Saying Without Knowing What or How

In response to Stephen Neale (2016), I argue that aphonic expressions, such as PRO, are intentionally uttered by normal speakers of natural language, either by acts of omitting to say something explicitly, or by acts of giving phonetic realization to aphonics. I argue, also, that Gricean intention-based semantics should seek divorce from Cartesian assumptions of transparent access to propositional attitudes and, consequently, that Stephen Schiffer's so-called meaning-intention problem is not powerful enough to banish alleged cases of over-intellectualization in contemporary philosophy of language and mind

Perspectival Plurality, Relativism, and Multiple Indexing

In this paper I focus on a recently discussed phenomenon illustrated by sentences containing predicates of taste: the phenomenon of " perspectival plurality " , whereby sentences containing two or more predicates of taste have readings according to which each predicate pertains to a different perspective. This phenomenon has been shown to be problematic for (at least certain versions of) relativism. My main aim is to further the discussion by showing that the phenomenon extends to other perspectival expressions than predicates of taste and by proposing a general solution to the problem raised by it on behalf of the relativist. The core claim of the solution (" multiple indexing ") is that utterances of sentences containing perspectival expressions should be evaluated with respect to (possibly infinite) sequences of perspective parameters

Naturalizing Logic: a case study of the ad hominem and implicit bias

The fallacies, as traditionally conceived, are wrong ways of reasoning that nevertheless appear attractive to us. Recently, however, Woods (2013) has argued that they don’t merit such a title, and that what we take to be fallacies are instead largely virtuous forms of reasoning. This reformation of the fallacies forms part of Woods’ larger project to naturalize logic. In this paper I will look to his analysis of the argumentum ad hominem as a case study for the prospects of this project. I will argue that the empirical literature on implicit bias presents a difficulty for the reformation of the ad hominem as cognitively virtuous. Cases where implicit bias influences our assessment of the truth or claim or argument are instances of ad hominem reasoning, and these qualify as fallacious on Woods’ own definition

Rape Culture and Epistemology

We consider the complex interactions between rape culture and epistemology. A central case study is the consideration of a deferential attitude about the epistemology of sexual assault testimony. According to the deferential attitude, individuals and institutions should decline to act on allegations of sexual assault unless and until they are proven in a formal setting, i.e., a criminal court. We attack this deference from several angles, including the pervasiveness of rape culture in the criminal justice system, the epistemology of testimony and norms connecting knowledge and action, the harms of tacit idealizations away from important contextual factors, and a contextualist semantics for 'knows' ascriptions

Zur Semantik und Pragmatik explizit performativer Äußerungen : ein parenthetisches Experiment

