A pied-piper situation : do bureaucratic researchers produce more science?

¿Puede un científico confiar en que el gobierno le va a pagar honestamente? En la relación entre la ciencia y el Estado, el gobernante sale ganando si no paga (o si no paga honradamente). Todo científico público, así, afronta el riesgo de que tras una carrera larga y difícil el gobernante cambie las reglas del juego. A pesar de que la solución a este problema de credibilidad es lo que da forma a las instituciones de la ciencia pública el problema ha sido rara vez estudiado teórica o empíricamente en los estudios de la ciencia. En este trabajo proponemos un modelo de esa relación entre gobiernos y científicos de acuerdo con la teoría de juegos que muestra la importancia del tipo de contrato que los vincula, el que sea más o menos burocrático en un sentido weberiano. Hasta cierto punto, los contratos burocráticos —como los de los funcionarios— protegen a los científicos contra el mal comportamiento de los gobernantes. Mediante esas reglas burocráticas, los contratos atan las manos del gobierno con lo que se hace creíble su compromiso a la vez que se protege el delicado sistema de recompensas de la ciencia. De esta manera se estimula la productividad tanto en calidad como en cantidad. Sin embargo, cuando se da el caso de gobiernos fiables los contratos burocráticos limitan los sistemas de incentivos y van en contra tanto de la receptividad de los científicos a las demandas de los gobiernos o de la sociedad como, al final, al interés de los gobiernos por el producto que ofrecen. En este trabajo utilizamos evidencia comparada entre países que confirma las proposiciones del modelo teórico y muestra cómo los contratos burocráticos estimulan la productividad científica en el caso de gobiernos poco confiables —como en el caso de las dictaduras— pero limitan esa productividad con gobiernos más fiables — como las democracias—

The Relationship Between Minority Business Enterprises and Corporate Purchasing Personnel: Perceptions from Both Sides of the Table

This paper addresses the nature of the difficulties MBEs face when conducting business with large companies through MBE purchasing programs. Data collected from MBEs and purchasing personnel were analyzed with logistic regression to demonstrate that MBEs and their corporate purchasing counterparts have different perceptions across human, environmental, and organizational dimensions of transaction cost economics. These differences help to explain the problems: (1) that MBEs have in selling to large companies and the problems that MBEs and purchasing personnel have in implementing MBE purchasing programs; (2) of reaching agreement in the marketplace; and, (3) of collectively pursuing the economic development of the minority business community. We offer recommendations for improving the relationship between these parties

We Don\u27t Work For Free : Tenured Faculty Engagement In Assessment Initiatives On A Unionized Community College Campus

This case study, which included faculty and administrator interviews as well as an exploration of institutional documents and faculty meeting spaces, examined what influences a tenured faculty member’s decision to engage with assessment initiatives at Midwest Community College and what senior leaders can do to successfully engage tenured faculty in these efforts. Principal-agent theory (PAT) offers an important and helpful framework for considering how senior leadership can successfully engage tenured faculty in student learning outcomes assessment on this specific unionized community college campus. The findings of this study suggest that senior leaders must leverage both incentives and monitoring to successfully engage tenured faculty in institutional efforts to assess student learning outcomes. In addition to incentives and monitoring, the faculty and senior leaders in this case study spoke to the need for acknowledging the value of assessment work, demonstrating respect for faculty’s engagement in institutional assessment processes, and giving inherent meaning to what faculty do. The findings of this study have direct implications for collective bargaining agreements, tenure processes, hiring practices, and senior leaders’ own behavior towards and relationships with tenured faculty. Specific recommendations for action are provided, as well as implications for further research

U.S.-Mexican migration cooperation: obstacles and opportunities

This chapter begins by briefly reviewing theoretical issues regarding opportunities for migration cooperation. Immigration is an inherently multidimensional issue and differs from trade and other aspects of the bilateral relationship because of Mexico's unique ability to influence policy outcomes. Thus, simple asymmetric bargaining models are of limited utility for examining joint migration policy-making, and it is necessary instead to consider specific migration preferences in each country as well as the context in which migration negotiations occur. The remainder of the chapter therefore reviews the history of U.S. and Mexican preferences over migration policy, changes in the broader bilateral relationship, and the evolution of bilateral conflict and cooperation on migration policy. A final section evaluates contemporary preferences and context to identify obstacles and opportunities for migration cooperation at this time.Emigration and immigration ; Mexico

Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action

In a complex economy, many business transactions take place sequentially-one party performs in part or in full before the other side executes its side of the bargain. Sequencing has many advantages, but it creates an unfortunate incentive. Having received its benefit from the bargain, the party who is to perform last may be tempted to renege on its obligations. Law and economics scholars often describe the conduct of a reneging party in these situations as opportunistic. The reneging party, perceiving an opportunity to increase its gain, yields to temptation and refuses to perform. The law of contract helps to diminish the danger of opportunism by providing assurance to those performing first that their contracting partners can be held accountable if they renege. Accountability reduces the risk of entering business transactions and facilitates an atmosphere of confidence conducive to exchange. Recently, scholars have explored the dangers of opportunism even after a contract is formed. If performance under the contract requires one side to invest in assets specially tailored to the transaction, the other side may be tempted to exploit this postcontractual situation by renegotiating the original terms to capture more of the bargaining surplus.\u27 The same postcontractual opportunistic incentives exist when one side becomes dependent on unique skills or knowledge acquired by the other side after performance has begun. This scholarly interest in postcontractual opportunism has not extended to the precontractual stage of business dealings. Law and economics scholars have assumed that parties in the precontractual stage are not likely to invest heavily in contract-specific assets and that the costs of finding suitable substitutes for performance are relatively low. More traditional doctrinal scholars likewise have failed to explore the concept of opportunism in their analyses of precontractual legal regulation. Both groups\u27 approaches reflect traditional doctrinal distinctions, which sharply differentiate between precontractual and postcontractual dealings. This Article challenges the assumptions of law and economics scholars regarding precontractual opportunism and seeks to fill a significant gap in the doctrinal analysis of commercial negotiation. First, the Article argues that the dangers of opportunism arise in the precontractual stages of business relations more frequently than law and economics literature has recognized. Opportunism often is more subtle in initial negotiations than in long-term contracts, and precontractual losses usually are more modest than those in the postcontractual cases. Nevertheless, a case survey reveals recurring fact patterns that point strongly toward the presence of opportunism in the initial negotiation of agreements. Second, as a normative matter, the Article posits that legal doctrines regulating the precontractual stage can be made more precise and effective by directly introducing the concept of opportunism into the law. Third, the Article argues that regulation of precontractual opportunism is appropriate because opportunistic behavior during bargaining undermines one of the fundamental psychological conditions for the successful coordination of complex commercial transactions--interpersonal trust. Social psychologists, sociologists, economists, philosophers, and legal scholars all have recognized that trust is central to the efficient coordination of human goals. Once trust is established, commercial parties are better able to take risks that are necessary to coordinate transactions. Without trust, parties must resort to costly mechanisms such as simultaneous exchanges, precontractual contracts, or deposits to reduce suspicion of one another\u27s motives to manageable levels. If these mechanisms are unavailable, parties may forego transactions altogether. Until now, scholarship regarding the relationship between law and trust has been lacking. Legal economists have discounted trust in their analyses of legal regulation. At the opposite extreme, more traditional scholars have treated trust as a self-evident necessity of commercial dealings without examining the social psychological mechanisms for creating and maintaining trust. This Article addresses the shortcomings of both law and economics theorists and traditional scholars. It does so by exploring theoretical and empirical research on trust from the fields of sociology and social psychology and linking that research to the judicialy imposed legal penalties for precontractual opportunism. Part II of this Article first discusses and defines commercial opportunism. Part II then describes the landscape of complex commercial negotiations. By exploring the wide variety of doctrines that courts have manipulated to compensate victims of precontractual opportunistic conduct, this section demonstrates that transaction-specific investments are common in complex negotiations. Part III explores why precontractual opportunism is socially and economically undesirable. Part III examines sociological and social psychological literature on the dynamics of interpersonal trust and asserts that precontractual transaction-specific investments are part of a vital trust-building process that undergirds many commercial relationships. Part IV looks at the role of law in supporting the construction of trusting commercial relationships. After analyzing nonlegal methods of deterring opportunistic conduct and reviewing the costs of legal intervention, Part IV concludes that legal rules proscribing opportunism in negotiation are justified as a means to reinforce and support the process of building trust. Part IV then extends this analysis by suggesting a new cause of action to improve deterrence of precontractual opportunistic conduct. Part V concludes with a summary and a suggestion for further research

The rhetoric of presidential summit diplomacy: Ronald Reagan and the U.S. Soviet summits, 1985-1988

President Ronald Reagan participated in more U.S.-Soviet summits than any previous U.S. president, as he met with his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, on four occasions between November 1985 and June 1988. Prior to, during, and following each meeting with Gorbachev, Reagan often engaged in the rhetoric of public diplomacy, including speeches, statements, and media interviews. The four Reagan- Gorbachev summits accompanied significant changes in U.S.-Soviet relations, in the Cold War, and also within the Soviet Union. Many scholars attribute improved U.S.- Soviet relations to a change in Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric and policies, arguing that he abandoned the confrontation of his first term for conciliation during his second term. Other scholars argue that Reagan failed to abandon confrontation and, consequently, missed opportunities to support the liberalization of the Soviet system. Based upon close analysis of Reagan’s summit rhetoric, this dissertation contends that he did not abandon his confrontational policy objectives, but he did modify his rhetoric about the Soviets. Reagan reformulated the conventional Cold War rhetoric of rapprochement that emphasized nuclear arms controls as the path to world peace by emphasizing increased U.S.-Soviet trust as prerequisite to new arms treaties. Reagan’s summit rhetoric emphasized the need for the Soviets to make changes in non-nuclear arms areas as a means of reducing international mistrust and increasing the likelihood of new U.S.- Soviet arms treaties. Reagan advocated that the Soviets participate in increased bilateral people-to-people exchanges, demonstrate respect for human rights, and disengage from various regional conflicts, especially Afghanistan. Reagan adopted a dualistic strategy that combined confrontation and conciliation as he sought to promote those changes in Soviet policies and practices. During his second term as president, Reagan made his confrontational rhetoric less strident and also used more conciliatory discourse. At the same time, he subsumed his anti-Soviet objectives within his conciliatory rhetoric. This rhetorical strategy allowed Reagan to continue to advocate anti-Soviet objectives while at the same time seeking to promote improved relations and world peace. The findings of this dissertation suggest that existing scholarly views of Reagan’s summit rhetoric and his role in promoting the liberalization of the Soviet system should be reconsidered