Schedulability Analysis for Multi-Core Systems Accounting for Resource Stress and Sensitivity

Timing verification of multi-core systems is complicated by contention for shared hardware resources between co-running tasks on different cores. This paper introduces the Multi-core Resource Stress and Sensitivity (MRSS) task model that characterizes how much stress each task places on resources and how much it is sensitive to such resource stress. This model facilitates a separation of concerns, thus retaining the advantages of the traditional two-step approach to timing verification (i.e. timing analysis followed by schedulability analysis). Response time analysis is derived for the MRSS task model, providing efficient context-dependent and context independent schedulability tests for both fixed priority preemptive and fixed priority non-preemptive scheduling. Dominance relations are derived between the tests, and proofs of optimal priority assignment provided. The MRSS task model is underpinned by a proof-of-concept industrial case study

Modeling Power Consumption and Temperature in TLM Models

International audienceMany techniques and tools exist to estimate the power consumption and the temperature map of a chip. These tools help the hardware designers develop power efficient chips in the presence of temperature constraints. For this task, the application can be ignored or at least abstracted by some high level scenarios; at this stage, the actual embedded software is generally not available yet. However, after the hardware is defined, the embedded software can still have a significant influence on the power consumption; i.e., two implementations of the same application can consume more or less power. Moreover, the actual software powe

Isolation Without Taxation: {N}ear-Zero-Cost Transitions for {WebAssembly} and {SFI}

Software sandboxing or software-based fault isolation (SFI) is a lightweight approach to building secure systems out of untrusted components. Mozilla, for example, uses SFI to harden the Firefox browser by sandboxing third-party libraries, and companies like Fastly and Cloudflare use SFI to safely co-locate untrusted tenants on their edge clouds. While there have been significant efforts to optimize and verify SFI enforcement, context switching in SFI systems remains largely unexplored: almost all SFI systems use \emph{heavyweight transitions} that are not only error-prone but incur significant performance overhead from saving, clearing, and restoring registers when context switching. We identify a set of \emph{zero-cost conditions} that characterize when sandboxed code has sufficient structured to guarantee security via lightweight \emph{zero-cost} transitions (simple function calls). We modify the Lucet Wasm compiler and its runtime to use zero-cost transitions, eliminating the undue performance tax on systems that rely on Lucet for sandboxing (e.g., we speed up image and font rendering in Firefox by up to 29.7\% and 10\% respectively). To remove the Lucet compiler and its correct implementation of the Wasm specification from the trusted computing base, we (1) develop a \emph{static binary verifier}, VeriZero, which (in seconds) checks that binaries produced by Lucet satisfy our zero-cost conditions, and (2) prove the soundness of VeriZero by developing a logical relation that captures when a compiled Wasm function is semantically well-behaved with respect to our zero-cost conditions. Finally, we show that our model is useful beyond Wasm by describing a new, purpose-built SFI system, SegmentZero32, that uses x86 segmentation and LLVM with mostly off-the-shelf passes to enforce our zero-cost conditions; our prototype performs on-par with the state-of-the-art Native Client SFI system