Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: The Stability Likelihood of an International Climate Agreement

Results derived from empirical analyses on the stability of climate coalitions are usually very sensitive to the large uncertainties associated with the benefits and costs of climate policies. This paper provides the methodology of Stability Likelihood that links uncertainty about benefits and costs of climate change to the stability analysis of coalitions in a stochastic, empirical setting. We show that the concept of Stability Likelihood improves upon the robustness and interpretation of stability analysis. Our numerical application is based on a modified version of the climate model STACO. It turns out that the only non-trivial coalition structure with a relatively high Stability Likelihood (around 25 percent) is a coalition between the European Union and Japan, though quantitative results depend especially on the variance in regional benefits from abatement.Climate change, Coalition formation, International environmental agreements, Uncertainty

Asymmetrical treatment and revenue from regional protest

This study seeks to empirically determine to what extent continual protest by regionalist parties may generate revenue for their regions. To this end, we perform an econometric estimation using the collaboration agreements between Spanish governments and the autonomous communities as the dependent variable (first-level political and administrative divisions, CCAA in their Spanish initials). We test our hypothesis by analogously applying the economic specifications employed in studies of "pork barrel politics", including control variables regarding per capita income, regional financing systems, political variables such as support for regional governments from the same political party or the existence of pivot parties. The results support the theoretical conclusions reached by Treisman (1999), namely that non-sovereignist regionalism generates revenue while sovereignist nationalism or regionalism leads governments to react by applying unfavourable treatment. Similarly, the fact that a regionalist party plays a key role in the investiture of the national president brings with it even greater revenue to the region in question, concurring with the results predicted by Brancati (2008)

Banks as blockholders

In this paper, we analyze the effects of banks as main blockholders on a firm's returns and on the concentration of ownership in the hands of the controlling blockholders. Compared with previous studies, we approach to this problem by taking into consideration the type of blockholders building up coalitions with banks for controlling a firm. This allows us to reconcile different results, reported in relevant literature, on the impact of banks' ownership of a firm on its returns. In short, we argue that the effect is only negative when banks are the main blockholders or when they build up coalitions with other banks. We prove empirically our theoretical contentions making use of a sample of Spanish firms for the period 1996-2000

The grand coalition versus competing coalitions: trade-offs in how to standardize

The standardization landscape in the Information and Communication technology industries is fragmented in many different standardization bodies, industry consortia, and alliances. Some of these coalitions cooperate with each other, while others compete. The existence of competing standardization coalitions may prevent coordination on a common standard. There is a lot of debate among practitioners and analysts about whether this fragmentation creates a coordination failure. This paper takes a middle ground in this debate. Competition between standardization coalitions may indeed harm compatibility, but it also helps to mitigate coordination failures within standardization bodies and coalitions. The negotiation process in a coalition can cause coordination failures of its own. An important failure is lack of timeliness, due to delaying tactics by company delegates in the coalition. Introducing competition between coalitions can speed up negotiations within them, and thus help to overcome this intracommittee coordination failure. A game theoretic model explores the effect of competition between coalitions on the speed of decision-making and standardization.Economics ;

Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions: Explaining Fiscal Retrenchment in the European Union

Driven by the desire to fulfill the Maastricht fiscal criteria and pressed by mounting debt burdens that have accumulated over the past 30 years, a majority of EU-15 countries attempted to reduce their budget deficits during the 1990s. Yet, these nations have exhibited remarkable differences in their ability to pursue such retrenchment policies. This paper endeavours to illuminate the political and institutional factors that can help explain those differing degrees of fiscal retrenchment in European Union countries for the time period 1990-2001. Several variants of the partisan approach and the veto players framework are elucidated and applied to the question of budgetary consolidation. These elaborations yield four working hypotheses which are empirically tested using a time-series cross-section data set of 14 EU countries. The results lend support to the notion that a low number of insitutional veto players increases likelihood and extent of a budgetary retrenchment. Given these findings it is possible to draw some conclusions concerning the effectiveness and deficiencies of the Stability and Growth Pact.