If we want to develop a semantic analysis for explicit performatives such as I promise you to free Willy, we are faced with the following puzzle: In order to account for the speech act expressed by the performative verb, one can assume that the so-called performative clause is purely performative and provides the illocutionary force of the speech act whose content is given by the semantic object denoted by the complement clause. Yet under this perspective, the performative clause that is, next to the performative verb, the indexicals I and you that refer to the speaker and to the addressee of the utterance context is semantically invisible and does not contribute compositionally its meaning to the meaning of the entire explicit performative sentence. Conversely, if we account for the truth conditional contribution of the performative clause and deny that the meaning of the performative verb is purely performative, then we have to find a way to account for the speech act expressed by the performative verb. Of course, there is already the widely accepted and very appealing indirectness account for explicit performative utterances developed by Bach & Harnish (1979). Roughly, Bach and Harnish solve this puzzle in deriving the performativity by means of a pragmatic inference process. According to them, the important speech act performed by means of the utterance of the explicit performative sentence is a kind of the conventionalized indirect speech act. However, the boundary between semantics and pragmatics can be drawn in many various ways. Therefore, I think there could be other perspectives regarding the interface between the truth-functional treatment of the declarative explicit performative sentences and the speech acts performed with their utterances and which are expressed by the performative verbs. Hence, this thesis consists in the experiment to develop a further analysis and to check out its consequences with respect to the semantics and pragmatics of explicit performative utterances and the new interface emerged. Briefly, the experiment runs as follows: First, I develop an analysis for explicit performative sentences framed by parenthetical structures such as in (1)(a). In a second step, this parenthetical analysis is applied to the proper Austinian explicit performative sentences in (1)(b). (1) a. Tomorrow, I promise you this, I will teach them Tyrolean songs. b. I promise you that I will teach them Tyrolean songs. To analyze at first explicit performatives framed by parenthetical structures bears the convenience that we are faced with two utterances of two main clauses. In (1)(a) there is the utterance of the host sentence Tomorrow I will teach them Tyrolean songs, and the utterance of the explicit parenthetical I promise you this, where the demonstrative this refers to the utterance of Tomorrow I will teach them Tyrolean songs. Since speakers perform speech acts with utterances of main clauses, I assume that the meaning of the explicit parenthetical I promise you this specifies that the actual illocutionary force of the utterance of Tomorrow I will teach them Tyrolean songs is the illocutionary force of a promise. Hence, instead of deriving an indirect illocutionary force by means of a pragmatic inference schema, we can deal with an ordinary direct speech act that is performed with the utterance of the host sentence. This kind of analysis stresses the particular discourse function of explicit performative utterances. Performative verbs are used whenever the contextual information is not sufficient to determine the illocutionary force of the corresponding implicit speech act. The resulting consequences of the parenthetical analysis are interesting since they cast a different light on performative verbs. Surprisingly, the performative verbs are not performative at all. They do not constitute the execution of a speech act, but are execution supporting. Instead of constituting the particular illocutionary force, they merely specify the illocutionary force of the utterance of the host sentence. For instance, the speaker utters the explicit parenthetical I promise you this for specifying what he is simultaneously doing. Hence the speaker does not succeed in performing the promise simply because he is uttering I promise you this. Rather, by means of the information conveyed by the utterance of I promise you this, the potential illocutionary forces of the utterance of the host sentence are disambiguated. Thus, it is not the case that explicit parentheticals are trivially true when uttered. Their function is more complex. Their self-verifying property (‘saying so makes it so’) is explained by means of disambiguation. Furthermore, according to the parenthetical analysis, instead of being purely performative, the performative verbs contribute compositionally their meanings to the truth conditions of the entire explicit performative sentence. Together with its consequences, this analysis is applied to the proper Austinian performatives, which display subordination. I assume that regardless of their structure, explicit performatives always semantically and pragmatically behave as the parenthetical analysis predicts.Mit Äußerungen von expliziten performativen Sätzen wie Ich verspreche Dir, dass ich Brot kaufen kommunizieren Sprecher explizit den Sprechakt, den sie gleichzeitig vollziehen. Semantisch und pragmatisch konfrontieren uns solche Äußerungen mit dem folgenden Phänomen: Möchte man dem Sprechakt gerecht werden, der durch das performative Verb ausgedrückt wird, kann man gemäß Austin annehmen, der Ausdruck Ich verspreche Dir sei rein performativ und verweise auf die illokutionäre Kraft des Sprechaktes, dessen semantischer Gehalt durch den Komplementsatz denotiert wird. Allerdings wären so das performative Verb und die Pronomina für die Semantik unsichtbar und würden keinerlei kompositionalen Beitrag zur Semantik des gesamten Satzes leisten. Im Sinne der Fregeschen Kompositionalität brauchen wir somit eine Analyse, die einerseits der Semantik expliziter Ausdrücke aber andererseits auch dem durch die Äußerung vollzogenen und durch das performative Verb ausgedrückten Sprechakt gerecht wird. Diese Arbeit begegnet dem obigen Phänomen mit einer recht unorthodoxen Analyse expliziter Performative basierend auf einer Analyse expliziter Performative in parenthetischen Strukturen wie in (1)(a). (1) a. Morgen, das verspreche ich Dir, werde ich mit Euch jodeln. b. Ich verspreche Dir, dass ich morgen mit Euch jodeln werde. Sätze wie (1)(a) haben den Vorteil, dass wir diese als zwei Äußerungen zweier Hauptsätze betrachten können – die Äußerung des sogenannten Gastsatzes Morgen werde ich mit Euch jodeln und die Äußerung der expliziten Parenthese das verspreche ich Dir, wo das Demonstrativum das auf die Äußerung von Morgen werde ich mit Euch jodeln referiert. Somit lässt sich annehmen, dass die Semantik von das verspreche ich Dir die illokutionäre Kraft der Äußerung von Morgen werde ich mit Euch jodeln spezifiziert – nämlich die illokutionäre Kraft des Versprechens. Anstatt wie Bach und Harnisch (1979) die illokutionäre Kraft durch ein pragmatisches Inferenzschema herzuleiten und indirekte Sprechakte zu postulieren, ist das vollzogene Versprechen gemäß dieser Analyse ein ganz gewöhnlicher direkter Sprechakt. Unter der parenthetischen Analyse zeigen performative Verben unerwartete Eigenschaften. Performative Verben tragen ihre Semantik kompositional zu der des gesamten Satzes bei und sind dementsprechend trotz ihrer Bezeichnung nicht performativ. Sie konstituieren nicht die Durchführung eines Sprechaktes sondern unterstützen die Durchführung des Sprechaktes. Statt eine bestimmte illokutionäre Kraft zu denotieren, spezifizieren diese Verben die illokutionäre Kraft der Äußerung des Gastsatzes und schränken die Menge der möglichen illokutionären Kräfte dieses Satzes ein (Disambiguierung). Mit der Äußerung von das verspreche ich Dir spezifiziert der Sprecher seine simultane Sprechhandlung – nämlich dass er verspricht. Somit ist das Versprechen nicht erfolgreich nur weil der Sprecher das verspreche ich Dir geäußert hat. Explizite Parenthesen sind nicht trivialerweise wahr. Ihre Funktion ist komplexer. Sprecher verwenden explizite performative Verben wenn die Informationen des Kontextes nicht genügen, die jeweilige illokutionäre Kraft des analogen impliziten Sprechaktes zu bestimmen - in gewissen Kontexten könnte man Morgen werde ich mit Euch jodeln auch als Drohung oder Behauptung interpretieren. Die Eigenschaft der Selbstverifkation expliziter Performative (Saying so makes it so) kann somit durch Disambiguierung entmystifiziert werden. Im Folgenden übertrage ich im Sinne eines Experiments, diese Analyse auf die eigentlichen expliziten Performativen wie in (1)(b). Es wird sich zeigen, dass sich explizite Performative, trotz des syntaktischen Unterschieds semantisch und pragmatisch so verhalten wie es die parenthetische Analyse vorhersagt

