A Roadmap for Change: Federal Policy Recommendations for Addressing the Criminilization of LGBT People and People Living with HIV

Each year in the United States, thousands of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, Two Spirit, queer, questioning and gender non-conforming (LGBT) people and people living with HIV come in contact with the criminal justice system and fall victim to similar miscarriages of justice.According to a recent national study, a startling 73% of all LGBT people and PLWH surveyed have had face-to-face contact with police during the past five years.1 Five percent of these respondents also report having spent time in jail or prison, a rate that is markedly higher than the nearly 3% of the U.S. adult population whoare under some form of correctional supervision (jail, prison, probation, or parole) at any point in time.In fact, LGBT people and PLWH, especially Native and LGBT people and PLWH of color, aresignificantly overrepresented in all aspects of the penal system, from policing, to adjudication,to incarceration. Yet their experiences are often overlooked, and little headway has been madein dismantling the cycles of criminalization that perpetuate poor life outcomes and push already vulnerable populations to the margins of society.The disproportionate rate of LGBT people and PLWH in the criminal system can best be understoodin the larger context of widespread and continuing discrimination in employment, education, socialservices, health care, and responses to violence

Confidential Settlements for Professional Malpractice

(Excerpt) A lawyer representing a plaintiff in a professional malpractice case advises her client not to file a complaint with the state regulatory body—the state bar, the medical board, or some other pertinent body—until later. The lawyer explains that she can offer to settle the case more favorably, more quickly, and at lower cost if they promise that, as part of the settlement, defendant’s malfeasance will never be reported to the state regulatory body responsible for ensuring professional competence in the area. This tactic may allow the client to negotiate a larger settlement because the defendant should be willing to pay more to avoid having to defend himself in an administrative, criminal, or disciplinary proceeding. Although the lawyer’s present client may benefit, failing to report professional malfeasance may hurt both future clients and the public at large. Professional regulatory agencies exist to protect the public from substandard professional services. Advising a client to withhold relevant information from such agencies for personal gain—both the client’s and the lawyer’s—raises serious public policy issues. The dangers of confidentiality provisions have been explored in other contexts, particularly in products liability and sexual harassment cases. This Article explores similar problems in the context of professional malpractice. Much of the discussion here will focus on legal malpractice; however, similar concerns and arguments apply to other professionals as well

Widening the Lens on Boys and Men of Color

Current philanthropic initiatives on boys and men of color use research that often fails to disaggregate the "Asian" category, and disadvantaged AAPI and AMEMSA boys and men are often excluded from these funding initiatives.  In response to AAPI and AMEMSA organizations' concerns about the lack of attention to boys and men in their communities, AAPIP undertook a community-based research effort as an initial step towards building knowledge within philanthropy about AAPI and AMEMSA boys and men of color.

Cultural Competency in a Post-Model Rule 8.4(g) World

Självmord är en av de vanligaste dödsorsakerna i Sverige. Personer som begått självmord lämnar efter sig närstående med en stor sorg. Syftet med studien var att undersöka huruvida närstående till personer som begått självmord får det stöd som de önskar. Studien är baserad på en kvantitativ metod genom ett webb-baserat frågeformulär med 66 deltagare. Urvalet utgår ifrån en kontakt med en ansvarig för anhörigorganisationen SPES (Riksförbundet för SuicidPrevention och Efterlevandes Stöd). Resultatet analyserades sedan med en kvantitativ deskriptiv statistik och kvalitativ innehållsanalys. Studiens resultat visade att 30% av deltagarna var det mer än sex år sedan självmordet skett. Nästan alla av deltagarna söktes upp eller blev erbjudna, på ett eller annat sätt, minst ett slags stöd. Majoriteten av deltagarna sökte i första hand stöd hos sin familj, släkt, vänner eller arbetskamrater. Av de närstående svarade 33% att de var nöjda med det stödet. Hälften av de närstående som fått något slags professionellt stöd upplevde att stödet var bra. Behov av att få stöd i vardagen påtalades av 29%. Studien visade sammanfattningsvis att många av deltagarna är missnöjda med det professionella stöd de erhållit. Deltagarna har ett stort behov av att uttrycka sina tankar och känslor trots att det gått lång tid sedan självmordet skett

