Quantitative Verification: Formal Guarantees for Timeliness, Reliability and Performance

Computerised systems appear in almost all aspects of our daily lives, often in safety-critical scenarios such as embedded control systems in cars and aircraft or medical devices such as pacemakers and sensors. We are thus increasingly reliant on these systems working correctly, despite often operating in unpredictable or unreliable environments. Designers of such devices need ways to guarantee that they will operate in a reliable and efficient manner. Quantitative verification is a technique for analysing quantitative aspects of a system's design, such as timeliness, reliability or performance. It applies formal methods, based on a rigorous analysis of a mathematical model of the system, to automatically prove certain precisely specified properties, e.g. ``the airbag will always deploy within 20 milliseconds after a crash'' or ``the probability of both sensors failing simultaneously is less than 0.001''. The ability to formally guarantee quantitative properties of this kind is beneficial across a wide range of application domains. For example, in safety-critical systems, it may be essential to establish credible bounds on the probability with which certain failures or combinations of failures can occur. In embedded control systems, it is often important to comply with strict constraints on timing or resources. More generally, being able to derive guarantees on precisely specified levels of performance or efficiency is a valuable tool in the design of, for example, wireless networking protocols, robotic systems or power management algorithms, to name but a few. This report gives a short introduction to quantitative verification, focusing in particular on a widely used technique called model checking, and its generalisation to the analysis of quantitative aspects of a system such as timing, probabilistic behaviour or resource usage. The intended audience is industrial designers and developers of systems such as those highlighted above who could benefit from the application of quantitative verification,but lack expertise in formal verification or modelling

Avionics architecture studies for the entry research vehicle

This report is the culmination of a year-long investigation of the avionics architecture for NASA's Entry Research Vehicle (ERV). The Entry Research Vehicle is conceived to be an unmanned, autonomous spacecraft to be deployed from the Shuttle. It will perform various aerodynamic and propulsive maneuvers in orbit and land at Edwards AFB after a 5 to 10 hour mission. The design and analysis of the vehicle's avionics architecture are detailed here. The architecture consists of a central triply redundant ultra-reliable fault tolerant processor attached to three replicated and distributed MIL-STD-1553 buses for input and output. The reliability analysis is detailed here. The architecture was found to be sufficiently reliable for the ERV mission plan

Airborne Advanced Reconfigurable Computer System (ARCS)

A digital computer subsystem fault-tolerant concept was defined, and the potential benefits and costs of such a subsystem were assessed when used as the central element of a new transport's flight control system. The derived advanced reconfigurable computer system (ARCS) is a triple-redundant computer subsystem that automatically reconfigures, under multiple fault conditions, from triplex to duplex to simplex operation, with redundancy recovery if the fault condition is transient. The study included criteria development covering factors at the aircraft's operation level that would influence the design of a fault-tolerant system for commercial airline use. A new reliability analysis tool was developed for evaluating redundant, fault-tolerant system availability and survivability; and a stringent digital system software design methodology was used to achieve design/implementation visibility

Semi-Markov adjunction to the Computer-Aided Markov Evaluator (CAME)

The rule-based Computer-Aided Markov Evaluator (CAME) program was expanded in its ability to incorporate the effect of fault-handling processes into the construction of a reliability model. The fault-handling processes are modeled as semi-Markov events and CAME constructs and appropriate semi-Markov model. To solve the model, the program outputs it in a form which can be directly solved with the Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator (SURE) program. As a means of evaluating the alterations made to the CAME program, the program is used to model the reliability of portions of the Integrated Airframe/Propulsion Control System Architecture (IAPSA 2) reference configuration. The reliability predictions are compared with a previous analysis. The results bear out the feasibility of utilizing CAME to generate appropriate semi-Markov models to model fault-handling processes