes in social cognition. Contrary to the traditional approach of focusing on self-other processes within the confines of a single domain, this thesis highlights the prominent role of these processes across different socio-cognitive domains. Three main empirical questions form the basis of the research reported here. The first is concerned with the extent to which self-other representations are shared across three different socio-cognitive abilities: the control of imitation, theory of mind, and visual perspective taking. The second relates to the neural underpinnings of self-other representations, in particular, the role of the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) during socio-cognitive processing. The third question examines the role of culture as a modulatory factor of self-other processes. The findings from Experiment 1, 3 and 4 showed a relationship between the control of imitation and visual perspective taking. This relationship seems to rely on the online control of co-activated self-other representations, which at the neural level are mediated by the TPJ (bilaterally). In Experiment 2 it was found that individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia are impaired in the control of imitation but their performance on visual perspective taking and theory of mind is comparable with non-synaesthetes. It is hypothesised that atypical self-other processes in mirror-touch synaesthesia might be confined to situations in which representations of the ‘other’ should be inhibited, but not when they should be enhanced. Experiment 5 showed that acculturation strategies adopted by migrants modulate their imitative behaviour towards a member of the heritage vs. a member of the host culture. The diverse nature of the studies reported in this thesis shows the complexity of self-other processes in social cognition. Taken together, these findings demonstrate how adopting a wider approach to the investigation of self-other processes contributes towards a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying socio-cognitive abilities

Cued repetition of self-directed behaviors in macaques (Macaca nemestrina)

Two macaques were trained to perform three self-directed behaviors on signal, and to repeat behaviors after a ‘repeat’ signal. The cognitive processes underlying the monkeys’ repeat performance were evaluated using multiple repetitions of the repeat signal, extended delay periods between target behavior and repeat signal, and by transferring the repeat signal to novel behaviors. The monkeys appear to have used representations of their own past behaviors as a basis for repetition performance, but they mostly failed to correctly repeat target behaviors after extended delays and during transfer tasks. Implications for episodic memory abilities are discussed

Warranted Diagnosis

A diagnostic process is an investigative process that takes a clinical picture as input and outputs a diagnosis. We propose a method for distinguishing diagnoses that are warranted from those that are not, based on the cognitive processes of which they are the outputs. Processes designed and vetted to reliably produce correct diagnoses will output what we shall call ‘warranted diagnoses’. The latter are diagnoses that should be trusted even if they later turn out to have been wrong. Our work is based on the recently developed Cognitive Process Ontology and further develops the Ontology of General Medical Science. It also has applications in fields such as intelligence, forensics, and predictive maintenance, all of which rely on vetted processes designed to secure the reliability of their outputs

Triangulating consumers' perceptions of payment systems by using social representations theory: A multi-method approach

Social systems play a pivotal role in shaping customers' views, the adoption process and subsequent product diffusion for novel products. Perceptions of Austrian consumers regarding payment systems were assessed in a cross-sectional analysis applying social representations theory. Social representations help to unravel the sources of individuals' attitudinal or perceptual similarities and differences, which often stem from inter-group differences. In short, they are useful for the investigation of ‘deeper structure’ aspects of consumer behaviour, as has been shown in previous studies. This may be seen as a further step forward for marketing research, which operates largely on social phenomena. This study addresses the shortage of non-cognitive-based research in marketing by offering a methodological approach that uses triangulation on the basis of associative answers from social groups. A four-step analytic design revealed that consumer groups transpose the abstract concept of payment systems into tangible objects and processes in a similar way; however, their social background impacted which value was attached to established as well as new means of payment. Cash is still seen as the prototypical form of payment; newer forms, such as credit cards or ATM cards, appear already in the periphery of representations, urgently needing well-concerted marketing efforts to become recognized as substitutes for cash. From a managerial view, the research employs social phenomena as a basis for segmenting natural rather than nominal groups in order to better serve consumers' needs in an increasingly connected social reality

Why the cognitive approach in psychology would profit from a functional approach and vice versa

Cognitively oriented psychologists often define behavioral effects in terms of mental constructs (e.g., classical conditioning as a change in behavior that is due to the formation of associations in memory) and thus effectively treat those effects as proxies for mental constructs. This practice can, however, hamper scientific progress. I argue that if psychologists would consistently define behavioral effects only in terms of the causal impact of elements in the environment (e.g., classical conditioning as a change in behavior that is due to the pairing of stimuli), they would adopt a functional approach that not only reveals the environmental causes of behavior but also optimizes cognitive research. The cognitive approach in turn strengthens the functional approach by facilitating the discovery of new causal relations between the environment and behavior. I thus propose a functional-cognitive framework for research in psychology that capitalizes on the mutually supportive nature of the functional and cognitive approaches in psychology