If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposi-tion, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one’s rational character, whether or not those activities are under one’s voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle

Beliefs and actions in the trust game: creating instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect

In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's expectation about relevant events, e.g. about other agents' behavior. Recent experimental studies as well as surveys have asked participants to state their beliefs explicitly, but little is known about the causal relation between beliefs and other behavioral variables. This paper discusses the possibility of creating exogenous instrumental variables for belief statements, by shifting the probabilities of the relevant events. We conduct trust game experiments where the amount sent back by the second player (trustee) is exogenously varied by a random process, in a way that informs only the �first player (trustor) about the realized variation. The procedure allows detecting causal links from beliefs to actions under plausible assumptions. The IV estimates indicate a signi�ficant causal effect, comparable to the connection between beliefs and actions that is suggested by OLS analyses

Culture, beliefs and economic performance

Beliefs are one component of culture. Data from the World Values Survey is available on a subset of beliefs concerning (broadly) meritocracy and poverty that appear relevant for economics. We document how they vary as well as their distribution across countries. We then correlate these measures of beliefs with economic growth and compare them with institutional and geographical determinants of income. A strong negative relationship is found between leftist economic beliefs and growth but little evidence is found of a relationship with respect to non-economic beliefs. Finally, we briefly discuss some causal effects on beliefs. The evidence suggests that higher country risk and more dependence on natural resources shifts nations to a more leftist set of economic beliefs. Overall the evidence supports the view that cultural specificities may explain why certain institutions cannot be transplanted between nations with different cultural histories and underlines the limit to policy activism

Group Knowledge

There is knowledge in groups or communities, e.g. in the\ud scientific community, that such and such is the case, and\ud that in some cases groups as groups know; and in all\ud these cases there must be or have been actual knowers.\ud Accordingly, there is knowledge available in social groups,\ud and this knowledge can be "picked up� and had by\ud individual members as knowledge. My main concern in this\ud paper is to give an account of group beliefs and knowledge\ud in the sense that the group members as a group believe or\ud know something. A central case here is normatively\ud binding group belief and knowledge. In such a case the\ud group is obligated to reason and act on the truth of the\ud content of the belief in question. I will assume that a group\ud cannot know unless its members or at least some of them\ud know the item in question. The general ground for this\ud assumption is that group properties supervene on their\ud members' relevant properties (see Tuomela 1995 Chapter\ud 6, for a discussion). A group's normatively binding belief\ud concerning a topic will accordingly depend on its members,\ud beliefs, indeed we-mode "acceptance� beliefs, about the\ud topic and on their relevant "interconnections" concerning it.\ud We-mode acceptance belief centrally involves the idea of\ud functioning fully as a group member (see Tuomela 2002a,\ud 2003a for the we-mode). A member"s private or I-mode\ud beliefs may differ from his relevant we-mode beliefs

Beliefs and Actions in the Trust Game: Creating Instrumental Variables to Estimate the Causal Effect

In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's expectation about relevant events, e.g. about other agents' behavior. Recent experimental studies as well as surveys have asked participants to state their beliefs explicitly, but little is known about the causal relation between beliefs and other behavioral variables. This paper discusses the possibility of creating exogenous instrumental variables for belief statements, by shifting the probabilities of the relevant events. We conduct trust game experiments where the amount sent back by the second player (trustee) is exogenously varied by a random process, in a way that informs only the first player (trustor) about the realized variation. The procedure allows detecting causal links from beliefs to actions under plausible assumptions. The IV estimates indicate a significant causal effect, comparable to the connection between beliefs and actions that is suggested by OLS analyses.Social capital, trust game, instrumental variables, belief elicitation

Beliefs and Actions in the Trust Game: Creating Instrumental Variables to Estimate the Causal Effect

In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's expectation about relevant events, e.g. about other agents' behavior. Recent experimental studies as well as surveys have asked participants to state their beliefs explicitly, but little is known about the causal relation between beliefs and other behavioral variables. This paper discusses the possibility of creating exogenous instrumental variables for belief statements, by shifting the probabilities of the relevant events. We conduct trust game experiments where the amount sent back by the second player (trustee) is exogenously varied by a random process, in a way that informs only the first player (trustor) about the realized variation. The procedure allows detecting causal links from beliefs to actions under plausible assumptions. The IV estimates indicate a significant causal effect, comparable to the connection between beliefs and actions that is suggested by OLS analyses.social capital, trust game, instrumental variables, belief elicitation

Other-regarding behaviour: Testing guilt- and reciprocity-based models

We analyse two types of belief-dependant models of social preferences: guilt aversion and reciprocity. In particular, we test the relevance of their input variables (second-order beliefs and general dispositions for guilt/reciprocity). The data confirm the predictions of belief-dependant models. Both second-order beliefs and a participant's sensitivity to guilt/reciprocity are relevant for the decisions taken. Second-order beliefs appear to have an inverse U-shaped effect on the extent of kind behaviour.social preferences, other-regarding behaviour, belief-dependent models, experiments, trust game, guilt aversion, beliefs, psychological game theory, emotions, reciprocity

Development of theory-based health messages: three-phase programme of formative research

Online health behaviour interventions have great potential but their effectiveness may be hindered by a lack of formative and theoretical work. This paper describes the process of formative research to develop theoretically and empirically based health messages that are culturally relevant and can be used in an online intervention to promote healthy lifestyle behaviours among new university students. Drawing on the Theory of Planned Behaviour, a three-phase programme of formative research was conducted with prospective and current undergraduate students to identify (i) modal salient beliefs (the most commonly held beliefs) about fruit and vegetable intake, physical activity, binge drinking and smoking, (ii) which beliefs predicted intentions/behaviour and (iii) reasons underlying each of the beliefs that could be targeted in health messages. Phase 1, conducted with 96 pre-university college students, elicited 56 beliefs about the behaviours. Phase 2, conducted with 3026 incoming university students, identified 32 of these beliefs that predicted intentions/behaviour. Phase 3, conducted with 627 current university students, elicited 102 reasons underlying the 32 beliefs to be used to construct health messages to bolster or challenge these beliefs. The three-phase programme of formative research provides researchers with an example of how to develop health messages with a strong theoretical- and empirical base for use in health behaviour change interventions

Household Stock Market Beliefs and Learning

This paper characterizes heterogeneity of the beliefs of American households about future stock market returns, provides an explanation for that heterogeneity and establishes its relationship to stock holding behavior. We find substantial belief heterogeneity that is puzzling since households can observe the same publicly available information about the stock market. We propose a simple learning model where agents can invest in the acquisition of financial knowledge. Differential incentives to learn about the returns process can explain heterogeneity in beliefs. We check this explanation by using data on beliefs elicited as subjective probabilities and a rich set of other variables from the Health and Retirement Study. Both descriptive statistics and estimated relevant heterogeneity of the structural parameters provide support for our explanation. People with higher lifetime earnings, higher education, higher cognitive abilities, defined contribution as opposed to defined benefit pension plans, for example, possess beliefs that are considerably closer to what historical time series would imply. Our results also suggest that a substantial part of the reduced form relationship between stock holding and household characteristics is due to differences in beliefs. Our methodological contribution is estimating relevant heterogeneity of structural belief parameters from noisy survey answers to probability questions.