Learning and Governance in Inter-Firm Relations

This paper connects theory of learning with theory of governance, in the context of inter-firm relations. It recognizes fundamental criticism of transaction cost economics (TCE), but preserves elements from that theory. The theory of governance used incorporates learning and trust. The paper identifies two kinds of relational risk: hold-up and spillover. For the governance of relations, i.e. the control of relational risk, it develops a box of instruments which includes trust, next to instruments derived and adapted from TCE. These instruments are geared to problems that are specific to learning in interaction between firms. They also include additional roles for go-betweens.transaction cost economics;trust;inter-organizational learning

Cost, quality and learning based governance of transactions : Western, Japanese and a third way

The paper considers a (static) portfolio system that satisfies adding-up contraints and the gross substitution theorem. The paper shows the relationship of the two conditions to the weak dominant diagonal property of the matrix of interest rate elasticities. This enables to investigate the impact of simultaneous changes in interest rates on the asset demands.

Capabilities, Confusion, and the Costs of Coordination On Some Problems in Recent Research On Inter-Firm Relations

The arguably dominant approaches to the study of interfirm relations are the capabilities and organizational economics perspectives. This paper discusses their merits and weaknesses, concentrating on the capabilities perspective, which is argued to rest on rather weak foundations, particularly as a theory of economic organization (including interfirm relations). However, it is suggested that both perspectives may be seen as part of an overarching bargaining approach to economic organization (yet to be developed). Both perspectives have identified impediments to efficient bargaining.Interfirm relations, capabilities, organizational economics, research methodology

Parallel Opportunistic Routing in Wireless Networks

We study benefits of opportunistic routing in a large wireless ad hoc network by examining how the power, delay, and total throughput scale as the number of source- destination pairs increases up to the operating maximum. Our opportunistic routing is novel in a sense that it is massively parallel, i.e., it is performed by many nodes simultaneously to maximize the opportunistic gain while controlling the inter-user interference. The scaling behavior of conventional multi-hop transmission that does not employ opportunistic routing is also examined for comparison. Our results indicate that our opportunistic routing can exhibit a net improvement in overall power--delay trade-off over the conventional routing by providing up to a logarithmic boost in the scaling law. Such a gain is possible since the receivers can tolerate more interference due to the increased received signal power provided by the multi-user diversity gain, which means that having more simultaneous transmissions is possible.Comment: 18 pages, 7 figures, Under Review for Possible Publication in IEEE Transactions on Information Theor

Learning and Governance in Inter-Firm Relations

This article connects theory of learning with theory of governance, in the context of inter-firm relations.It recognizes fundamental criticism of transaction cost economics (TCE), but preserves elements from that theory.Two kinds of relational risk are identified: hold-up and spillover risk.For the governance of relations, i.e. the control of relational risk, the article presents a set of instruments that includes trust, next to instruments adopted and adapted from TCE.It also includes roles for gobetweens.Some references to empirical evidence are included.Inter-firm alliances;learning;transaction costs;governance

Accessible Capacity of Secondary Users

A new problem formulation is presented for the Gaussian interference channels (GIFC) with two pairs of users, which are distinguished as primary users and secondary users, respectively. The primary users employ a pair of encoder and decoder that were originally designed to satisfy a given error performance requirement under the assumption that no interference exists from other users. In the scenario when the secondary users attempt to access the same medium, we are interested in the maximum transmission rate (defined as {\em accessible capacity}) at which secondary users can communicate reliably without affecting the error performance requirement by the primary users under the constraint that the primary encoder (not the decoder) is kept unchanged. By modeling the primary encoder as a generalized trellis code (GTC), we are then able to treat the secondary link and the cross link from the secondary transmitter to the primary receiver as finite state channels (FSCs). Based on this, upper and lower bounds on the accessible capacity are derived. The impact of the error performance requirement by the primary users on the accessible capacity is analyzed by using the concept of interference margin. In the case of non-trivial interference margin, the secondary message is split into common and private parts and then encoded by superposition coding, which delivers a lower bound on the accessible capacity. For some special cases, these bounds can be computed numerically by using the BCJR algorithm. Numerical results are also provided to gain insight into the impacts of the GTC and the error performance requirement on the accessible capacity.Comment: 42 pages, 12 figures, 2 tables; Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Information Theory on December, 2010, Revised on November, 201

Unfolding the impacts of transaction-specific investments: Moderation by out-of-thechannel-loop perceptions and achievement orientations

When distribution channel partners make specific investments, tailored to a particular supplier, it could prompt either opportunism or beneficial (e.g., extra-role) behaviors. The impact of the investment in turn may depend on whether the channel partner perceives that it is being left out of the channel loop by the supplier, as well as that partner’s achievement orientation. This study considers a sample of 155 IT professional service firms and finds that their knowledge-intensive, transaction-specific investments (TSIs) encourage distinct behavioral intentions. If they perceive that the supplier is leaving them out of the channel loop, the effects of the TSIs get amplified in relation to opportunistic and extra-role behavioral intentions. Furthermore, the firms’ achievement orientation moderates these influences. Suppliers thus should attend closely to achievement-oriented partners to ensure they do not perceive that they have been left out of the channel loop

Opportunistic Interference Mitigation Achieves Optimal Degrees-of-Freedom in Wireless Multi-cell Uplink Networks

We introduce an opportunistic interference mitigation (OIM) protocol, where a user scheduling strategy is utilized in $K$-cell uplink networks with time-invariant channel coefficients and base stations (BSs) having $M$ antennas. Each BS opportunistically selects a set of users who generate the minimum interference to the other BSs. Two OIM protocols are shown according to the number $S$ of simultaneously transmitting users per cell: opportunistic interference nulling (OIN) and opportunistic interference alignment (OIA). Then, their performance is analyzed in terms of degrees-of-freedom (DoFs). As our main result, it is shown that $KM$ DoFs are achievable under the OIN protocol with $M$ selected users per cell, if the total number $N$ of users in a cell scales at least as $\text{SNR}^{(K-1)M}$. Similarly, it turns out that the OIA scheme with $S$($<M$) selected users achieves $KS$ DoFs, if $N$ scales faster than $\text{SNR}^{(K-1)S}$. These results indicate that there exists a trade-off between the achievable DoFs and the minimum required $N$. By deriving the corresponding upper bound on the DoFs, it is shown that the OIN scheme is DoF optimal. Finally, numerical evaluation, a two-step scheduling method, and the extension to multi-carrier scenarios are shown.Comment: 18 pages, 3 figures, Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Communication

Learning and Governance in Inter-Firm Relations

This paper connects theory of learning with theory of governance, in the context of inter-firm relations. It recognizes fundamental criticism of transaction cost economics (TCE), but preserves elements from that theory. The theory of governance used incorporates learning and trust. The paper identifies two kinds of relational risk: hold-up and spillover. For the governance of relations, i.e. the control of relational risk, it develops a box of instruments which includes trust, next to instruments derived and adapted from TCE. These instruments are geared to problems that are specific to learning in interaction between firms. They also include additional roles for go-betweens