Routing in mobile Ad Hoc Networks

A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is built on the fly where a number of wireless mobile nodes work in cooperation without the engagement of any centralized access point or any fixed infrastructure. Two nodes in such a network can communicate in a bidirectional manner if and only if the distance between them is at most the minimum of their transmission ranges. When a node wants to communicate with a node outside its transmission range, a multihop routing strategy is used which involves some intermediate nodes. Because of the movements of nodes, there is a constant possibility of topology change in MANET. Considering this unique aspect of MANET, a number of routing protocols have been proposed so far. This chapter gives an overview of the past, current, and future research areas for routing in MANET. In this chapter we will learn about the following things: - The preliminaries of mobile ad hoc network - The challenges for routing in MANET - Expected properties of a MANET routing protocol - Categories of routing protocols for MANET - Major routing protocols for MANET - Criteria for performance comparison of the routing protocols for MANET - Achievements and future research directions - Expectations and realit

A Survey on Anonymous On-Demand Routing Protocols for MANETs

At present Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) is used in many real time applications and hence such networks are vulnerable to different kinds of security threats. MANET networks suffered more from security attacks due to use of free wireless communication frequency spectrum and dynamic topology. Therefore it becomes very tough to provide security to MANET under different adversarial environments like battlefields. For MANET, anonymous communications are vital under the adversarial environments, in which the identification of nodes as well as routes is replaced by pseudonyms or random numbers for the purpose of protection. There are many protocols presented for anonymous communication security for MANET, which hide node identities and routes from exterior observers in order to provide anonymity protection. This paper presents review of various anonymous on demand routing protocols

Compromising Anonymous Communication Systems Using Blind Source Separation

We propose a class of anonymity attacks to both wired and wireless anonymity networks. These attacks are based on the blind source separation algorithms widely used to recover individual signals from mixtures of signals in statistical signal processing. Since the philosophy behind the design of current anonymity networks is to mix traffic or to hide in crowds, the proposed anonymity attacks are very effective. The flow separation attack proposed for wired anonymity networks can separate the traffic in a mix network. Our experiments show that this attack is effective and scalable. By combining the flow separation method with frequency spectrum matching, a passive attacker can derive the traffic map of the mix network. We use a nontrivial network to show that the combined attack works. The proposed anonymity attacks for wireless networks can identify nodes in fully anonymized wireless networks using collections of very simple sensors. Based on a time series of counts of anonymous packets provided by the sensors, we estimate the number of nodes with the use of principal component analysis. We then proceed to separate the collected packet data into traffic flows that, with help of the spatial diversity in the available sensors, can be used to estimate the location of the wireless nodes. Our simulation experiments indicate that the estimators show high accuracy and high confidence for anonymized TCP traffic. Additional experiments indicate that the estimators perform very well in anonymous wireless networks that use traffic padding

Compromising Anonymous Communication Systems Using Blind Source Separation

We propose a class of anonymity attacks to both wired and wireless anonymity networks. These attacks are based on the blind source separation algorithms widely used to recover individual signals from mixtures of signals in statistical signal processing. Since the philosophy behind the design of current anonymity networks is to mix traffic or to hide in crowds, the proposed anonymity attacks are very effective. The flow separation attack proposed for wired anonymity networks can separate the traffic in a mix network. Our experiments show that this attack is effective and scalable. By combining the flow separation method with frequency spectrum matching, a passive attacker can derive the traffic map of the mix network. We use a nontrivial network to show that the combined attack works. The proposed anonymity attacks for wireless networks can identify nodes in fully anonymized wireless networks using collections of very simple sensors. Based on a time series of counts of anonymous packets provided by the sensors, we estimate the number of nodes with the use of principal component analysis. We then proceed to separate the collected packet data into traffic flows that, with help of the spatial diversity in the available sensors, can be used to estimate the location of the wireless nodes. Our simulation experiments indicate that the estimators show high accuracy and high confidence for anonymized TCP traffic. Additional experiments indicate that the estimators perform very well in anonymous wireless networks that use traffic padding

Reputed authenticated routing for ad hoc networks protocol (reputed-ARAN)

In this paper, we analyze one of the secure mobile ad hoc networks protocols, which is Authenticated routing for ad hoc networks (ARAN). Such protocol is classified as a secure reactive routing protocol, which is based on some type of query-reply dialog. That means ARAN does not attempt to continuously maintain the up-to-date topology of the network, but rather when there is a need, it invokes a function to find a route to the destination. Here, we detail how ARAN works, criticize how an authenticated misbehaving node can abuse the bandwidth and propose different solutions for this flaw in the protocol. 1