Remote software protection by orthogonal client replacement *

ABSTRACT In a typical client-server scenario, a trusted server provides valuable services to a client, which runs remotely on an untrusted platform. Of the many security vulnerabilities that may arise (such as authentication and authorization), guaranteeing the integrity of the client code is one of the most difficult to address. This security vulnerability is an instance of the malicious host problem, where an adversary in control of the client's host environment tries to tamper with the client code. We propose a novel client replacement strategy to counter the malicious host problem. The client code is periodically replaced by new orthogonal clients, such that their combination with the server is functionally-equivalent to the original client-server application. The reverse engineering efforts of the adversary are deterred by the complexity of analysis of frequently changing, orthogonal program code. We use the underlying concepts of program obfuscation as a basis for formally defining and providing orthogonality. We also give preliminary empirical validation of the proposed approach

Software Protection

A computer system's security can be compromised in many ways a denial-of-service attack can make a server inoperable, a worm can destroy a user's private data, or an eavesdrop per can reap financial rewards by inserting himself in the communication link between a customer and her bank through a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. What all these scenarios have in common is that the adversary is an untrusted entity that attacks a system from the outside-we assume that the computers under attack are operated by benign and trusted users. But if we remove this assumption, if we allow anyone operating a computer system- from system administrators down to ordinary users-to compromise that system's security, we find ourselves in a scenario that has received comparatively little attention. Methods for protecting against MATE attacks are variously known as anti-tamper techniques, digital asset protection, or, more

Hectospec, the MMT's 300 Optical Fiber-Fed Spectrograph

The Hectospec is a 300 optical fiber fed spectrograph commissioned at the MMT in the spring of 2004. A pair of high-speed six-axis robots move the 300 fiber buttons between observing configurations within ~300 s and to an accuracy ~25 microns. The optical fibers run for 26 m between the MMT's focal surface and the bench spectrograph operating at R~1000-2000. Another high dispersion bench spectrograph offering R~5,000, Hectochelle, is also available. The system throughput, including all losses in the telescope optics, fibers, and spectrograph peaks at ~10% at the grating blaze in 1" FWHM seeing. Correcting for aperture losses at the 1.5" diameter fiber entrance aperture, the system throughput peaks at $\sim$17%. Hectospec has proven to be a workhorse instrument at the MMT. Hectospec and Hectochelle together were scheduled for 1/3 of the available nights since its commissioning. Hectospec has returned \~60,000 reduced spectra for 16 scientific programs during its first year of operation.Comment: 68 pages, 28 figures, to appear in December 2005 PAS

Towards an aspect weaving BPEL engine

This position paper proposes the use of dynamic aspects and the visitor design pattern to obtain a highly configurable and extensible BPEL engine. Using these two techniques, the core of this infrastructural software can be customised to meet new requirements and add features such as debugging, execution monitoring, or changing to another Web Service selection policy. Additionally, it can easily be extended to cope with customer-specific BPEL extensions. We propose the use of dynamic aspects not only on the engine itself but also on the workflow in order to tackle the problems of Web Service hot deployment and hot fixes to long running processes. In this way, composing aWeb Service "on-the-fly" means weaving its choreography interface into the workflow

Code renewability for native software protection

Software protection aims at safeguarding assets embedded in software by preventing and delaying reverse engineering and tampering attacks. This article presents an architecture and supporting tool flow to renew parts of native applications dynamically. Renewed and diversified code and data belonging to either the original application or to linked-in protections are delivered from a secure server to a client on demand. This results in frequent changes to the software components when they are under attack, thus making attacks harder. By supporting various forms of diversification and renewability, novel protection combinations become available and existing combinations become stronger. The prototype implementation is evaluated on several industrial use cases

Code Renewability for Native Software Protection

Software protection aims at safeguarding assets embedded in software by preventing and delaying reverse engineering and tampering attacks. This paper presents an architecture and supporting tool flow to renew parts of native applications dynamically. Renewed and diversified code and data belonging to either the original application or to linked-in protections are delivered from a secure server to a client on demand. This results in frequent changes to the software components when they are under attack, thus making attacks harder. By supporting various forms of diversification and renewability, novel protection combinations become available, and existing combinations become stronger. The prototype implementation is evaluated on a number of industrial use cases

Software protection

A computer system's security can be compromised in many ways—a denial-of-service attack can make a server inoperable, a worm can destroy a user's private data, or an eavesdropper can reap financial rewards by inserting himself in the communication link between a customer and her bank through a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. What all these scenarios have in common is that the adversary is an untrusted entity that attacks a system from the outside—we assume that the computers under attack are operated by benign and trusted users. But if we remove this assumption, if we allow anyone operating a computer system—from system administrators down to ordinary users—to compromise that system's security, we find ourselves in a scenario that has received comparatively little attention