A "winner" under any voting rule ? An experiment on the single transferable vote

In this paper, we expose the results of a voting experiment realised in 2007, during the French Presidential election. This experiment aimed at confronting the Single Transferable vote (SVT) procedure to two criteria : simplicity and the selection of a Condorcet-winner. Building on our electoral sample's preferences, we show that this voting procedure can design a different winner, depending on the vote counting process. With the vote counting process advocated by Hare, the winner is Nicolas Sarkozy, while the Coombs vote counting process has François Bayrou as winner. For these two vote counting processes, the details of the experiment are the same and it is shown that the simplicity criterion is respected. However, with regard to the Condorcet-winner criterion, the Coombs methods is the only one to elect the Condorcet-winner, i.e. François Bayrou.Field experiments, elections, Single Transferable Vote, voting system, Condorcet Winner.

Condorcet Methods - When, Why and How?

Geometric representations of 3-candidate profiles are used to investigate properties of preferential election methods. The representation visualizes both the possibility to win by agenda manipulation, i.e. introducing a third and chanceless candidate in a 2-candidate race, and the possibility to win a 3-candidate election through different kinds of strategic voting. Here the focus is on the "burying" strategy in single-winner elections, where the win is obtained by ranking a main competitor artificially low. Condorcet methods are compared with the major alternatives (Borda Count, Approval Voting, Instant Runoff Voting). Various Condorcet methods are studied, and one method is proposed that minimizes the number of noncyclic profiles where burying is possible.Preferential election methods; agenda manipulation; strategic voting

Don’t Just Make Redistricters More Accountable to the People, Make Them the People

This thesis investigated the heat transfer of internally oil cooled rotors in permanent magnet electric machines which are, among other things, used in hybrid vehicles or zero emission vehicles. The magnets become sensitive and can be demagnetized at high working temperatures, hence the need of cooling. The scope of this work included CFD simulations in STAR-CCM+. Three different 3D multiphase models simulating the oil propagation in the rotor were performed. A Lagrangian multiphase model combined with a fluid film model was the most suitable model for simulating the spray of the oil and the film thickness along the inner rotor wall. It was noticed that periodic boundaries caused problems for the fluid film model, therefore a complete geometry was preferred over a truncated model. The 3D solutions provided thicker film thicknesses than the analytical solutions from the fluid film thickness theory. The maximum analytical thickness was of the same order of magnitude as the surface average film thickness provided by the multiphase models. This thickness was assumed to be constant when used as the base for the fluid region in the 2D one-phase models.The study showed that aluminum was the most suitable rotor material due to its high conductive capacity, which provided a more even distribution of the temperature in the solid and hence resulted in lower overall temperatures. The cooling power increased linearly with the volumetric flow rate, however the heat transfer coefficient decreased for the higher flow rates. A volumetric flow rate of 10dl/min was recommended. A 2D model was compared to a preliminary experiment and showed that these were not correlated. The conclusion was that more experiments and simulations are needed in order to confirm the validity of the 2D model

The social sciences and the web : From ‘Lurking’ to interdisciplinary ‘Big Data’ research

Acknowledgements This research is supported by the award made by the RCUK Digital Economy theme to the dot.rural Digital Economy Hub (award reference: EP/G066051/1) and the UK Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC) (award reference: ES/M001628/1).Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Towards a Dichotomy for the Possible Winner Problem in Elections Based on Scoring Rules

To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings, the voters may often only provide partial orders. This directly leads to the Possible Winner problem that asks, given a set of partial votes, whether a distinguished candidate can still become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational complexity of Possible Winner for the broad class of voting protocols defined by scoring rules. A scoring rule provides a score value for every position which a candidate can have in a linear order. Prominent examples include plurality, k-approval, and Borda. Generalizing previous NP-hardness results for some special cases, we settle the computational complexity for all but one scoring rule. More precisely, for an unbounded number of candidates and unweighted voters, we show that Possible Winner is NP-complete for all pure scoring rules except plurality, veto, and the scoring rule defined by the scoring vector (2,1,...,1,0), while it is solvable in polynomial time for plurality and veto.Comment: minor changes and updates; accepted for publication in JCSS, online version available