Are Campus Sexual Assault Tribunals Fair?: The Need for Judicial Review and Additional Due Process Protections in Light of New Case Law

The pervasiveness of sexual assault on college and university campuses and the schools’ failures to take sexual assault seriously have resulted in recent reforms to college campus disciplinary proceedings. The federal government has largely prompted this wave of reform through Title IX, requiring schools to employ particular policies and procedures for investigating and adjudicating sexual assault as a condition of receiving federal funds. Although the federal government’s mandates may be properly motivated, these reforms are criticized because they encourage schools to enact procedures that are heavily stacked against those accused of sexual assault. Consequently, students alleging that they have been wrongfully held responsible for sexual assault violations due to flawed disciplinary procedures have brought lawsuits against their schools. Recent case law demonstrates that some schools, in an attempt to comply with Title IX, have employed procedures that are fundamentally unfair to accused students. This Note considers the interests involved in campus investigatory and adjudicatory systems through an analysis of recent cases and the procedural flaws that have emerged. It further evaluates procedural protections that would strike a better balance between the interests of the accusers, the accused, and the schools. In conclusion, this Note argues that in light of the recent case law, more meaningful judicial review and additional due process protections are necessary for accused students

The Return of the Rogue

The “rogue trader”—a famed figure of the 1990s—recently has returned to prominence due largely to two phenomena. First, recent U.S. mortgage market volatility spilled over into stock, commodity, and derivative markets worldwide, causing large financial institution losses and revealing previously hidden unauthorized positions. Second, the rogue trader has gained importance as banks around the world have focused more attention on operational risk in response to regulatory changes prompted by the Basel II Capital Accord. This Article contends that of the many regulatory options available to the Basel Committee for addressing operational risk it arguably chose the worst: an enforced selfregulatory regime unlikely to substantially alter financial institutions’ ability to successfully manage operational risk. That regime also poses the danger of high costs, a false sense of security, and perverse incentives. Particularly with respect to the low-frequency, high-impact events—including rogue trading—that may be the greatest threat to bank stability and soundness, attempts at enforced self-regulation are unlikely to significantly reduce operational risk, because those financial institutions with the highest operational risk are the least likely to credibly assess that risk and set aside adequate capital under a regime of enforced self-regulation

Twenty Years of Compromise: How the Caps on Damages in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Codified Sex Discrimination

This article takes a novel approach and reexamines the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 with a central focus on exploring the issue of capped damages. Part I begins by briefly contrasting and summarizing the diverging remedies available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. The article then shifts in Part II to an examination of the political climate and legislative history that forged the enactment of the 1991 Act, paying particular attention to the debate surrounding damages. This history reveals that many members of Congress had a discriminatory motive in capping damages for victims of sex discrimination under Title VII, and therefore, that these capped damages represent a codified version of injustice. Although prior scholarship documents the legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, it fails to adequately address the issue of capped damages. Thus, this legislative history is a substantial contribution to contemporary Title VII scholarship, as it provides necessary context for the current debate about whether to abolish the existing Title VII damage regime

Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model

This article demonstrates that, at least since the adoption of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991, the United States legal regime has been moving away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational liability. Under this system, organizational liability for agent misconduct is dependant on whether or not the organization has exercised due care to avoid the harm in question, rather than under traditional agency principles of respondeat superior. Courts and agencies typically evaluate the level of care exercised by the organization by inquiring whether the organization had in place internal compliance structures ostensibly designed to detect and discourage such conduct. I argue, however, that any internal compliance-based organizational liability regime is likely to fail because courts and agencies lack sufficient information about the effectiveness of such structures. As a result, an internal compliance-based liability system encourages the implementation of largely cosmetic internal compliance structures that reduce legal liability without reducing the incidence of organizational misconduct. Furthermore, a review of the empirical literature on the effectiveness of internal compliance structures suggests that many organizations have adopted precisely this cosmetic approach to internal compliance. This leads to two potential problems: first, an underdeterrence of organizational misconduct and, second, a proliferation of costly but ineffective internal compliance structures