“It is only extra information…”: Social representation and value preferences of gay men in Hungary

Nowadays the grounds for existence of homosexual identities can be questioned: in an increasing number of societies we can witness that homosexuality loses its identity constructing capacity. In these places homosexuality is not a focal point of social attention any longer, and while same-sex attraction can remain an important factor in organising one’s individual life, it will not hinder the social integration of individuals. Thus if homosexuality still has a strong identity constructing capacity in a society, it can suggest that the given society is dominated by exclusive monolithic homosexual and heterosexual identity patterns which can threaten the successful social integration of people. The presupposition of my research is that the salience of homosexual identities—attributed by outgroups, and internalised by ingroup members— is a social symptom. The (potentially unifying) concept and the practical realisation of homosexual identity can be seen as the product of social stigmatisation and discrimination: the greater the proportion of signs of rejecting individual difference, the more widespread personal and group identities are organised by and around these differences. This type of stigmatisation can be interpreted in general as a social symptom reflecting the rejection of the right to be different. This paper presents findings of empirical research conducted between 1998 and 2000 in Hungary on the social representation and the value preferences of Hungarian men identifying themselves as gays.1 In the first part of the paper I will present quantitative research findings on the specific value preferences of Hungarian gay men that could be interpreted as indicators of the existence of homosexual identities. In the second part I will present qualitative findings focusing on the connection between social representation of homosexuality and the development of threatened identities

Is identity per se irrelevant? A contrarian view of self-verification effects

Self-verification theory (SVT) posits that people who hold negative self-views, such as depressive patients, ironically strive to verify that these self-views are correct, by actively seeking out critical feedback or interaction partners who evaluate them unfavorably. Such verification strivings are allegedly directed towards maximizing subjective perceptions of prediction and control. Nonetheless, verification strivings are also alleged to stabilize maladaptive self-perceptions, and thereby hindering therapeutic recovery. Despite the widespread acceptance of SVT, I contend that the evidence for it is weak and circumstantial. In particular, I contend that that most or all major findings cited in support of SVT can be more economically explained in terms of raison oblige theory (ROT). ROT posits that people with negative self-views solicit critical feedback, not because they want it, but because they their self-view inclines them regard it as probative, a necessary condition for considering it worth obtaining. Relevant findings are reviewed and reinterpreted with an emphasis on depression, and some new empirical data reported

Geiger and Wollheim on Expressive Properties and Expressive Perception

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct Geiger’s realist and Wollheim’s projectionist accounts on expressive properties and expressive perception by considering them within the larger contexts from which they emerged, by using as far as possible a common language and by focusing on the questions of the nature of expressive properties and of how we grasp them. My aim is to show that it is possible to put into dialogue phenomenological and Anglo-American aesthetics and that this dialogue might lead to new insights about how we engage with art

"And Why Not?" Hegel, Comedy, and the End of Art

Towards the very end of his wide-ranging lectures on the philosophy of art, Hegel unexpectedly expresses a preference for comedy over tragedy. More surprisingly, given his systematic claims for his aesthetic theory, he suggests that this preference is arbitrary. This essay suggests that this arbitrariness is itself systematic, given Hegel’s broader claims about unity and necessity in art generally and his analysis of ancient as opposed to modern drama in particular. With the emergence of modern subjectivity, tragic plots lose their necessity and so their redemptive conclusions; comic plots disintegrate into mockery and entertainment. In many cases, the dramas in question consequently fail to be art. This does not, however, mean that art ends: insofar as it inspires humans to a better understanding of their unity with the divine, it will continue to meet its mandate. But the lack of necessity in modern drama means we are free to prefer happy endings. Hegel’s seemingly arbitrary preference is, in the end, systematically justified