301 research outputs found
Well-orders in the transfinite Japaridze algebra
This paper studies the transfinite propositional provability logics
\glp_\Lambda and their corresponding algebras. These logics have for each
ordinal a modality \la \alpha \ra. We will focus on the closed
fragment of \glp_\Lambda (i.e., where no propositional variables occur) and
\emph{worms} therein. Worms are iterated consistency expressions of the form
\la \xi_n\ra \ldots \la \xi_1 \ra \top. Beklemishev has defined
well-orderings on worms whose modalities are all at least and
presented a calculus to compute the respective order-types.
In the current paper we present a generalization of the original
orderings and provide a calculus for the corresponding generalized order-types
. Our calculus is based on so-called {\em hyperations} which are
transfinite iterations of normal functions.
Finally, we give two different characterizations of those sequences of
ordinals which are of the form \la {\formerOmega}_\xi (A) \ra_{\xi \in \ord}
for some worm . One of these characterizations is in terms of a second kind
of transfinite iteration called {\em cohyperation.}Comment: Corrected a minor but confusing omission in the relation between
Veblen progressions and hyperation
Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication
C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication".
Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary
box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater
expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the
ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular
semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal
logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with
the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction
between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the
strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the
functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with
"idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the
intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of
Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years
later
Complete Additivity and Modal Incompleteness
In this paper, we tell a story about incompleteness in modal logic. The story
weaves together a paper of van Benthem, `Syntactic aspects of modal
incompleteness theorems,' and a longstanding open question: whether every
normal modal logic can be characterized by a class of completely additive modal
algebras, or as we call them, V-BAOs. Using a first-order reformulation of the
property of complete additivity, we prove that the modal logic that starred in
van Benthem's paper resolves the open question in the negative. In addition,
for the case of bimodal logic, we show that there is a naturally occurring
logic that is incomplete with respect to V-BAOs, namely the provability logic
GLB. We also show that even logics that are unsound with respect to such
algebras do not have to be more complex than the classical propositional
calculus. On the other hand, we observe that it is undecidable whether a
syntactically defined logic is V-complete. After these results, we generalize
the Blok Dichotomy to degrees of V-incompleteness. In the end, we return to van
Benthem's theme of syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness
Independent Combinatoric Worm Principles for First Order Arithmetic and Beyond
Treballs Finals del Mà ster de Lògica Pura i Aplicada, Facultat de Filosofia, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2019-2020, Tutor: Joost J. JoostenIn this thesis we study Beklemishev’s combinatorial principle Every Worm Dies, EWD which although true, it is unprovable in Peano Arithmetic (PA). The principle talks about sequences of modal formulas, the finiteness of all of them being equivalent to the one-consistency of PA. We present the elements of proof theory at play here and perform two attempts at generalizing this theorem. One is directed towards its relationship with some known fragments of PA while the other aims to see its connection with fragments of second order arithmetic
Propositional Logics Complexity and the Sub-Formula Property
In 1979 Richard Statman proved, using proof-theory, that the purely
implicational fragment of Intuitionistic Logic (M-imply) is PSPACE-complete. He
showed a polynomially bounded translation from full Intuitionistic
Propositional Logic into its implicational fragment. By the PSPACE-completeness
of S4, proved by Ladner, and the Goedel translation from S4 into Intuitionistic
Logic, the PSPACE- completeness of M-imply is drawn. The sub-formula principle
for a deductive system for a logic L states that whenever F1,...,Fk proves A,
there is a proof in which each formula occurrence is either a sub-formula of A
or of some of Fi. In this work we extend Statman result and show that any
propositional (possibly modal) structural logic satisfying a particular
formulation of the sub-formula principle is in PSPACE. If the logic includes
the minimal purely implicational logic then it is PSPACE-complete. As a
consequence, EXPTIME-complete propositional logics, such as PDL and the
common-knowledge epistemic logic with at least 2 agents satisfy this particular
sub-formula principle, if and only if, PSPACE=EXPTIME. We also show how our
technique can be used to prove that any finitely many-valued logic has the set
of its tautologies in PSPACE.Comment: In Proceedings DCM 2014, arXiv:1504.0192
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