7,867 research outputs found
Some Concerns Regarding Ternary-relation Semantics and Truth-theoretic Semantics in General
This paper deals with a collection of concerns that, over a period of time, led the author away from the Routley–Meyer semantics, and towards proof- theoretic approaches to relevant logics, and indeed to the weak relevant logic MC of meaning containment
The Relevant Logic E and Some Close Neighbours: A Reinterpretation
This paper has two aims. First, it sets out an interpretation of the relevant logic E of relevant entailment based on the theory of situated inference. Second, it uses this interpretation, together with Anderson and Belnap’s natural deduc- tion system for E, to generalise E to a range of other systems of strict relevant implication. Routley–Meyer ternary relation semantics for these systems are produced and completeness theorems are proven
Don't Blame Distributional Semantics if it can't do Entailment
Distributional semantics has had enormous empirical success in Computational
Linguistics and Cognitive Science in modeling various semantic phenomena, such
as semantic similarity, and distributional models are widely used in
state-of-the-art Natural Language Processing systems. However, the theoretical
status of distributional semantics within a broader theory of language and
cognition is still unclear: What does distributional semantics model? Can it
be, on its own, a fully adequate model of the meanings of linguistic
expressions? The standard answer is that distributional semantics is not fully
adequate in this regard, because it falls short on some of the central aspects
of formal semantic approaches: truth conditions, entailment, reference, and
certain aspects of compositionality. We argue that this standard answer rests
on a misconception: These aspects do not belong in a theory of expression
meaning, they are instead aspects of speaker meaning, i.e., communicative
intentions in a particular context. In a slogan: words do not refer, speakers
do. Clearing this up enables us to argue that distributional semantics on its
own is an adequate model of expression meaning. Our proposal sheds light on the
role of distributional semantics in a broader theory of language and cognition,
its relationship to formal semantics, and its place in computational models.Comment: To appear in Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on
Computational Semantics (IWCS 2019), Gothenburg, Swede
Relevant Logics Obeying Component Homogeneity
This paper discusses three relevant logics that obey Component Homogeneity - a principle that Goddard and Routley introduce in their project of a logic of significance. The paper establishes two main results. First, it establishes a general characterization result for two families of logic that obey Component Homogeneity - that is, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their consequence relations. From this, we derive characterization results for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Second, the paper establishes complete sequent calculi for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Among the other accomplishments of the paper, we generalize the semantics from Bochvar, Hallden, Deutsch and Daniels, we provide a general recipe to define containment logics, we explore the single-premise/single-conclusion fragment of S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fdeand the connections between crossS*fde and the logic Eq of equality by Epstein. Also, we present S*fde as a relevant logic of meaninglessness that follows the main philosophical tenets of Goddard and Routley, and we briefly examine three further systems that are closely related to our main logics. Finally, we discuss Routley's criticism to containment logic in light of our results, and overview some open issues
A Logic-based Approach for Recognizing Textual Entailment Supported by Ontological Background Knowledge
We present the architecture and the evaluation of a new system for
recognizing textual entailment (RTE). In RTE we want to identify automatically
the type of a logical relation between two input texts. In particular, we are
interested in proving the existence of an entailment between them. We conceive
our system as a modular environment allowing for a high-coverage syntactic and
semantic text analysis combined with logical inference. For the syntactic and
semantic analysis we combine a deep semantic analysis with a shallow one
supported by statistical models in order to increase the quality and the
accuracy of results. For RTE we use logical inference of first-order employing
model-theoretic techniques and automated reasoning tools. The inference is
supported with problem-relevant background knowledge extracted automatically
and on demand from external sources like, e.g., WordNet, YAGO, and OpenCyc, or
other, more experimental sources with, e.g., manually defined presupposition
resolutions, or with axiomatized general and common sense knowledge. The
results show that fine-grained and consistent knowledge coming from diverse
sources is a necessary condition determining the correctness and traceability
of results.Comment: 25 pages, 10 figure
Wierenga on theism and counterpossibles
Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argument in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give an example of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for which it fails
Logically Impossible Worlds
What does it mean for the laws of logic to fail? My task in this paper is to answer this question. I use the resources that Routley/Sylvan developed with his collaborators for the semantics of relevant logics to explain a world where the laws of logic fail. I claim that the non-normal worlds that Routley/Sylvan introduced are exactly such worlds. To disambiguate different kinds of impossible worlds, I call such worlds logically impossible worlds. At a logically impossible world, the laws of logic fail. In this paper, I provide a definition of logically impossible worlds. I then show that there is nothing strange about admitting such worlds
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