864 research outputs found
Testing Top Monotonicity
Top monotonicity is a relaxation of various well-known domain restrictions
such as single-peaked and single-crossing for which negative impossibility
results are circumvented and for which the median-voter theorem still holds. We
examine the problem of testing top monotonicity and present a characterization
of top monotonicity with respect to non-betweenness constraints. We then extend
the definition of top monotonicity to partial orders and show that testing top
monotonicity of partial orders is NP-complete
Recovering Single-Crossing Preferences From Approval Ballots
An electorate with fully-ranked innate preferences casts approval votes over
a finite set of alternatives. As a result, only partial information about the
true preferences is revealed to the voting authorities. In an effort to
understand the nature of the true preferences given only partial information,
one might ask whether the unknown innate preferences could possibly be
single-crossing. The existence of a polynomial time algorithm to determine this
has been asked as an outstanding problem in the works of Elkind and Lackner. We
hereby give a polynomial time algorithm determining a single-crossing
collection of fully-ranked preferences that could have induced the elicited
approval ballots, or reporting the nonexistence thereof. Moreover, we consider
the problem of identifying negative instances with a set of forbidden
sub-ballots, showing that any such characterization requires infinitely many
forbidden configurations.Comment: To appear in WINE'23; add acknowledgements, change formatting, minor
correction
Single-Peaked Consistency for Weak Orders Is Easy
In economics and social choice single-peakedness is one of the most important
and commonly studied models for preferences. It is well known that
single-peaked consistency for total orders is in P. However in practice a
preference profile is not always comprised of total orders. Often voters have
indifference between some of the candidates. In a weak preference order
indifference must be transitive. We show that single-peaked consistency for
weak orders is in P for three different variants of single-peakedness for weak
orders. Specifically, we consider Black's original definition of
single-peakedness for weak orders, Black's definition of single-plateaued
preferences, and the existential model recently introduced by Lackner. We
accomplish our results by transforming each of these single-peaked consistency
problems to the problem of determining if a 0-1 matrix has the consecutive ones
property.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729
Confronting the Robinson Crusoe paradigm with household-size heterogeneity
Modern macroeconomics empirically addresses economy-wide incentives behind economic actions by using insights from the way a single representative household would behave. This analytical approach requires that incentives of the poor and the rich are strictly aligned. In empirical analysis a challenging complication is that consumer and income data are typically available at the household level, and individuals living in multimember households have the potential to share goods within the household. The analytical approach of modern macroeconomics would require that intra-household sharing is also strictly aligned across the rich and the poor. Here we have designed a survey method that allows the testing of this stringent property of intra-household sharing and find that it holds: once expenditures for basic needs are subtracted from disposable household income, household-size economies implied by the remainder household incomes are the same for the rich and the poor
Computational aspects of voting: a literature survey
Preference aggregation is a topic of study in different fields such as philosophy, mathematics, economics and political science. Recently, computational aspects of preference aggregation have gained especial attention and “computational politics” has emerged as a marked line of research in computer science with a clear concentration on voting protocols. The field of voting systems, rooted in social choice theory, has expanded notably in both depth and breadth in the last few decades. A significant amount of this growth comes from studies concerning the computational aspects of voting systems. This thesis comprehensively reviews the work on voting systems (from a computing perspective) by listing, classifying and comparing the results obtained by different researchers in the field. This survey covers a wide range of new and historical results yet provides a profound commentary on related work as individual studies and in relation to other related work and to the field in general. The deliverables serve as an overview where students and novice researchers in the field can start and also as a depository that can be referred to when searching for specific results. A comprehensive literature survey of the computational aspects of voting is a task that has not been undertaken yet and is initially realized here. Part of this research was dedicated to creating a web-depository that contains material and references related to the topic based on the survey. The purpose was to create a dynamic version of the survey that can be updated with latest findings and as an online practical reference
Confronting the Robinson Crusoe paradigm with household-size heterogeneity
Modern macroeconomics empirically addresses economy-wide incentives behind economic actions by using insights from the way a single representative household would behave. This analytical approach requires that incentives of the poor and the rich are strictly aligned. In empirical analysis a challenging complication is that consumer and income data are typically available at the household level, and individuals living in multimember households have the potential to share goods within the household. The analytical approach of modern macroeconomics would require that intra-household sharing is also strictly aligned across the rich and the poor. Here we have designed a survey method that allows the testing of this stringent property of intra-household sharing and find that it holds: once expenditures for basic needs are subtracted from disposable household income, household-size economies implied by the remainder household incomes are the same for the rich and the poor.Linear Aggregation, Representative Consumer, Equivalence Scales, Survey Method, Household-Size Economies
Confronting the Robinson Crusoe paradigm with household-size heterogeneity
Authors' draft published as working paper by Center for Financial Studies, University of FrankfurtModern macroeconomics empirically addresses economy-wide incentives behind economic actions by using insights from the way a single representative household would behave. This analytical approach requires that incentives of the poor and the rich are strictly aligned. In empirical analysis a challenging complication is that consumer and income data are typically available at the household level, and individuals living in multimember households have the potential to share goods within the household. The analytical approach of modern macroeconomics would require that intra-household sharing is also strictly aligned across the rich and the poor. Here we have designed a survey method that allows the testing of this stringent property of intra-household sharing and find that it holds: once expenditures for basic needs are subtracted from disposable household income, household-size economies implied by the remainder household incomes are the same for the rich and the poor
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