Representational fluidity in embodied (artificial) cognition

Theories of embodied cognition agree that the body plays some role in human cognition, but disagree on the precise nature of this role. While it is (together with the environment) fundamentally engrained in the so-called 4E (or multi-E) cognition stance, there also exists interpretations wherein the body is merely an input/output interface for cognitive processes that are entirely computational. In the present paper, we show that even if one takes such a strong computationalist position, the role of the body must be more than an interface to the world. To achieve human cognition, the computational mechanisms of a cognitive agent must be capable not only of appropriate reasoning over a given set of symbolic representations; they must in addition be capable of updating the representational framework itself (leading to the titular representational fluidity). We demonstrate this by considering the necessary properties that an artificial agent with these abilities need to possess. The core of the argument is that these updates must be falsifiable in the Popperian sense while simultaneously directing representational shifts in a direction that benefits the agent. We show that this is achieved by the progressive, bottom-up symbolic abstraction of low-level sensorimotor connections followed by top-down instantiation of testable perception-action hypotheses. We then discuss the fundamental limits of this representational updating capacity, concluding that only fully embodied learners exhibiting such a priori perception-action linkages are able to sufficiently ground spontaneously-generated symbolic representations and exhibit the full range of human cognitive capabilities. The present paper therefore has consequences both for the theoretical understanding of human cognition, and for the design of autonomous artificial agents

Representational fluidity in embodied (artificial) cognition

Theories of embodied cognition agree that the body plays some role in human cognition, but disagree on the precise nature of this role. While it is (together with the environment) fundamentally engrained in the so-called 4E (or multi-E) cognition stance, there also exists interpretations wherein the body is merely an input/output interface for cognitive processes that are entirely computational. In the present paper, we show that even if one takes such a strong computationalist position, the role of the body must be more than an interface to the world. To achieve human cognition, the computational mechanisms of a cognitive agent must be capable not only of appropriate reasoning over a given set of symbolic representations; they must in addition be capable of updating the representational framework itself (leading to the titular representational fluidity). We demonstrate this by considering the necessary properties that an artificial agent with these abilities need to possess. The core of the argument is that these updates must be falsifiable in the Popperian sense while simultaneously directing representational shifts in a direction that benefits the agent. We show that this is achieved by the progressive, bottom-up symbolic abstraction of low-level sensorimotor connections followed by top-down instantiation of testable perception-action hypotheses. We then discuss the fundamental limits of this representational updating capacity, concluding that only fully embodied learners exhibiting such a priori perception-action linkages are able to sufficiently ground spontaneously-generated symbolic representations and exhibit the full range of human cognitive capabilities. The present paper therefore has consequences both for the theoretical understanding of human cognition, and for the design of autonomous artificial agents

Action, Enaction, Inter(en)action

Leman and Maes offer a comprehensive review of the main theoretical and empirical themes covered by the research on music and embodied cognition. Their article provides an insight into the work being carried at the Institute for Psychoacoustic and Electronic Music (IPEM) of Ghent University, Belgium - in which they work - and presents a theory of the main implications of embodiment for music perception. The present paper is divided into three parts. In the first one, I will explore the conceptual topography of embodied music cognition as maintained by the authors, to see whether the empirical research proposed fits the aims of this standpoint. In the second I will argue that while Leman and Maes are right to move towards a more dynamically implemented stance, the arguments used to justify this shift seem to be inconsistent with the framework they account for. In the third and final part of this commentary I will claim that if the authors wish to dedicate their work to develop a truly embodied, sensorimotor, and dynamic account to music cognition, they would need to abandon some of the assumptions defended in their work, searching for further empirical corroboration in the concrete dynamics of interactive, or participatory, musical sense-making

Emergent interfaces: vague, complex, bespoke and embodied interaction between humans and computers

Most human-computer interfaces are built on the paradigm of manipulating abstract representations. This can be limiting when computers are used in artistic performance or as mediators of social connection, where we rely on qualities of embodied thinking: intuition, context, resonance, ambiguity, fluidity. We explore an alternative approach to designing interaction that we call the emergent interface: interaction leveraging unsupervised machine learning to replace designed abstractions with contextually-derived emergent representations. The approach offers opportunities to create interfaces bespoke to a single individual, to continually evolve and adapt the interface in line with that individual’s needs and affordances, and to bridge more deeply with the complex and imprecise interaction that defines much of our non-digital communication. We explore this approach through artistic research rooted in music, dance and AI with the partially emergent system Sonified Body. The system maps the moving body into sound using an emergent representation of the body derived from a corpus of improvised movement from the first author. We explore this system in a residency with three dancers. We reflect on the broader implications and challenges of this alternative way of thinking about interaction, and how far it may help users avoid being limited by the assumptions of a system’s designer

How to Knit Your Own Markov Blanket

Hohwy (Hohwy 2016, Hohwy 2017) argues there is a tension between the free energy principle and leading depictions of mind as embodied, enactive, and extended (so-called ‘EEE1 cognition’). The tension is traced to the importance, in free energy formulations, of a conception of mind and agency that depends upon the presence of a ‘Markov blanket’ demarcating the agent from the surrounding world. In what follows I show that the Markov blanket considerations do not, in fact, lead to the kinds of tension that Hohwy depicts. On the contrary, they actively favour the EEE story. This is because the Markov property, as exemplified in biological agents, picks out neither a unique nor a stationary boundary. It is this multiplicity and mutability– rather than the absence of agent-environment boundaries as such - that EEE cognition celebrates