How econometric models help policy makers; theory and practice

Frisch and Tinbergen founded the standard framework for finding the optimal economic policy by maximizing the welfare function under constraints supplied by the econometric model. Frisch worried about the reliability of the model and Tinbergen thought that it would be too difficult to specify the welfare function. Looking at current practice in Dutch policy making, both worries are relevant but the solutions proposed by the founders are not very helpful. Rather, the solution is found in applying an iterative trial-and-error procedure interfacing between the policy maker and the model-cum-expert system. The main contributions of the standard framework are its useful set of concepts, the famous order condition for a feasible solution, and the clear definition of role models for the two parties in the interaction.

D3.2 Cost Concept Model and Gateway Specification

This document introduces a Framework supporting the implementation of a cost concept model against which current and future cost models for curating digital assets can be benchmarked. The value built into this cost concept model leverages the comprehensive engagement by the 4C project with various user communities and builds upon our understanding of the requirements, drivers, obstacles and objectives that various stakeholder groups have relating to digital curation. Ultimately, this concept model should provide a critical input to the development and refinement of cost models as well as helping to ensure that the curation and preservation solutions and services that will inevitably arise from the commercial sector as ‘supply’ respond to a much better understood ‘demand’ for cost-effective and relevant tools. To meet acknowledged gaps in current provision, a nested model of curation which addresses both costs and benefits is provided. The goal of this task was not to create a single, functionally implementable cost modelling application; but rather to design a model based on common concepts and to develop a generic gateway specification that can be used by future model developers, service and solution providers, and by researchers in follow-up research and development projects.<p></p> The Framework includes:<p></p> • A Cost Concept Model—which defines the core concepts that should be included in curation costs models;<p></p> • An Implementation Guide—for the cost concept model that provides guidance and proposes questions that should be considered when developing new cost models and refining existing cost models;<p></p> • A Gateway Specification Template—which provides standard metadata for each of the core cost concepts and is intended for use by future model developers, model users, and service and solution providers to promote interoperability;<p></p> • A Nested Model for Digital Curation—that visualises the core concepts, demonstrates how they interact and places them into context visually by linking them to A Cost and Benefit Model for Curation.<p></p> This Framework provides guidance for data collection and associated calculations in an operational context but will also provide a critical foundation for more strategic thinking around curation such as the Economic Sustainability Reference Model (ESRM).<p></p> Where appropriate, definitions of terms are provided, recommendations are made, and examples from existing models are used to illustrate the principles of the framework

BANKS AS BLOCKHOLDERS

In this paper, we analyze the effects of banks as main blockholders on a firm’s returns and on the concentration of ownership in the hands of the controlling blockholders. Compared with previous studies, we approach to this problem by taking into consideration the type of blockholders building up coalitions with banks for controlling a firm. This allows us to reconcile different results, reported in relevant literature, on the impact of banks’ ownership of a firm on its returns. In short, we argue that the effect is only negative when banks are the main blockholders or when they build up coalitions with other banks. We prove empirically our theoretical contentions making use of a sample of Spanish firms for the period 1996-2000.

The Global Effects of Subglobal Climate Policies

Individual countries are in the process of legislating responses to the challenges posed by climate change. The prospect of rising carbon prices raises concerns in these nations about the effects on the competitiveness of their own energy-intensive industries and the potential for carbon leakage, particularly leakage to emerging economies that lack comparable regulation. In response, certain developed countries are proposing controversial trade-related measures and allowance allocation designs to complement their climate policies. Missing from much of the debate on trade-related measures is a broader understanding of how climate policies implemented unilaterally (or subglobally) affect all countries in the global trading system. Arguably, the largest impacts are from the targeted carbon pricing itself, which generates macroeconomic effects, terms-of-trade changes, and shifts in global energy demand and prices; it also changes the relative prices of certain energy-intensive goods. This paper studies how climate policies implemented in certain major economies (the European Union and the United States) affect the global distribution of economic and environmental outcomes, and how these outcomes may be altered by complementary policies aimed at addressing carbon leakage.cap-and-trade, emissions leakage, border carbon adjustments, output-based allocation, general equilibrium model