77 research outputs found
Some problems with the Russellian open future
In a recently published paper, Todd (Mind, 125(499), pp. 775-798, 2016a)
advocates a novel treatment of future contingents. On his view, all statements concerning the contingent future are false. He motivates his semantic postulates by considerations in philosophy of time and modality, in particular by the claim that there is no actual future. I present a number of highly controversial consequences of Todd’s theory. Inadequacy of his semantics might indirectly serve as an argument against the philosophical view underpinning his proposal
Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21
TesisSe realizó un análisis clínico-electrocardiográfico integral de los hemibloqueos comprendiendo incidencia, edad, etiología, evaluación cuantitativa de los criterios diagnósticos, relación con los trastornos de conducción aurículo-ventricular, y pronóstico. Con tal motivo se estudiaron 221hemibloqueos encontrados en 7,130 pacientes adultos de sexo masculino en un servicio de cardiología y medicina. Los hemibloqueos fueron diagnosticados mediante los criterios señalados por Rosenbaum, Castellanos, y Prior y Blount
Type-Ambiguous Names
The orthodox view of proper names, Millianism, provides a very simple and elegant explanation of the semantic contribution of referential uses of names–names that occur as bare singulars and as the argument of a predicate. However, one problem for Millianism is that it cannot explain the semantic contribution of predicative uses of names. In recent years, an alternative view, so-called the-predicativism, has become increasingly popular. According to the-predicativists, names are uniformly count nouns. This straightforwardly explains why names can be used predicatively, but is prima facie less congenial to an analysis of referential uses. To address this issue, the-predicativists argue that referential names are in fact complex determiner phrases consisting of a covert definite determiner and a count noun—and so, a referential name is a definite description. In this paper, I will argue that despite the appearance of increased theoretical complexity, the view that names are ambiguous between predicative and referential types is in fact superior to the unitary the-predicativist view. However, I will also argue that to see why this ambiguity view is better, we need to give up the standard Millian analysis. Consequently, I will first propose an alternative analysis of referential names that retains the virtues of Millianism, but provides an important explanatory connection to the predicative uses. Once this analysis of names is adopted, the explanation for why names are systematically ambiguous between referential and predicative types is both simple and elegant. Second, I will argue that the-predicativism has the appearance of being simpler than an ambiguity view, but is in fact unable to account for certain key properties of referential names without making ad hoc stipulations
The end of vagueness : technological epistemicism, surveillance capitalism, and explainable Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence (AI) pervades humanity in 2022, and it is notoriously difficult to understand how certain aspects of it work. There is a movement—Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)—to develop new methods for explaining the behaviours of AI systems. We aim to highlight one important philosophical significance of XAI—it has a role to play in the elimination of vagueness. To show this, consider that the use of AI in what has been labeled surveillance capitalism has resulted in humans quickly gaining the capability to identify and classify most of the occasions in which languages are used. We show that the knowability of this information is incompatible with what a certain theory of vagueness—epistemicism—says about vagueness. We argue that one way the epistemicist could respond to this threat is to claim that this process brought about the end of vagueness. However, we suggest an alternative interpretation, namely that epistemicism is false, but there is a weaker doctrine we dub technological epistemicism, which is the view that vagueness is due to ignorance of linguistic usage, but the ignorance can be overcome. The idea is that knowing more of the relevant data and how to process it enables us to know the semantic values of our words and sentences with higher confidence and precision. Finally, we argue that humans are probably not going to believe what future AI algorithms tell us about the sharp boundaries of our vague words unless the AI involved can be explained in terms understandable by humans. That is, if people are going to accept that AI can tell them about the sharp boundaries of the meanings of their words, then it is going to have to be XAI.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe
Paraconsistent resolution
Digraphs provide an alternative syntax for propositional logic, with digraph kernels corresponding to classical models. Semikernels generalize kernels and we identify a subset of well-behaved semikernels that provides nontrivial models for inconsistent theories, specializing to the classical semantics for the consistent ones. Direct (instead of refutational) reasoning with classical resolution is sound and complete for this semantics, when augmented with a specific weakening which, in particular, excludes Ex Falso. Dropping all forms of weakening yields reasoning which also avoids typical fallacies of relevance
Taking meaning out of context : essays on the foundations of natural language semantics
David Lewis articulated minimal constraints on a formal theory of natural language
semantics that have been widely adopted by subsequent theorists: compositionality
and sentence truth in a given context. In the process, Lewis distinguished between the
compositional semantic value of an expression and its propositional content relative
to a context. This dissertation consists of a series of essays in which I address several
questions that arise from this distinction, including how we should understand semantic
values, how we should understand propositional content, and how we should understand
the relation between them.
Related to this, I explore and address a number of interesting and unresolved
methodological issues that arise in relation to context-sensitivity, and provide an
account of the role of speaker intentions in a formal theory of natural language
semantics. Additionally, I provide a detailed analysis of the role of context in a theory
of natural language semantics and its connection to various aspects of language use and
communication. I also motivate coherence with syntactic structure (in the tradition of
generative grammar) as an additional constraint on a formal theory of natural language
semantics and assess its import for how we theorize about tense and modality and
issues related to the syntax-semantics interface, including covert structure and logical
form.
In broad strokes, this dissertation addresses issues concerning the aims, scope and
criteria of a theory of natural language semantics. I approach these issues from the
perspective of generative grammar, a theoretical framework that aims to characterize
our understanding of natural language independent of its use. These essays help to
clarify what should be expected of a formal theory of natural language semantics and
its contribution to theories of speech acts and communication
Against the identification of assertoric content with compositional value
This essay investigates whether the things we say are identical to the things our sentences mean. It is argued that these theoretical notions should be distinguished, since assertoric content does not respect the compositionality principle. As a paradigmatic example, Kaplan's formal language LD is shown to exemplify a failure of compositionality. It is demonstrated that by respecting the theoretical distinction between the objects of assertion and compositional values certain conflicts between compositionality and contextualism are avoided. This includes the conflict between eternalism and the semantics of tense, the embedding problems for contextualism about epistemic modals and taste claims, and the conflict between direct reference and the semantics of bound pronouns (and monstrous operators). After presenting the theoretical picture which distinguishes assertoric content from compositional semantic value, some objections to the picture are addressed. In so doing, the objection from King (Philos Perspect 17(1):195-246, 2003) stemming from apparent complications with the interaction of temporal expressions and attitude reports is assessed and shown to be non-threatening
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