218,542 research outputs found
An Ordinal View of Independence with Application to Plausible Reasoning
An ordinal view of independence is studied in the framework of possibility
theory. We investigate three possible definitions of dependence, of increasing
strength. One of them is the counterpart to the multiplication law in
probability theory, and the two others are based on the notion of conditional
possibility. These two have enough expressive power to support the whole
possibility theory, and a complete axiomatization is provided for the strongest
one. Moreover we show that weak independence is well-suited to the problems of
belief change and plausible reasoning, especially to address the problem of
blocking of property inheritance in exception-tolerant taxonomic reasoning.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Tenth Conference on Uncertainty in
Artificial Intelligence (UAI1994
Independence - revision and defaults
We investigate different aspects of independence here, in the context of
theory revision, generalizing slightly work by Chopra, Parikh, and Rodrigues,
and in the context of preferential reasoning
A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency
This paper offers a probabilistic treatment of the conditions for argument cogency as endorsed in informal logic: acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency. Treating a natural language argument as a reason-claim-complex, our analysis identifies content features of defeasible argument on which the RSA conditions depend, namely: change in the commitment to the reason, the reasonâs sensitivity and selectivity to the claim, oneâs prior commitment to the claim, and the contextually determined thresholds of acceptability for reasons and for claims. Results contrast with, and may indeed serve to correct, the informal understanding and applications of the RSA criteria concerning their conceptual dependence, their function as update-thresholds, and their status as obligatory rather than permissive norms, but also show how these formal and informal normative approachs can in fact align
The meaning of materiality: reconsidering the materiality of Gramscian IR
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Knowledge embedded
How should we account for the contextual variability of knowledge claims? Many philosophers favour an invariantist account on which such contextual variability is due entirely to pragmatic factors, leaving no interesting context-sensitivity in the semantic meaning of âknow that.â I reject this invariantist division of labor by arguing that pragmatic invariantists have no principled account of embedded occurrences of âS knows/doesnât know that pâ: Occurrences embedded within larger linguistic constructions such as conditional sentences, attitude verbs, expressions of probability, comparatives, and many others, I argue, give rise to a threefold problem of embedded implicatures
Perspectives, Questions, and Epistemic Value
Many epistemologists endorse true-belief monism, the thesis that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. However, this view faces formidable counterexamples. In response to these challenges, we alter the letter, but not the spirit, of true-belief monism. We dub the resulting view âinquisitive truth monismâ, which holds that only true answers to relevant questions are of fundamental epistemic value. Which questions are relevant is a function of an inquirerâs perspective, which is characterized by his/her interests, social role, and background assumptions. Using examples of several different scientific practices, we argue that inquisitive truth monism outperforms true-belief monism
Beyond the DSGE Straitjacket
Academic macroeconomics and the research department of central banks have come to be dominated by Dynamic, Stochastic, General Equilibrium (DSGE) models based on micro-foundations of optimising representative agents with rational expectations. We argue that the dominance of this particular sort of DSGE and the resistance of some in the profession to alternatives has become a straitjacket that restricts empirical and theoretical experimentation and inhibits innovation and that the profession should embrace a more flexible approach to macroeconometric modelling. We describe one possible approach
Real Talk on the Metaphysics of Gender
Gender classifications often are controversial. These controversies typically focus on whether gender classifications align with facts about gender kind membership: Could someone really be nonbinary? Is Chris Mosier really a man? I think this is a bad approach. Consider the possibility of ontological oppression, which arises when social kinds operating in a context unjustly constrain the behaviors, concepts, or affect of certain groups. Gender kinds operating in dominant contexts, I argue, oppress trans and nonbinary persons in this way: they marginalize trans men and women, and exclude nonbinary persons. As a result, facts about membership in dominant gender kinds should not settle gender classification practices
Theories of understanding others: the need for a new account and the guiding role of the person model theory
What would be an adequate theory of social understanding? In the last decade, the philosophical debate has focused on Theory Theory, Simulation Theory and Interaction Theory as the three possible candidates. In the following, we look carefully at each of these and describe its main advantages and disadvantages. Based on this critical analysis, we formulate the need for a new account of social understanding. We propose the Person Model Theory as an independent new account which has greater explanatory power compared to the existing theorie
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