Asymptotic Bias of Stochastic Gradient Search

The asymptotic behavior of the stochastic gradient algorithm with a biased gradient estimator is analyzed. Relying on arguments based on the dynamic system theory (chain-recurrence) and the differential geometry (Yomdin theorem and Lojasiewicz inequality), tight bounds on the asymptotic bias of the iterates generated by such an algorithm are derived. The obtained results hold under mild conditions and cover a broad class of high-dimensional nonlinear algorithms. Using these results, the asymptotic properties of the policy-gradient (reinforcement) learning and adaptive population Monte Carlo sampling are studied. Relying on the same results, the asymptotic behavior of the recursive maximum split-likelihood estimation in hidden Markov models is analyzed, too.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:0907.102

Distributed Learning Policies for Power Allocation in Multiple Access Channels

We analyze the problem of distributed power allocation for orthogonal multiple access channels by considering a continuous non-cooperative game whose strategy space represents the users' distribution of transmission power over the network's channels. When the channels are static, we find that this game admits an exact potential function and this allows us to show that it has a unique equilibrium almost surely. Furthermore, using the game's potential property, we derive a modified version of the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory which applies to this continuous game, and we show that if the network's users employ a distributed learning scheme based on these dynamics, then they converge to equilibrium exponentially quickly. On the other hand, a major challenge occurs if the channels do not remain static but fluctuate stochastically over time, following a stationary ergodic process. In that case, the associated ergodic game still admits a unique equilibrium, but the learning analysis becomes much more complicated because the replicator dynamics are no longer deterministic. Nonetheless, by employing results from the theory of stochastic approximation, we show that users still converge to the game's unique equilibrium. Our analysis hinges on a game-theoretical result which is of independent interest: in finite player games which admit a (possibly nonlinear) convex potential function, the replicator dynamics (suitably modified to account for nonlinear payoffs) converge to an eps-neighborhood of an equilibrium at time of order O(log(1/eps)).Comment: 11 pages, 8 figures. Revised manuscript structure and added more material and figures for the case of stochastically fluctuating channels. This version will appear in the IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communication, Special Issue on Game Theory in Wireless Communication

Convergence and Convergence Rate of Stochastic Gradient Search in the Case of Multiple and Non-Isolated Extrema

The asymptotic behavior of stochastic gradient algorithms is studied. Relying on results from differential geometry (Lojasiewicz gradient inequality), the single limit-point convergence of the algorithm iterates is demonstrated and relatively tight bounds on the convergence rate are derived. In sharp contrast to the existing asymptotic results, the new results presented here allow the objective function to have multiple and non-isolated minima. The new results also offer new insights into the asymptotic properties of several classes of recursive algorithms which are routinely used in engineering, statistics, machine learning and operations research