A Conditional Intent to Perform

The doctrine of promissory fraud holds that a contractual promise implicitly represents an intent to perform. A promisor’s conditional intent to perform poses a problem for that doctrine. It is clear that some undisclosed conditions on the promisor’s intent should result in liability for promissory fraud. Yet no promisor intends to perform come what may, so there is a sense in which all promisors conditionally intend to perform. Building on Michael Bratman’s planning theory of intentions, this article provides a theoretical account of the distinction between “foreground” and “background” conditions on intentions in general and then explains why foreground conditions on a promisor’s intent to perform are likely to result in material promissory misrepresentation, while background conditions are not. The difference between foreground and background conditions lies in whether the agent accepts the satisfaction of the condition for the purposes of her practical reasoning. A promisor’s nonacceptance of a condition on her intent to perform is material because it is likely to affect her preperformance deliberations and investment in the transaction, as well as her willingness to seek agreement with the promisee on how to fill contractual gaps

The Many Uses of Predicates of Taste and the Challenge from Disagreement

In the debate between contextualism and relativism about predicates of taste, the challenge from disagreement (the objection that contextualism cannot account for disagreement in ordinary exchanges involving such predicates) has played a central role. This paper investigates one way of answering the challenge consisting on appeal to certain, less focused on, uses of predicates of taste. It argues that the said thread is unsatisfactory, in that it downplays certain exchanges that constitute the core disagreement data. Additionally, several arguments to the effect that the exchanges in question don’t amount to disagreement are considered and rejected

Deliberation and Collective Identity Formation

Deliberation is an argumentative practice in which several parties reason in order to decide the best available course of action. I argue that deliberation, unlike negotiation, requires a collective agency, defined by shared commitments, and not merely a plural agency defined by aggregation of individual commitments. Since the “we” presupposed by this argumentative genre is built up in the course of the deliberation exchange itself, shaping collective identity is a basic function of public deliberation

Speaking the Truth: Supporting Authentic Advocacy with Professional Identity Formation

When law students are asked to articulate legal rules in a persuasive communication such as a brief, they may experience internal tension. Their version of the rule, as framed to benefit a particular client’s position, may be different from the way they would articulate the rule if they were not taking on an advocate’s role. The conflict between those two versions of a legal rule leads some students to wonder if advocacy itself is deceptive, if an advocate’s role requires one to sacrifice ethics for success, and if ancient Greek philosophers were correct when they derided persuasive communication as “trickery and magic,” and criticized advocates for making arguments that were “artfully written but not truthfully meant.” This tension is not unique to students. All advocates must ask themselves whether they can provide a true and accurate version of the law (truthful law) and simultaneously articulate a version of the law that will help their clients. This question speaks to the very nature of law and what it means to be a lawyer. If the question is not successfully resolved, students and lawyers are more susceptible to the cynicism and discontent that permeates the legal profession.Using Plato’s denunciation of rhetoric and rhetoricians as a starting point, Part I of this Article will explore how the first year of law school may create and exacerbate tension between law students’ desire to advocate on behalf of their clients and their desire to truthfully communicate the law. Part II will explore how law school could resolve this tension with an explicit discussion of legal determinacy and the lawyer’s role in creating law: what students need to hear, when they need to hear it, and where that conversation might be placed within the curriculum. The Article will identify the developing area of professional identity formation as a natural location for an effective discussion, which would ideally occur within the first year of studies. In that discussion, law students can explore a view of lawyers as meaning-makers and truth-tellers: rhetoricians who understand and are faithful to the true essence of a law but are also able to create alternatives within the scope of that true law. Students and lawyers can integrate their own identities into this professional identity, and maintain authenticity in their advocacy

Weak Assertion

We present an inferentialist account of the epistemic modal operator might. Our starting point is the bilateralist programme. A bilateralist explains the operator not in terms of the speech act of rejection ; we explain the operator might in terms of weak assertion, a speech act whose existence we argue for on the basis of linguistic evidence. We show that our account of might provides a solution to certain well-known puzzles about the semantics of modal vocabulary whilst retaining classical logic. This demonstrates that an inferentialist approach to meaning can be successfully extended beyond the core logical constants