6,547 research outputs found
Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures
This document collects the lecture notes from my mini-course "Complexity
Theory, Game Theory, and Economics," taught at the Bellairs Research Institute
of McGill University, Holetown, Barbados, February 19--23, 2017, as the 29th
McGill Invitational Workshop on Computational Complexity.
The goal of this mini-course is twofold: (i) to explain how complexity theory
has helped illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory; and (ii)
to illustrate how game-theoretic questions have led to new and interesting
complexity theory, including recent several breakthroughs. It consists of two
five-lecture sequences: the Solar Lectures, focusing on the communication and
computational complexity of computing equilibria; and the Lunar Lectures,
focusing on applications of complexity theory in game theory and economics. No
background in game theory is assumed.Comment: Revised v2 from December 2019 corrects some errors in and adds some
recent citations to v1 Revised v3 corrects a few typos in v
Non-Cooperative Scheduling of Multiple Bag-of-Task Applications
Multiple applications that execute concurrently on heterogeneous platforms
compete for CPU and network resources. In this paper we analyze the behavior of
non-cooperative schedulers using the optimal strategy that maximize their
efficiency while fairness is ensured at a system level ignoring applications
characteristics. We limit our study to simple single-level master-worker
platforms and to the case where each scheduler is in charge of a single
application consisting of a large number of independent tasks. The tasks of a
given application all have the same computation and communication requirements,
but these requirements can vary from one application to another. In this
context, we assume that each scheduler aims at maximizing its throughput. We
give closed-form formula of the equilibrium reached by such a system and study
its performance. We characterize the situations where this Nash equilibrium is
optimal (in the Pareto sense) and show that even though no catastrophic
situation (Braess-like paradox) can occur, such an equilibrium can be
arbitrarily bad for any classical performance measure
Stochastic Stability in the Best Shot Game
The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It has generally a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. In this paper we show that, depending on how we define perturbations, i.e. the possible mistakes that agents can make, we can obtain very different sets of stochastically stable equilibria. In particular and non-trivially, if we assume that the only possible source of error is that of an agent contributing that stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable equilibria are those in which the maximal number of players contributes.Networks, Best Shot Game, Stochastic Stability
Behavioural Economics: Classical and Modern
In this paper, the origins and development of behavioural economics, beginning with the pioneering works of Herbert Simon (1953) and Ward Edwards (1954), is traced, described and (critically) discussed, in some detail. Two kinds of behavioural economics â classical and modern â are attributed, respectively, to the two pioneers. The mathematical foundations of classical behavioural economics is identified, largely, to be in the theory of computation and computational complexity; the corresponding mathematical basis for modern behavioural economics is, on the other hand, claimed to be a notion of subjective probability (at least at its origins in the works of Ward Edwards). The economic theories of behavior, challenging various aspects of 'orthodox' theory, were decisively influenced by these two mathematical underpinnings of the two theoriesClassical Behavioural Economics, Modern Behavioural Economics, Subjective Probability, Model of Computation, Computational Complexity. Subjective Expected Utility
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