Independence of the telecommunications regulatory authority in Palestine: Institutional challenges

This paper identifies view points of the Palestinian telecommunications sector's stakeholders with regard to regulatory independence and analyzes reasons behind the rejection of the 2009 Telecommunications Law that establishes an independent telecommunications regulatory authority. It sheds a light on the everlasting debate about necessity and viability of an unbiased, autonomous, and accountable regulator under occupation and political instability. The paper looks at the historical developments of the concept in the US and Europe and discusses political and social factors that played part in establishing regulatory authorities and placing safeguards that strengthen their independence and prevent them from being captured by any stakeholder. Then, through interviewing main stakeholders, the paper presents key issues of regulatory independence in Palestine. It first discusses the 2009 Telecommunications law and compares proposed safeguards to international best practices. Then it presents stakeholders' opinions and position regarding these safeguards. Finally, the paper makes some policy recommendation to ensure that a regulatory authority would be truly independent. --Telecommunications,Regulatory Independence,Institutional Reform

How Independent are Independent Directors? The Case of Italy

In this article, we provide an interpretation for the voluntary independence requirements contained in the Italian Corporate Governance Code (Preda Code) checking them against a proxy for international best practice, the independence criteria provided in the EC Recommendation on non-executive and supervisory directors of 2005. We then check to what extent company disclosure for 2003 allows the verification of the independence of directors qualified as independent by the Italian 40 blue chips. We find that the Preda Code (currently under revision) should be updated in several respects in order to make it abreast with best practice in the European Union. We also find that for two key independence requirements (not to have business relationships with the company and not to have too many concurrent commitments outside of the company) the level of compliance is dramatically low (4% and 16% respectively). Overall, for only 5 out of the 284 directors declared as independent by the Italian blue chips is it possible to verify the respect of all the Italian independence standards (and for only 4 directors with respect to the EC standards). This raises the problem of who should monitor what listed companies declare.Independent directors, Corporate governance

HOW INDEPENDENT ARE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS? THE CASE OF ITALY

In this article, we provide an interpretation for the voluntary independence requirements contained in the Italian Corporate Governance Code (Preda Code) checking them against a proxy for international best practice, the independence criteria provided in the EC Recommendation on non-executive and supervisory directors of 2005. We then check to what extent company disclosure for 2003 allows the verification of the independence of directors qualified as independent by the Italian 40 blue chips. We find that the Preda Code (currently under revision) should be updated in several respects in order to make it abreast with best practice in the European Union. We also find that for two key independence requirements (not to have business relationships with the company and not to have too many concurrent commitments outside of the company) the level of compliance is dramatically low (4% and 16% respectively). Overall, for only 5 out of the 284 directors declared as independent by the Italian blue chips is it possible to verify the respect of all the Italian independence standards (and for only 4 directors with respect to the EC standards). This raises the problem of who should monitor what listed companies declare.Independent directors, Corporate governance,

The Cyprus Issue in Australian Politics: PASEKA & SEKA (SA) Perspectives

While the ALP supported the decolonisation and independence of Cyprus in the 1950s, the Menzies Liberal-Country Party coalition government, with the escalation of the Cold War, condemned Cypriot freedom fighters of the late 1950s as terrorists. However, Menzies' commitment to mutual Anglo-Australian loyalty and Commonwealth cohesion led him, on Britain's recommendation, to accept Cyprus as a fellow Commonwealth member once it gained its independence in 1960, as this suited Britain's vested interests

Evolutie van de onafhankelijkheidsregels van de commissaris

The European Commission has approved on 16 May 2002 its recommendation on statutory auditor’s independence in the EU. The Commission has adopted a conceptual approach, by identifying threats on independence and by stating safeguards. The Fédération des Experts-comptables Européens had already adopted this approach in 1998. The International Federation of Accountants has updated the section on independence of its Code of Ethics in 2001. The US Securities and Exchange Commission has adopted in the beginning of 2003 new independence rules of the external auditors, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In this context, this study focuses on the implementation mechanism, at national level, of the European principles on independence, through the example of the Belgian law on corporate governance of 2 August 2002 and of the decrees of 4 April 2003.

Judicial impartiality and independence in the documents of the Council of Europe

The principle of equality as a fundamental norm in law and political philosophy, Jurysprudencja 8., Wojciechowski B., Bekrycht T., Cern K.M., (eds.), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2017;The project was financed by National Science Centre Poland (decision no. DEC-2012/05/B/HS5/01111)