Reinforcement Mechanism Design for E-Commerce

We study the problem of allocating impressions to sellers in e-commerce websites, such as Amazon, eBay or Taobao, aiming to maximize the total revenue generated by the platform. We employ a general framework of reinforcement mechanism design, which uses deep reinforcement learning to design efficient algorithms, taking the strategic behaviour of the sellers into account. Specifically, we model the impression allocation problem as a Markov decision process, where the states encode the history of impressions, prices, transactions and generated revenue and the actions are the possible impression allocations in each round. To tackle the problem of continuity and high-dimensionality of states and actions, we adopt the ideas of the DDPG algorithm to design an actor-critic policy gradient algorithm which takes advantage of the problem domain in order to achieve convergence and stability. We evaluate our proposed algorithm, coined IA(GRU), by comparing it against DDPG, as well as several natural heuristics, under different rationality models for the sellers - we assume that sellers follow well-known no-regret type strategies which may vary in their degree of sophistication. We find that IA(GRU) outperforms all algorithms in terms of the total revenue

Learning Adaptive Display Exposure for Real-Time Advertising

In E-commerce advertising, where product recommendations and product ads are presented to users simultaneously, the traditional setting is to display ads at fixed positions. However, under such a setting, the advertising system loses the flexibility to control the number and positions of ads, resulting in sub-optimal platform revenue and user experience. Consequently, major e-commerce platforms (e.g., Taobao.com) have begun to consider more flexible ways to display ads. In this paper, we investigate the problem of advertising with adaptive exposure: can we dynamically determine the number and positions of ads for each user visit under certain business constraints so that the platform revenue can be increased? More specifically, we consider two types of constraints: request-level constraint ensures user experience for each user visit, and platform-level constraint controls the overall platform monetization rate. We model this problem as a Constrained Markov Decision Process with per-state constraint (psCMDP) and propose a constrained two-level reinforcement learning approach to decompose the original problem into two relatively independent sub-problems. To accelerate policy learning, we also devise a constrained hindsight experience replay mechanism. Experimental evaluations on industry-scale real-world datasets demonstrate the merits of our approach in both obtaining higher revenue under the constraints and the effectiveness of the constrained hindsight experience replay mechanism.Comment: accepted by CIKM201

Whole-Chain Recommendations

With the recent prevalence of Reinforcement Learning (RL), there have been tremendous interests in developing RL-based recommender systems. In practical recommendation sessions, users will sequentially access multiple scenarios, such as the entrance pages and the item detail pages, and each scenario has its specific characteristics. However, the majority of existing RL-based recommender systems focus on optimizing one strategy for all scenarios or separately optimizing each strategy, which could lead to sub-optimal overall performance. In this paper, we study the recommendation problem with multiple (consecutive) scenarios, i.e., whole-chain recommendations. We propose a multi-agent RL-based approach (DeepChain), which can capture the sequential correlation among different scenarios and jointly optimize multiple recommendation strategies. To be specific, all recommender agents (RAs) share the same memory of users' historical behaviors, and they work collaboratively to maximize the overall reward of a session. Note that optimizing multiple recommendation strategies jointly faces two challenges in the existing model-free RL model - (i) it requires huge amounts of user behavior data, and (ii) the distribution of reward (users' feedback) are extremely unbalanced. In this paper, we introduce model-based RL techniques to reduce the training data requirement and execute more accurate strategy updates. The experimental results based on a real e-commerce platform demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework.Comment: 29th ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Managemen

Q-Strategy: A Bidding Strategy for Market-Based Allocation of Grid Services

The application of autonomous agents by the provisioning and usage of computational services is an attractive research field. Various methods and technologies in the area of artificial intelligence, statistics and economics are playing together to achieve i) autonomic service provisioning and usage of Grid services, to invent ii) competitive bidding strategies for widely used market mechanisms and to iii) incentivize consumers and providers to use such market-based systems. The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we present a bidding agent framework for implementing artificial bidding agents, supporting consumers and providers in technical and economic preference elicitation as well as automated bid generation by the requesting and provisioning of Grid services. Secondly, we introduce a novel consumer-side bidding strategy, which enables a goal-oriented and strategic behavior by the generation and submission of consumer service requests and selection of provider offers. Thirdly, we evaluate and compare the Q-strategy, implemented within the presented framework, against the Truth-Telling bidding strategy in three mechanisms – a centralized CDA, a decentralized on-line machine scheduling and a FIFO-scheduling mechanisms

Rational bidding using reinforcement learning: an application in automated resource allocation

The application of autonomous agents by the provisioning and usage of computational resources is an attractive research field. Various methods and technologies in the area of artificial intelligence, statistics and economics are playing together to achieve i) autonomic resource provisioning and usage of computational resources, to invent ii) competitive bidding strategies for widely used market mechanisms and to iii) incentivize consumers and providers to use such market-based systems. The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we present a framework for supporting consumers and providers in technical and economic preference elicitation and the generation of bids. Secondly, we introduce a consumer-side reinforcement learning bidding strategy which enables rational behavior by the generation and selection of bids. Thirdly, we evaluate and compare this bidding strategy against a truth-telling bidding strategy for two kinds of market mechanisms – one centralized and one decentralized