The long and winding road: Routine creation and replication in multi-site organizations

Prior research on organizational routines in the ‘capabilities’ literature has either studied how new routines are created during an exploratory process of variation and selection or how existing routines are replicated during a phase of exploitation. Few studies have analyzed the life cycle of new routine creation and replication as an integrated process. In an in-depth case study of England’s Highways Agency, this paper shows that the creation and replication of a new routine across multiple sites involves four sequential steps: envisioning, experimenting, entrenching and enacting. We contribute to the capabilities research in two ways: first, by showing how different organizational levels, capabilities and logics (cognitive and behavioural) shape the development of new routines; and second, by identifying how distinct evolutionary cycles of variation and selective retention occur during each step in the process. In contrast with prior research on replication as an exact copy of a template or existing routine, our study focuses on the replication of an entirely new routine (based on novel principles) that is adapted to fit local operational conditions during its large-scale replication across multiple sites. We draw upon insights from adjacent ‘practice research’ and suggest how capabilities and practice studies may complement each other in future research on the evolution of routines

The impact of the mode of thought in complex decisions: intuitive decisions are better

A number of recent studies have reported that decision quality is enhanced under conditions of inattention or distraction (unconscious thought; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). These reports have generated considerable controversy, for both experimental (problems of replication) and theoretical reasons (interpretation). Here we report the results of four experiments. The first experiment replicates the unconscious thought effect, under conditions that validate and control the subjective criterion of decision quality. The second and third experiments examine the impact of a mode of thought manipulation (without distraction) on decision quality in immediate decisions. Here we find that intuitive or affective manipulations improve decision quality compared to analytic/deliberation manipulations. The fourth experiment combines the two methods (distraction and mode of thought manipulations) and demonstrates enhanced decision quality, in a situation that attempts to preserve ecological validity. The results are interpreted within a framework that is based on two interacting subsystems of decision-making: an affective/intuition based system and an analytic/deliberation system

Learning and selection

Are learning processes selection processes? This paper takes a slightly modified version of the account of selection presented in Hull et al. (Behav Brain Sci 24:511–527, 2001) and asks whether it applies to learning processes. The answer is that although some learning processes are selectional, many are not. This has consequences for teleological theories of mental content. According to these theories, mental states have content in virtue of having proper functions, and they have proper functions in virtue of being the products of selection processes. For some mental states, it is plausible that the relevant selection process is natural selection, but there are many for which it is not plausible. One response to this (due to David Papineau) is to suggest that the learning processes by which we acquire non-innate mental states are selection processes and can therefore confer proper functions on mental states. This paper considers two ways in which this response could be elaborated, and argues that neither of them succeed: the teleosemanticist cannot rely on the claim that learning processes are selection processes in order to justify the attribution of proper functions to beliefs

In defense of mechanism

In Life Itself and in Essays on Life Itself, Robert Rosen (1991, 2000) argued that machines were, in principle, incapable of modeling the defining feature of living systems, which he claimed to be the existence of closed causal loops. Rosen's argument has been used to support critiques of computational models in ecological psychology. This article shows that Rosen's attack on mechanism is fundamentally misconceived. It is, in fact, of the essence of a mechanical system that it contains closed causal loops. Moreover, Rosen's epistemology is based on a strong form of indirect realism and his arguments, if correct, would call into question some of the fundamental principles of ecological psychology

Effects of thinking-aloud pair problem solving on the troubleshooting performance of undergraduate students in a power technology course

A randomized post-test-only experimental design with a counter-balanced internal replication was used to determine the effects of thinking-aloud pair problem solving (TAPPS) on the troubleshooting performance of college students in a power technology course. The experimental results were stable across two troubleshooting tasks. Students who participated in the pair problem solving groups were significantly more successful (p ≤ .05) at troubleshooting engine faults than were students in the control groups. Among students who successfully completed the troubleshooting tasks across both groups, there were no significant differences in time required for completion. These findings indicate that the use of pair problem solving may be an important step in the development of metacognitive skills among students in technological troubleshootin

“Excellence R Us”: university research and the fetishisation of excellence

The rhetoric of “excellence” is pervasive across the academy. It is used to refer to research outputs as well as researchers, theory and education, individuals and organisations, from art history to zoology. But does “excellence” actually mean anything? Does this pervasive narrative of “excellence” do any good? Drawing on a range of sources we interrogate “excellence” as a concept and find that it has no intrinsic meaning in academia. Rather it functions as a linguistic interchange mechanism. To investigate whether this linguistic function is useful we examine how the rhetoric of excellence combines with narratives of scarcity and competition to show that the hypercompetition that arises from the performance of “excellence” is completely at odds with the qualities of good research. We trace the roots of issues in reproducibility, fraud, and homophily to this rhetoric. But we also show that this rhetoric is an internal, and not primarily an external, imposition. We conclude by proposing an alternative rhetoric based on soundness and capacity-building. In the final analysis, it turns out that that “excellence” is not excellent. Used in its current unqualified form it is a pernicious and dangerous rhetoric that undermines the very foundations of good research and scholarship

In praise of the referee

There has been a lively debate in many fields, including statistics and related applied fields such as psychology and biomedical research, on possible reforms of the scholarly publishing system. Currently, referees contribute so much to improve scientific papers, both directly through constructive criticism and indirectly through the threat of rejection. We discuss ways in which new approaches to journal publication could continue to make use of the valuable efforts of peer reviewers.Comment: 13 page