Engineering Students’ Dynamic And Fluid Group Practices In A Collaborative Design Project

There is a growing interest in engineering education that the curriculum should include collaborative design projects. Collaboration and collaborative learning imply a shared activity, a shared purpose, a joint problem-solving space, and mutual interdependence to achieve intended learning outcomes. The focus, in this study, is 1 Corresponding Author J Bernhard [email protected] on engineering students’ collaborative group practices. The context is a design project in the fifth semester of the problem-based Architecture and Design programme at Aalborg University. Students’ collaborative work in the preparation for an upcoming status seminar was video recorded in situ. In our earlier studies video ethnography, conversation analysis and embodied interaction analysis have been used to explore what interactional work the student teams did and what kind of resources they used to collaborate and complete the design task on a momentmoment basis. In this paper we report from a one-hour period where a group of four engineering students do final designs in preparation for the status seminar. Using recorded multi-perspective videos, we have analysed students’ fine-grained patterns of social interaction within this group. We found that the interaction and collaboration was very dynamic and fluid. It was observed that students seamlessly switched from working individually to working collaboratively. In collaborative work students frequently changed constellations and would not only work as a whole group, but also would break into subgroups of two or three students to do some work. Our results point to the need to investigate group practices and individual and collaborative learning in design project groups and other collaborative learning environments in more detail and the results challenge a naïve individualcollaborative-binary

Queering Abstract Concepts. A Grounded Perspective on Gender

Concepts are the building blocks of our cognitive system. Theories of conceptual knowledge have attempted to explain how we acquire master concepts by relying on different assumptions. Among several proposals, theories of Embodied and Grounded Cognition (EGC) submit to the idea that our conceptual system is couched in our bodily states and is influenced by the environment surrounding us (Barsalou, 2008). Chapter 1 reviews and critically discusses the debate on conceptual format as developed in cognitive science. Abstract concepts (ACs) like ethic constitute a major challenge for theories of conceptual knowledge, and for EGC theories. Recently, some EG proposals addressed this criticism, arguing that the category of ACs is multifaced and heterogenous, encompassing exemplars that differ among them with respect of their grounding sources (Borghi et al., 2018). According to the WAT theory (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014), for instance, both abstract and concrete concepts are grounded in our bodily states and linguistic system, to different extents. Specifically, ACs are more influenced by social, cultural and linguistic aspects than concrete concepts, hence activating the mouth effector. In addition, ACs would be more influenced by cultural and linguistic variability. Chapter 2 tackles the issue of ACs from an EG perspective. In an EG approach, gender can be considered as a special kind of AC. In fact, its grounding sources enclose biological and perceptual aspects–related to one’s own sexual embodiment–and social and cultural factors. Whereas previous accounts on gender have stressed one specific aspect over the other (Eagly & Wood, 2013), nowadays the dichotomy opposing sex to gender seems less tenable (Butler, 1990; Hyde et al., 2019). Drawing on the description of ACs offered in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 I defend a queer perspective on ACs and gender, that escapes traditional dichotomies such as abstract/concrete and sex/gender

Learning as knowledge creation : learning for, and from, all

Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Virtuālās Realitātes mācīšanās taksonomija

Promocijas darbs tika izstrādāts izglītības zinātņu nozarē, vispārīgās pedagoģijas apakšnozarē Latvijas Universitātes Pedagoģijas, psiholoģijas un mākslas fakultātē, profesores, Dr. paed. Lindas Danielas vadībā. Darba apjoms ir 147 lpp., ieskaitot 30 attēlus un 16 tabulas, kā arī literatūras un avotu sarakstu ar 114 nosaukumiem. Darbam papildus pievienoti arī 2 pielikumi uz 21 lpp. Pētījuma mērķis ir informēt pedagogus un mācīšanas dizaina izstrādātājus, kā arī VR tehnoloģiju izstrādātājus, un potenciālos izglītojamos par VR mācīšanās principiem, tostarp, to sinerģijām un mijsakarībām, piedāvājot pamatotu teoriju virtuālās realitātes mācīšanās taksonomijai. Šī pētījuma nozīmīgākais devums ietver esošo, bet sadrumstaloto zināšanu apkopošanu un sistematizēšanu, pierādījumos balstītas teorētiskās bāzes izstrādi virtuālās realitātes mācīšanās taksonomijai, kā arī praktisku VR mācīšanas pieredžu dizaina un izvērtēšanas rīku izstrādiThe doctoral thesis by Lana Frančeska Dreimane titled “Taxonomy of Learning in Virtual Reality” was developed in the field of Education at the Faculty of Education, Psychology and Arts of the University of Latvia, under supervision of Dr. paed., professor Linda Daniela. The volume of the thesis is 147 pages, 30 figures and 16 tables in the main text, as well as list of bibliographic sources with 114 titles and 2 appendices. This research aims to inform educators and instructors, as well as VR technology developers and potential learners, about the alignment synergies and interconnections of VR learning principles by generating a substantive theory for the taxonomy of learning in Virtual Reality. The most important contribution of this inquiry is in systemising already existing but fragmented knowledge, and presenting evidence for theoretical basis for the taxonomy, as well as developing VR learning experience design and evaluation tools for practical applications