Reciprocity-driven Sparse Network Formation

A resource exchange network is considered, where exchanges among nodes are based on reciprocity. Peers receive from the network an amount of resources commensurate with their contribution. We assume the network is fully connected, and impose sparsity constraints on peer interactions. Finding the sparsest exchanges that achieve a desired level of reciprocity is in general NP-hard. To capture near-optimal allocations, we introduce variants of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program with sparsity penalties. We derive decentralized algorithms, whereby peers approximately compute the sparsest allocations, by reweighted l1 minimization. The algorithms implement new proportional-response dynamics, with nonlinear pricing. The trade-off between sparsity and reciprocity and the properties of graphs induced by sparse exchanges are examined.Comment: 19 page

Rethinking network reciprocity over social ties: local interactions make direct reciprocity possible and pave the rational way to cooperation

Since Nowak & May's (1992) influential paper, network reciprocity--the fact that individuals' interactions repeated within a local neighborhood support the evolution of cooperation--has been confirmed in several theoretical models. Essentially, local interactions allow cooperators to stay protected from exploiters by assorting into clusters, and the heterogeneity of the network of contacts--the co-presence of low- and high-connected nodes--has been shown to further favor cooperation. The few available large-scale experiments on humans have however missed these effects. The reason is that, while models assume that individuals update strategy by imitating better performing neighbors, experiments showed that humans are more prone to reciprocate cooperation than to compare payoffs. Inspired by the empirical results, we rethink network reciprocity as a rational form of direct reciprocity on networks--networked rational reciprocity--indeed made possible by the locality of interactions. We show that reciprocal altruism in a networked prisoner's dilemma can invade and fixate in any network of rational agents, profit-maximizing over an horizon of future interactions. We find that networked rational reciprocity works better at low average connectivity and we unveil the role of network heterogeneity. Only if cooperating hubs invest in the initial cost of exploitation, the invasion of cooperation is boosted; it is otherwise hindered. Although humans might not be as rational as here assumed, our results could help the design and interpretation of new experiments in social and economic network

Measuring social dynamics in a massive multiplayer online game

Quantification of human group-behavior has so far defied an empirical, falsifiable approach. This is due to tremendous difficulties in data acquisition of social systems. Massive multiplayer online games (MMOG) provide a fascinating new way of observing hundreds of thousands of simultaneously socially interacting individuals engaged in virtual economic activities. We have compiled a data set consisting of practically all actions of all players over a period of three years from a MMOG played by 300,000 people. This large-scale data set of a socio-economic unit contains all social and economic data from a single and coherent source. Players have to generate a virtual income through economic activities to `survive' and are typically engaged in a multitude of social activities offered within the game. Our analysis of high-frequency log files focuses on three types of social networks, and tests a series of social-dynamics hypotheses. In particular we study the structure and dynamics of friend-, enemy- and communication networks. We find striking differences in topological structure between positive (friend) and negative (enemy) tie networks. All networks confirm the recently observed phenomenon of network densification. We propose two approximate social laws in communication networks, the first expressing betweenness centrality as the inverse square of the overlap, the second relating communication strength to the cube of the overlap. These empirical laws provide strong quantitative evidence for the Weak ties hypothesis of Granovetter. Further, the analysis of triad significance profiles validates well-established assertions from social balance theory. We find overrepresentation (underrepresentation) of complete (incomplete) triads in networks of positive ties, and vice versa for networks of negative ties...Comment: 23 pages 19 figure

Neurogenesis Drives Stimulus Decorrelation in a Model of the Olfactory Bulb

The reshaping and decorrelation of similar activity patterns by neuronal networks can enhance their discriminability, storage, and retrieval. How can such networks learn to decorrelate new complex patterns, as they arise in the olfactory system? Using a computational network model for the dominant neural populations of the olfactory bulb we show that fundamental aspects of the adult neurogenesis observed in the olfactory bulb -- the persistent addition of new inhibitory granule cells to the network, their activity-dependent survival, and the reciprocal character of their synapses with the principal mitral cells -- are sufficient to restructure the network and to alter its encoding of odor stimuli adaptively so as to reduce the correlations between the bulbar representations of similar stimuli. The decorrelation is quite robust with respect to various types of perturbations of the reciprocity. The model parsimoniously captures the experimentally observed role of neurogenesis in perceptual learning and the enhanced response of young granule cells to novel stimuli. Moreover, it makes specific predictions for the type of odor enrichment that should be effective in enhancing the ability of animals to discriminate similar odor mixtures

The Organization and Control of an Evolving Interdependent Population

Starting with Darwin, biologists have asked how populations evolve from a low fitness state that is evolutionarily stable to a high fitness state that is not. Specifically of interest is the emergence of cooperation and multicellularity where the fitness of individuals often appears in conflict with that of the population. Theories of social evolution and evolutionary game theory have produced a number of fruitful results employing two-state two-body frameworks. In this study we depart from this tradition and instead consider a multi-player, multi-state evolutionary game, in which the fitness of an agent is determined by its relationship to an arbitrary number of other agents. We show that populations organize themselves in one of four distinct phases of interdependence depending on one parameter, selection strength. Some of these phases involve the formation of specialized large-scale structures. We then describe how the evolution of independence can be manipulated through various external perturbations.Comment: To download simulation code cf. article in Proceedings of the Royal Society, Interfac

Interactions between financial and environmental networks in OECD countries

We analyse a multiplex of networks between OECD countries during the decade 2002-2010, which consists of five financial layers, given by foreign direct investment, equity securities, short-term, long-term and total debt securities, and five environmental layers, given by emissions of N O x, P M 10 SO 2, CO 2 equivalent and the water footprint associated with international trade. We present a new measure of cross-layer correlations between flows in different layers based on reciprocity. For the assessment of results, we implement a null model for this measure based on the exponential random graph theory. We find that short-term financial flows are more correlated with environmental flows than long-term investments. Moreover, the correlations between reverse financial and environmental flows (i.e. flows of different layers going in opposite directions) are generally stronger than correlations between synergic flows (flows going in the same direction). This suggests a trade-off between financial and environmental layers, where, more financialised countries display higher correlations between outgoing financial flows and incoming environmental flows from lower financialised countries, which could have important policy implications. Five countries are identified as hubs in this finance-environment multiplex: The United States, France, Germany, Belgium-Luxembourg and the United Kingdom.Comment: Supplementary Information provide

Adaptive long-range migration promotes cooperation under tempting conditions

Migration is a fundamental trait in humans and animals. Recent studies investigated the effect of migration on the evolution of cooperation, showing that contingent migration favors cooperation in spatial structures. In those studies, only local migration to immediate neighbors was considered, while long-range migration has not been considered yet, partly because the long-range migration has been generally regarded as harmful for cooperation as it would bring the population to a well-mixed state that favors defection. Here, we studied the effects of adaptive long-range migration on the evolution of cooperation through agent-based simulations of a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma game where individuals can jump to a farther site if they are surrounded by more defectors. Our results show that adaptive long-range migration strongly promotes cooperation, especially under conditions where the temptation to defect is considerably high. These findings demonstrate the significance of adaptive long-range migration for the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 pages, 9 figure